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Preface
If  it is true that critics are closet autobiographers, that whatever they write 
about someone else’s work inevitably bears the impression of their own lives and 
selves, then readers should be forewarned; you are undertaking an exploration 
into my own life.
I first became aware of Walker Percy some time during my years at St. 
Joseph Seminary College, a small liberal arts college in Covington, Louisiana. 
This is the same school where Percy taught one year and where he delivered the 
commencement address in 1983. He was an acquaintance of the rector-president 
of the college—a "priest-sociologist"—and I saw them from time to time walking 
around the campus. I was not an avid reader during those years, so when I 
learned that Percy wrote novels, I did not rush out to get one of his books. I did 
have the occasion, however, to buy Love in the Ruins tor a friend of mine during 
the summer of 1979. I bought the book from The Kumquat, the bookstore in 
Covington owned by Percy’s daughter, Anne Moores. Mrs. Percy happened to be 
working in the store when I went in. After I paid for the book, she said, "Walker 
is working upstairs. He’ll be down in a few minutes if you’d like to talk to him." 
Being somewhat like Will Barrett of The Last Gentleman, an affable, albeit
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"addled young man," I declined. What was I going to say to this man? Why 
should I want to talk to him? So I took the book, wrote a note to my friend, a 
large part of which I copied from the dust cover—something about the 
"apocalyptic" nature of the work—and delivered it. Later on, I bought a 
paperback copy of the book for myself, read it, and became even more addled. I 
enjoyed the story, what I could make of it, enjoyed the descriptions of the "Love 
Clinic" and Tom More’s lapsometer, but I had no idea of what Percy was up to. 
All the same, I sensed that he was "onto something," a favorite phrase of his. So I 
read it again. Soon, I was hooked. I had to read his other works.
I gradually realized that this man was writing about me! It was not an 
altogether pleasant realization, for, if you know Percy’s characters, you know that 
they are a rather wounded lot. How could he know me so well? How could he 
show me my own wounds?
Thirteen years and one graduate degree later, I seek an answer to those 
questions in this study. I return, then, to the place I began. I think it is accurate 
for me to say that it was through reading Walker Percy that I ever came to do 
graduate work in English. I would like this study, the culmination of that work, 
which is also a beginning, to be seen as a tribute to him whose work has opened 
new possibilities for me. I can only hope that it is a fitting tribute.
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Abstract
While many critics have explored some connections between Walker Percy’s work 
and the philosophies of Soren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, none has 
examined that link in terms of autobiography and autobiographical theory. This 
study looks at both Percy’s fiction and nonfiction in light of the category of 
repetition and its relation to autobiography. Following largely the work of 
William Spanos, the first chapter establishes a reading of autobiography as 
repetition—understood as inter esse, "being between" and concerned in time. It 
then discloses a link between such a view of autobiography and Percy’s diagnostic 
use of the novel. The remainder of the study examines Percy’s works in light o f 
repetition and the three component parts of the word "autobiography"—autos, 
bios, and graphein. Chapter Two investigates Percy’s semiotics of the self, 
especially with regard to the self s "unformulability" and "dislocation" as those 
themes are displayed in Lost in the Cosmos, The Moviegoer, and The Last 
Gentleman. Chapter Three explores Percy’s criticism of a gnostic culture as it is 
framed in "The Loss of the Creature" and "The Message in the Bottle," and it 
explores references to the Nazi Holocaust (taken as the most extreme expression of 
gnosticism in this century) throughout his novels, but especially in The Thanatos 
Syndrome. Chapter Four examines the reflexive nature of Percy’s writing—the
ix
interpenetration of repetition as a theme and repetition as narrative technique— 
with reference to the "blue-dollar hawk" story as it is told in "Metaphor as 
Mistake" and The Second Coming. Chapter Five recapitulates much of the 
dissertation but with regard to Percy the man. In a large part of his life and work, 
Percy seems to have absorbed and been absorbed with the category of repetition.
x
Introduction
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time.
—T. S. Eliot 
"Little Gidding"
The search is what anyone would undertake
if he were not sunk in the everydayness of his own life.
—Binx Bolling 
The Mo viegoer
During an interview in 1981, J. Gerald Kennedy asked Walker Percy,
"When your biography is written, are we going to see your novels in those terms?"
Percy replied candidly:
"Oh, I guess some of it, but not in the current sense of a 
roman a clef. Not because I think there is anything wrong 
with it, but I mean the American vogue of writing a roman a 
clef to me is a big bore. It’s no fun. The fun comes in 
transforming experience, taking something that’s happened 
to you, something you might imagine that happened—or I ’m 
talking to you and I could imagine something that might 
have happened to you—and putting the pieces all together; 
that’s where the fun is."1
At first glance, Percy’s comment does not seem altogether significant. For what he
admits must undoubtedly transpire in almost every writer. Writers transform
experience—lived or imagined—into art. But what does it mean to transform
1
2experience? Transform comes from the Latin prefix trans, "across, implying 
change," and formare, "to form." Experience has its roots in experientia, which 
means "a trial or a test." To transform experience, then, would be "to change 
across the form of a trial," or better, "to change the form of a trial."2
Although Percy uses "experience" in this interview to signify the more or 
less "ordinary" understanding of the word, that is, "an actual living through an 
event or events," his comment gains significance when placed in the context of the 
existentialist philosophy which he found so illuminating.3 For, as he states time 
and again in both his essays and his novels, experience, the actual living through 
events, has returned to its original sense and has itself become a trial: "How does 
one live through an ordinary Wednesday afternoon?" This ostensibly innocent 
question provides much of the impetus for Percy’s writing.
Following his existentialist progenitors, Percy wonders whether one 
actually "lives" through events anymore. It seems, on the contrary, that a 
pervasive sense of death prevails. The "gas of malaise," "ravening particles," and 
"death-in-life" becloud and bombard attempts at ordinary living and pit his 
characters against the seductions of death. As Binx Bolling reflects in The 
Moviegoer, "for some time now the impression has been growing on me that 
everyone is dead" (86). And the older Will Barrett asks in The Second Coming, 
"Am I killed and until this moment did not know it" (135)? Or again, "Is it
possible for people to miss their lives in the same way one misses a plane" (113)? 
And Percy’s last novel even has death in its title: The Thanatos Syndrome. He 
speaks for himself (and more directly) in his essay "Notes for a Novel about the 
End of the World": "The hero of the postmodern novel is a man who has 
forgotten his bad memories and conquered his present ills and who finds himself in 
the victorious secular city. His only problem now is to keep from blowing his 
brains out" {MB 112).4
While Percy’s heroes have not necessarily forgotten their bad 
memories—Binx ponders his father’s death, Will Barrett confronts his father’s 
suicide both in The Last Gentleman and more powerfully in The Second Coming, 
Tom More remembers his daughter’s ugly death, and Lancelots built on the 
recovering memory of Lancelot Lamar—they nevertheless struggle constantly with 
the task of "living" through ordinary experience.
But as Kennedy’s question and Percy’s response suggest, Percy himself 
often found experience a trial, and the "fun" of writing his novels came about in 
changing the form of that trial. In a general sense this transformation, of course, 
is the autobiographical movement. Commenting on what by now must be 
considered the "classic" work in the field of autobiography, Metaphors o f Self, 
James Olney writes about his own work:
4When I began (in about 1966) to write what eventually 
became Metaphors o f S elf it never occurred to me to look 
for critical works on autobiography for the simple reason 
that I did not think of what I was doing as a study of 
autobiography; I thought of it as a study of the way 
experience is transformed into literature (which I suppose 
could be another way of describing autobiography)—as a 
study of the creative process, a humanistic study of the ways 
of men and the forms taken by human consciousness.5
The uncanny similarity between Percy’s comment and the words I have italicized
in Olney’s passage opens the door (as if it needed opening) to an understanding of
Percy’s works in an autobiographical context.
Of course, readers familiar with the extensive criticism that Percy’s writing 
has generated know that that metaphorical door has already been opened.
William Rodney Allen’s Walker Percy: A Southern Wayfarer approaches Percy’s 
fiction in light of his struggle with "fathers"—literal, adoptive, and literary.6 
Following closely the insight of Richard King’s A Southern Renaissance who in 
turn acknowledges debt to Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety o f Influence, Alien argues 
convincingly that "Percy’s fiction is in a very real sense his response to his father’s 
suicide" (xvii). But Allen maintains that Percy had more than one father to 
contend with:
I will suggest that Percy had an inordinate number of 
"fathers" to defeat in order to, in Bloom’s words, "clear 
imaginative space" for himself: his literal suicidal father; his 
stoical, melancholy adopted father; Freud (against whom he 
struggled in three years of psychoanalysis); Faulkner, whose
influence he has too insistently denied; and finally, American 
literary precursors like Twain, Warren, and Hemingway.
(xviii)
Allen’s readings of the particular novels are solid and insightful. He is at his best 
when he mines the rich layers of Percy’s literary allusions. Yet, I find it odd that in 
this "autobiographical study" he neglects the ever-growing body o f material on 
autobiography as a field of critical inquiry. Thus, while he implicitly traces the 
change in form of Percy’s trials, especially that of his father’s suicide, he does not 
explicitly place the works in a broader theoretical concept of autobiography. That 
is, he seems to presuppose a transformation of experience without exploring 
connections between Percy’s work, autobiographical theory, and actual 
autobiographies. I hope to cast light in this direction by means of this study.
Thus, while Allen’s work in some measure unlocks the mysteries o f Percy’s 
fiction with the keys of his personal experience, I will explore the "fun" of 
transforming experience at a more general level. I will look at Percy’s works 
(fiction and nonfiction) to discern their relation to the autos, bios, and graphein of 
autobiography, and I will do so, furthermore, in light o f what I take to be one the 
central movements of both his life and his work: Kierkegaard’s category of 
repetition, the movement in which "everything is returned double."7 I hope to 
show first, then, that autobiography—the type of work that presents itself as the 
story of its author’s life, written by himself—follows this same movement. That is
to say there is a sense in which autobiographers recover, regain, or, as we shall see, 
"repeat" their experience (as do Percy’s characters) so that they are able once again 
to inhabit, to live in, that experience. They thus attain a type of reconciliation and 
redemption. I will then go on to show the relation between repetition and autos, 
bios, and graphein, respectively, in light of Percy’s works and theories of 
autobiography.
It is interesting to note and entirely germane to my argument that
autobiography is a relatively recent entrant in the many fields of critical inquiry.
Almost every critic of autobiography with whom I am familiar has commented on
this fact.8 Yet it is Olney who offers lucid insights as to why this might be.
According to Olney autobiography has found its place in this cultural moment for
three reasons, the first related to genre and the second two to criticism:
First, there is the dual, paradoxical fact that autobiography 
is often something considerably less than literature and that 
it is always something rather more than literature. . . .  It 
refuses, simply to be a literary genre like any other.
("Cultural Moment" 24)
James Cox seems to say something similar when he writes that autobiography as a
genre exists somewhere between the self-enclosed and self-referential literature of
imagination and the purely referential literature of fact (Cox 8). Autobiography,
then, defies any facile generic classification.
7Olney continues: "A second, related reason . . .  is that critics o f twenty-five 
years ago insisted that for satisfying aesthetic apprehension a work must display 
(in Stephen Dedalus’s phrase) 'wholeness, harmony, and radiance’" (25). While 
some autobiographers may strive for the latter two of Dedalus’s triad, the first, in 
the sense of a completed and closed work is for autobiography an impossibility: 
"The end of the story cannot be told. . . . The narrative is never finished, nor ever 
can be, within the covers of a book" (25).
Here, Olney implicitly refers to what might be called the "revolution" that 
has occurred in literary studies during the last few decades. That is, he refers to 
the shift in allegiance from the New Critical (modernist) paradigm—a model that, 
as William V. Spanos and others have shown, takes its credo directly from Joyce’s 
A Portrait o f the Artist as a Young Man and which holds "timelessness" in priority 
to time—to the deconstructive or destructive (postmodern) criticism which has its 
origins in existential philosophy and which places a priority on time.9 I will treat 
this shift in perspective in more detail in chapter one—especially the relation 
between autobiography and time, for as Olney says in another context, the 
autobiographer’s prime motive is to "redeem the time."10 But it is enough to say 
now that autobiography, based on these first two reasons alone, can be viewed as 
the postmodern form par excellence, inasmuch as postmodernism has a form.
8The third reason for autobiography’s delay in entering the circles o f critical
inquiry has to do with its self-reflexive nature (in spite of Cox’s claim above, or
maybe in addition to that claim, since he places it in the middle, which would
mean, o f course, that it is self-reflexive to a degree). As Olney phrases it,
autobiography is a self-reflexive, a self-critical act, and 
consequently the criticism of autobiography exists within the 
literature instead of alongside it. The autobiographer can 
discuss and analyze the autobiographical act as he performs 
it. (25, his emphasis)
From Augustine’s reflections on time and memory in his Confessions to Mary
McCarthy’s italicized, complementary sections in Memories o f  a Catholic
Girlhood, to Ronald Fraser’s fascinating blend of subjective and objective history
(psychoanalysis and interviews) in his In Search o f a Past, autobiographers
theorize about their work even as they enact it.
Percy, of course, never wrote what is commonly considered an 
autobiography. His forms of choice were the essay and the novel. While he never 
completely abandoned the essay form, I agree with Patricia Lewis Poteat who 
maintains that it is the novel that is best suited to Percy’s aims as a writer. She 
argues that "Percy’s conceptual vision becomes progressively more blurred as his 
style and vocabulary become progressively less anecdotal or narrative and more 
analytical and abstract—hence, ever more tenuously anchored in the concrete 
particulars of persons in predicaments."11 Those essays which incorporate
anecdote and narrative (persons in predicaments)—essays which might be called 
"novelistic," such as "The Man on the Train," "The Loss of the Creature," and 
"The Message in the Bottle"—she claims, are clearer and more persuasive than the 
technical and more abstract essays which comprise the other pieces in The 
Message in the Bottle. Percy himself was aware of this problem: tired of "getting 
paid in reprints," interested in the French novel of writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre 
and Albert Camus, writers who "see nothing wrong with writing novels that 
address what they consider the deepest philosophical issues," and eager to reach a 
broader audience than his essays allowed, Percy turned to novel-writing during the 
1950’s (Con 183, and Coles 137).
His first two efforts—"The Charterhouse," and "The Gramercy 
Winner"—were, by his own admission, terrible: "[I wrote] two bad novels which 
I’m glad were not published" ( Con 89).12 He made his breakthrough with The 
Moviegoer, published in 1961 and the winner of the 1962 National Book Award. 
The rest, as the saying goes, "is history." His writing career spanned the next 
thirty years of his life: The Last Gentleman (1966), Lo ve in the Ruins (1971), The 
Message in the Bottle (197'5), Lancelot (1977), The Second Coining (\9ttQ), Lost in 
the Cosmos {\9^Z), The Thanatos Syndrome (1987), and Signposts in a Strange 
Land(\99\), the posthumously published collection of essays, edited by Patrick 
Samway, S.J., Percy’s "authorized" biographer.13
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But this brief foray into the chronology of his works steers me away from 
my principal concern with his novels and his view of the novel. For, as I will claim 
in the first chapter of this study, Percy’s view of the novel and the characteristics of 
autobiography already outlined above share much in common and thus further 
signal the aptness of an autobiographical approach to his works. Percy’s 
comments in essays and interviews about the novel being a "mess" or having been 
"always in trouble," for example, correspond not only to the "oppositional poetics" 
Walter Reed discusses in An Exemplary History o f  the Novel, but also to the 
generic instability that Olney sees in autobiography.14 Furthermore, Percy’s view 
of the novel as "diagnostic" and ultimately therapeutic, what Michael McKeon 
calls its "problem-solving mode,"15 seems to correspond to the autobiographer’s 
attempt to name himself by writing his life. Although naming a problem is the 
first step to solving it, giving a name entails a fall of sorts, a misname, for Percy. 
And since the self, as I will show in chapter two, is semiotically adrift, and since, as 
Percy writes in "Metaphor as Mistake," we can only know "one thing through the 
lens of another" (MB 82), it is precisely through the attempt to name that a subject 
opens itself to the possibility o f being a self. Of course, this striving after a name 
presupposes that the self is problematical in the first place; otherwise, why try to 
name it? The self cannot be so readily named as other things because it is not a 
thing among other things, but a nothing. Thus, and this relates Percy’s novel-
11
writing to autobiography all the more firmly, the attempt to name is life-long and 
hence without closure.
Furthermore, Percy sees the novel as the perfect medium for depicting what 
Marcel called homo viator; man the wayfarer or pilgrim (Con 231). Such a 
wayfarer, however, cannot reach his end. For if the novel is about "man on the 
road," then the road, quite literally, can have no terminus. Some critics have 
chided Percy for his ambiguous endings (except for The Second Coming, which 
was criticized for its apparent closure!), but it is precisely that ambiguity that 
points to the openness of possibility and the life-long process of self-naming. Both 
autobiography and Percy’s novels, then, struggle with the question of time, whose 
end remains unknown, but which nevertheless seems to demand redemption. That 
is to say, both Percy’s writing and autobiography share a common goal o f calling 
the writer (and the reader) back to time through the process o f self-naming.
The correspondence between the self-reflexive nature o f autobiography and 
Percy’s work is less clear. Instead of making his novels self-reflexive, as Faulkner 
does, for example, in Absalom! Absalom!, Percy seems to have used the essay and 
the interview to reflect on the nature of writing. He does not develop a theory of 
the novel in the act of writing a novel; instead, he uses other occasions of writing 
or speaking to think about the form as such. Nevertheless, his narrative style itself 
displays an interpenetration of form and content, if you will. Repetition finds
12
embodiment as a theme in Percy’s works even as it is manifested in his writing 
style. In this sense, his works can be read as exhibiting a self-reflexivity.
This essay, then, will introduce several new approaches to the appreciation 
of Percy’s works. Chapter One, "Autobiography, Repetition, and Percy," will 
place Percy’s works within a theoretical understanding of autobiography as 
repetition. Chapters Two, Three, and Four will carry as their main titles, 
respectively, "Repetition and Autos," "Repetition and Bios," and "Repetition and 
Graphein." But each of these chapter headings will bear subtitles as well, to give 
more specific focus to the topic at hand: "The Unformulability o f the Self," 
"Surviving Life in a Century of Gnosticism and Death," and "Metaphor and The 
Mystery of Language and Narrative." Finally, Chapter Five, "Autobiography, 
Repetition, and Percy," will provide a coda which "repeats" many of major themes 
developed in the work as a whole, but reflects more on Percy the man.
13
Notes to Introduction
1. Ben Forkner and J. Gerald Kennedy, "An Interview with Walker Percy," 
Conversations with Walker Percy, eds. Lewis A. Lawson and Victor A. 
Kramer (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1985) 239. Hereafter to be cited 
parenthetically in the text as Con.
2. Etymologies taken from Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).
3. It is almost impossible to write on Walker Percy without touching on his 
existentialist roots. In fact, because of his own statements in early 
interviews, most of the first criticism on his works focussed solely on this 
aspect. Thus, to cite all the works which connect Percy with existentialist 
thought would be to cite virtually a comprehensive bibliography. Hence, I 
offer here some of the books that deal more or less explicitly with his 
existentialist themes: Martin Luschei, The Sovereign Wayfarer: Walker 
Percy’s Diagnosis o f the Malaise (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1972); 
Robert Coles, Walker Percy: An American Search (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1978); Panthea Reid Broughton, ed., The A rt o f Walker Percy: Stratagems 
fo r Being (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1979); Jerome Taylor, In 
Search o f Self: Life, Death and Walker Percy (Cambridge, MA: Cowley 
Publications, 1986); Jerome Taylor, Walker Percy’s Heroes: A  
Kierkegaardian Analysis (New York: Seabury Press, 1983); Linda Whitney 
Hobson, Understanding Walker Percy (Columbia: U of South Carolina P,
1988); Lewis A Lawson, Following Percy: Essays on Walker Percy’s Work 
(Troy, New York: The Whitston Publishing Company, 1988); Mary Deems 
Howland, The G ift o f the Other: Gabriel M arcel’s Concept o f 
Intersubjectivity in Walker Percy’s Novels (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP,
1990); Jan Nordby Gretlund and Karl-Heinz Westarp eds., Walker Percy: 
Novelist and Philosopher (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1991).
4. Quotations from M G  and SC  are taken from the Ivy paperback editions. 
Quotations from MB taken from the original edition: Farrar, Strauss, and 
Giroux, 1975.
5. Metaphors o f Self: The Meaning ofAutobiography (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1972) and "Autobiography and the Cultural Moment: A Thematic, 
Historical, and Bibliographical Introduction," Autobiography: Essays
14
Theoretical and Critical, ed. James Olney (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980), 
10, hereafter to be cited parenthetically in the text as "Cultural Moment."
6. Walker Percy: A Southern Wayfarer (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1986); 
hereafter to be cited parenthetically in the text by page number.
7. Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling/Repetition, eds. and trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, Princeton UP, 1983) 220. 
In her book (see note 3 above), Mary Deems Howland argues convincingly 
that Percy’s major philosophical category is Marcel’s concept of 
"intersubjectivity." Yet, it seems to me that intersubjectivity and repetition 
are contemporaneous movements for Percy and thus of equal import.
8. See Olney, "Cultural Moment"; See also, in Olney’s collection, Robert F 
Sayre, "Autobiography and the Making of America," 146; See also Janet 
Varner Gunn’s Autobiography: Toward a Poetics o f Experience 
(Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1982) 3; Paul John Eakin: Fictions in 
Autobiography: Studies in the A rt o f Self-Invention (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1985); and James M. Cox: Recovering Literature’s Lost Ground: 
Essays in American Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP,
1989).
9. See William V. Spanos, Repetitions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 
1987); see also a number of his articles: "The Indifference of Differance. 
Retrieving Heidegger’s De-struction," Annals o f Scholarship 2(1981): 109- 
29; "Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic Circle: Toward a 
Postmodern Theory of Interpretation as Disclosure," boundary 2 A (1976): 
455-88; "Modern Drama and the Aristotelian Tradition: The Formal 
Imperatives o f Absurd Time," Contemporary Literature 12 (1971): 345-73; 
"Modern Literary Criticism and the Spatialization of Time," Journal o f 
Aesthetics and A rt Criticism 29 (1970): 87-104; "‘Wanna Go Home,
Baby?’: Sweeney Agon isles as Drama of the Absurd," PMLA 85 (1968): 8- 
20; "The Critical Imperatives of Alienation: The Theological Perspective of 
Nathan Scott’s Literary Criticism," Journal o f Religion 48 (1968): 89-103. 
See also Paul A. Bove’s "Cleanth Brooks and Modern Irony: A 
Kierkegaardian Critique," boundary 2 4(1976): 727-59; Nathan A. Scott 
Jr.’s The Broken Center: Studies in the Theological Horizon o f Modern 
Literature (New Haven: Yale UP, 1966); Joseph Frank’s "Spatial Form in 
Modern Literature," Sewanee Review 53 (1945): 221-40; 432-56; 643-53.
15
10. "Some Versions of Memory/Some Versions of Bios. The Ontology of 
Autobiography," Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical,\ ed. 
James Olney (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 240.
11. Walker Percy and the Old Modern Age: Reflections on Language, 
Argument and the Telling o f Stories (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 
1985) 2. While I agree with Poteat’s basic claim, I think that what she 
"discovers" about Percy’s behavioral stance in the essays is off the mark.
On the one hand, she does not consider the rhetorical situation of each 
essay—i.e., its audience—as does Coles, for example. On the other hand, 
she seems to disallow any incongruity in Percy’s thought. He was, after all 
trying to bridge a gap, as he says, between theorizing about "man" and 
theorizing about animals: "So you have this tremendous gap between 
accounting for animals and their behavior, which can be done by fairly 
adequate mechanistic models, and accounting for man, who can erect 
theories and utter sentences about these very creatures" (Con 134). It is 
surprising, too, that Poteat makes little reference to the essays that are 
collected in Signposts ; although uncollected at the time of her writing, 
most of them were nevertheless available in their original form. N or does 
she refer to the "Intermezzo" section of Lost in the Cosmos, a work Percy 
himself thought of as his "most important" achievement.
12. "The Grammercy Winner" is available at the Southern Historical 
Collection at UNC-Chapel Hill. Gary M. Ciuba has written a critical piece 
on this unpublished novel in Gretlund and Westarp’s collection (see note 
3), "Walker Percy’s Enchanted Mountain," 13-23.
13. One biography of Percy has already been written: Jay Tolson’s Pilgrim in 
the Ruins: A Life o f Walker Percy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 
Another one, by Samway, and a family history, by Bertram Wyatt-Brown 
are underway.
14. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981) 3-4.
15. The Origins o f the English Novel 1600-1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
UP, 1987) 21.
Chapter One
Autobiography, Repetition and Percy
When the novelist writes o f a man "coming to himself' 
through some such catalyst as catastrophe or ordeal, 
he may be offering obscure testimony to a gross 
disorder of consciousness and to the need of 
recovering oneself as neither angel nor organism but 
as a wayfaring creature somewhere between.
—"Notes for a Novel about the End of the World"
( The Message in the Bottle, 113)
1. Autobiography: A Necessary Attempt at Limiting the Term
One of the problems any writer confronts in developing an 
autobiographical study is the setting of limits to the term itself. That is to say, 
how does one define autobiography? Is there such a thing as a genre called 
autobiography that is characteristically different from other genres? W hat are the 
boundaries that set it off from other types of writing?
The OED defines autobiography as "the writing of one’s own history; the 
story of one’s life written by himself."1 This seems to be a fair assessment o f the 
term; yet what can be considered as one’s "history"? Is it a simple compilation of 
the events that occur during the course of one’s lifetime? And if this is so, how
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does one pattern those events, or can there be a pattern at all? Is it true that a 
pattern distorts, in some way, the material it encloses? Or is it more truthful to say 
that when one writes something in narrative form, a pattern is established or 
assumed in the very act of writing itself, and that writing without a pattern carries 
no significance beyond individual words? Furthermore, how can one account for 
those autobiographies, such as Herbert Read’s "The Innocent Eye," that contain 
very little reference to actual events? In short, this definition begs the question of 
history and historiography. Nor do the waters become less murky when one turns 
to a definition of "story." Cannot poetry be considered, in some sense, as the story 
of its writer? And if poetry can be so considered, why not a collection of essays, a 
philosophy, a theology, or a series of novels? If a story implies a pattern, as the 
OED suggests, then practically any narrative could be considered autobiography. 
The genre, if indeed I can even use that word, cannot be so readily catalogued.
But none of this is new to the study of autobiography. I have already cited
the comments of Olney and Cox who say that autobiography is both more and less
than literature. In Metaphors o f Self, Olney explicitly eschews any generic
approach to the field:
It is not at all my present purpose to try to define a literary 
form, or to distinguish and classify all the varieties and types 
of autobiography; indeed, definition of autobiography as a 
literary genre seems to me virtually impossible, because the 
definition must either include so much as to be no definition,
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or exclude so much as to deprive us of the most relevant 
texts. Either way, definition is not particularly desirable or 
significant. (38-9)
But if Olney denies any explicit definition of autobiography, his theory—the 
preceding quotation is taken from his chapter entitled "A Theory of 
Autobiography"—suggests an implicit one. Autobiography creates a metaphor of 
self for both its writer and reader. It names the self through the process of 
metaphorical indirection. Autobiography is that type of writing which creates and 
names a metaphor of self. Granted, this "definition" itself leaves much to be 
clarified—something which Olney does throughout the remainder of his book in 
his discussions of Eliot, Jung, Montaigne and others; nevertheless, it is a definition 
of sorts.
Theorists of autobiography seem to escape the trap of definition through 
an appeal to function. If autobiography cannot be classified generically, then 
what it does for both the writer and reader, or for the study of literature in general 
for that matter, comes to the fore. Thus, Cox maintains that the study of 
autobiography provides for the "recovering of literature’s lost ground," which he 
takes to be history. Janet Varner Gunn says that because autobiographers claim 
and take hold of the events of their lives, they become "fierce with reality."
Georges Gusdorf writes that autobiography is "the symbol, or parable o f a 
consciousness in quest of its own truth." And Paul John Eakin argues that
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autobiography functions as a "process of self-discovery and self-creation" which 
ultimately points to the fictive structure of the self. Like Olney’s metaphorizing 
then, these functions of autobiography define, in some sense, both the act and the 
product.2 At the same time, however, they are definitions which refuse to be 
definitions. While autobiography encompasses these functions, it is also always 
beyond them. As a genre, autobiography would seem to "de-struct," as William V. 
Spanos would say, the antinomy I suggest above between explicit and implicit.
For Spanos, "de-struction is n o t . . .  a nihilistic activity of thought that [portrays] 
its active force by levelling difference. Rather, it is, paradoxically, a positive or . . . 
a pro-jective interpretive activity in which thinking (theoria) is doing-in-the-world 
(praxis). "4 In this sense, then, the explicit is the implicit—the work (or the study 
of the work), the doing-in-the-world, is the definition and vice versa. One’s theory 
of autobiography is as much autobiography as is the work or works under 
scrutiny. It seems, then, that there can be no single definition of autobiography; 
rather, we are left only with the paradoxical and circular view that each instance of 
autobiography is its definition, just as each instance of criticism about 
autobiography projects a new and (one hopes) fruitful limitation, which is 
paradoxically a widening, of whatever boundaries autobiography can be said to 
have.5
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In this "limitation" of the term, then, I may have realized nothing more 
than Olney’s resistance to definition. Or perhaps I have returned to the view 
established in the Introduction of this study, that autobiography is the 
"transformation of experience into art," a broad enough definition, to be sure, yet 
one which still seems a good guide for an understanding of the term. For such a 
transformation involves, as I hope to show, both limitation and possibility. It 
involves repetition.
2. Autobiography and Time: Repetition
In Autobiography: Toward a Poetics o f Experience, Janet Varner Gunn
looks at the transformation of experience into art with an emphasis on the role of
time.6 She contends that "traditional" theorists in the field of autobiography
(writers such as Gusdorf and Olney) place the self in a privileged position with
regard to itself, and that the "ultimate expression of the selFs privileged position is
the Cartesian cogito" (Gunn 7). The result of such a placement of the self is its
separation from the vicissitudes of time. She writes:
[In traditional autobiographical theory] to avoid the 
contamination of time, the privacy of the true self must be 
made absolute . . . .  Autobiography has therefore to be 
understood as a form of "transcendental voyeurism"—as 
though the reader were getting a second-hand account of 
what the self, watching and overhearing itself, has seen and 
heard. (7)
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Gunn portrays Olney, Gusdorf and others as promoters of a Cartesian dualism
whose ultimate effect on autobiographical theory
deport[s] autobiography from the country of vital experience 
to the desert island of Husserlian reduction or a reified 
textual system. At the center of their assumptions about 
autobiography is the hidden or ghostly self which is absolute, 
ineffable and timeless. Being outside the momentum of 
temporality and beyond the reach of language, this self 
cannot be said to have a past at all; it never was, it simply is.
(8, her emphasis)
Gunn offers a corrective to what she sees as the fatal flaw to such a conception.
Since she sees Olney and Gusdorf as removing the self from its involvement with
time, she works from a view of the self "displayed in time":
The fact of the autobiographer’s anchorage in the 
temporality (and spatiality) of his or her lived world 
constitutes the beginning as well as the telos of 
autobiography. Not as an escape from time, but as a plunge 
into it; not as a self s divestment of its world involvement, 
but as acknowledgement of temporal experience as a vehicle 
of meaning—this is how autobiography displays its bios. (9)
G unn’s vision of autobiography points ultimately to a reversal of what she takes
to be the implicit question traditional theory posits: "Autobiography embodies the
story of Antaeus and not, as so many are ready to assume, Narcissus. Understood
so, the real question of autobiography becomes where do I  belong?not, who am
I?" (23).
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This idea of placement offers a fresh critical stance on the field, and I shall 
return to it later. Gunn follows through soundly with her thesis, and she offers 
compelling readings of texts, especially Walden. Yet I agree with Paul John Eakin 
who maintains that her view of autobiography has more in common with Gusdorf 
and Olney than she admits (Eakin 184). Eakin does not offer an analysis of these 
similarities; he merely suggests that Gunn would become aware of them through a 
closer reading of Olney. I wish to examine briefly what Eakin has left 
unexamined, in anticipation o f my discussion of Kierkegaard’s elusive category of 
repetition.
Gusdorf argues that man’s movement away from the mythic structures that 
quelled the "terrors of history," the awareness of time itself, forms one of the 
"conditions and limits" of autobiography in the first place.7 When an acute 
awareness of historical time emerges and time itself becomes problematic, the 
individual as individual may be compelled to write his life. The self, then, is not 
necessarily a fugitive from time, as Gunn suggests in her reading of Gusdorf; 
rather, time impels the writer forward in an attempt at self-definition, a definition, 
furthermore, which would have been unnecessary had the myths that provided 
stays for the self remained intact. For Gusdorf, the multiple self-portraits of 
Rembrandt and Van Gogh bear witness to the "impassioned new disquiet of 
modern man" (33), a disquiet brought on by their confrontation with time. The
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autobiographer’s recollection of the past "satisfies a more or less anguished 
disquiet o f the mind anxious to recover and redeem lost time in fixing it forever" 
(35).
Gunn also seems to overlook Olney’s claim that one reason for the current 
interest in autobiography, as I pointed out in the Introduction, emerges from the 
very question of time in relation to literary texts. The shift in allegiance in recent 
years from the New Criticism, which heralds Stephen Dedalus’s 
triad—"wholeness, radiance, harmony"—to what might be called "postmodern" 
criticism signals in itself a new appreciation of time and clears the way for the 
study of autobiography, which can never satisfy the criterion of wholeness. The 
roots of this shift date to the 1940’s, even as the tenets of New Criticism were being 
formulated, but at a time also, as we shall see, when the works of Soren 
Kierkegaard were making their way into the English-speaking world.
In what has become a "classic" essay for postmodern theorists, Joseph 
Frank shows how "spatial form" comprises the aesthetic of the modern period.8 
Following Gotthold Lessing’s distinction between the plastic and the literary arts 
in Laokoon, Frank suggests that what evolves in the modern period is the attempt 
on the part of literary artists to emulate the plastic arts. They establish an 
aesthetic
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based on a space-logic that demands a complete re­
orientation in the reader’s attitude towards language. Since 
the primary reference of any word-group is to something 
inside the poem itself, language in modern poetry is really 
reflexive: the meaning-relationship is completed only by the 
simultaneous perception in space of word-groups which, 
when read consecutively in time, have no comprehensible 
relation to each other. (229)
Modern poetry’s—and, incidentally, the novel’s—creation of "images" (what
Pound defined as "that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an
instant of time" [226]) removes the very medium through which the literary arts are
conveyed, namely time. While the plastic arts can be apprehended in an instant of
time, Lessing contends that literature cannot because of its use of words in
sequence (and because sequence implies time). Frank cites Lessing:
If it is true that painting and poetry in their imitations make 
use of entirely different means or symbols—the first, namely, 
of form and color in space, the second of articulated sounds 
in time—if these symbols indisputably require a suitable 
relation to the thing symbolized, then it is clear that symbols 
arranged in juxtaposition can only express subjects of which 
the wholes or parts exist in juxtaposition; while consecutive 
symbols can only express subjects of which the wholes or 
parts are themselves consecutive. (223)
Lessing’s distinction suffers, as William Spanos has shown, "in its over­
simplification. . . .  He is clearly wrong in his insistence that a painting or a 
sculpture is perceived in an absolute instant of time."9 It is restricted also, as 
Frank says, because Lessing developed his argument to attack the pictorial poetry
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and the allegorical painting of his day (223). Nevertheless, as Frank and Spanos 
make insistently clear, the "spatial" formalism of modern literature and the 
emphasis on the self-enclosed work that the emerging New Critics espoused lead to 
both the artist’s and the work’s removal from time. Frank cites Joyce’s A Portrait 
o f the Artist as a Young Man as offering the epitome of the New Critical artistic 
posture:
the personality of the artist, at first sight a cry or a cadence 
and then a fluid and lambent narrative, finally refines itself 
out of existence, impersonalizes itself, so to speak . . . the 
artist, like the God of creation, remains within or beyond or 
above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, 
indifferent, paring his fingernails (233).
It is this indifferent, transcendent, timeless, attitude that Frank sees as emblematic
of the "mythic" stance of modern literature, a stance that severs it from its
fundamental building blocks, words in sequence—time:
past and present are seen spatially, locked in a timeless unity 
which, while it may accentuate surface differences, eliminates 
any feeling of historical sequence by the very act of 
juxtaposition. . . .It is this timeless world of myth, forming 
the common content of modern literature, which finds its 
appropriate aesthetic expression in spatial form (653).
His appeal to difference and time explains why his article has attained classic
status and has become a sort of rallying point among those who wish to debunk
New Criticism, sometimes without the finesse of Frank himself.
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Be that as it may, Frank’s insights into the "spatial form" of modern
literature serve to foster a needed corrective to the view of poetry and literature as
a "well-wrought urn" or "verbal icon."10 Whereas the modern, as Frank suggests,
confronts the problem of time and then retreats to the timeless world of myth, the
postmodern seeks re-entry into the flux of time itself. Following Frank, William
Spanos bemoans the implications of New Critical thought:
The tendency of the New Criticism to collapse the distinction 
between the plastic and the literary arts and thus to argue in 
behalf of the aesthetic doctrine of simultaneous perception is 
itself an ontological commitment—one analogous to and 
probably having its specific source in the obsessive effort of 
the modern literary imagination to escape the destructive 
impact of time and change, of which a disintegrating cosmic 
order has made it acutely and painfully conscious, by way of 
achieving the timeless eternity of the aesthetic moment or, 
rather, of "spatial form." (Mod Lit Crit 91)
Now I have taken this circumambient route not so much to reveal what I 
see as a weakness in Gunn’s approach to autobiography in itself—her emphasis on 
time seems entirely appropriate and in line with my own thoughts on the subject; 
rather, I question what I see as an oversight in her analysis of Olney and Gusdorf. 
For if Olney’s claim about autobiography’s place in the cultural moment is true, 
then autobiography is inextricably joined to the question of time and literature. 
Autobiography cannot be thoroughly encompassed by a New Critical approach to
literature because that approach represses the crucial dimensions of time and
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change, the dimensions without which the act o f autobiography would never 
occur. Olney does not picture the autobiographer as a fugitive from time; if there 
can be any single picture of the autobiographer, and for Olney this is highly 
unlikely, even undesirable, then it is a picture of a writer confronting and 
grappling with his stance in time, trying to redeem his time.
Let me say, too, by way of parenthesis, that while I have called and will call
upon the aid of William Spanos and his destructive project, I do not thereby
readily assent to all its implications; nor do I claim that Walker Percy would, if he
ever read him. There is a sense in which, as Charles Altieri has shown, Spanos
restricts the difference he champions: "We find a much more varied world than
[Spanos] offers."11 As an example, Altieri offers a much richer definition of
modernism than the one Spanos develops:
Modernism . . .  is at least a set of tensions between scientific 
ideals of description and anti-scientific values, between 
symbolist and immanentist views of the mind, between 
desires for highly articulate formal arrangements and a need 
to make expressive arts somehow representative (by 
exploring mythic structures, for example), and between a 
desire to pose new images of spirit that can proclaim a 
nobility for man and a fear o f sentimentality and rhetoric.
(126)
Spanos’s definition, as we have seen, places an emphasis on the former member of 
each dyad—symbolist over immanentist, for example: scientific description over 
anti-scientific values. His description of modernism, then, becomes as "closed,"
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according to Altieri, as the enclosure into form he reacts against in the first place. 
In any case, I have come across no references to Spanos’s work in my readings of 
Percy. W hat interests me about Spanos and his possible relation to the work of 
Percy (and, of course, their relation to autobiography) is his use of Heideggerian 
retrieval or repetition, which has its source in Kierkegaard’s category of the same 
name. Percy was, of course, a devoted reader of both Heidegger and Kierkegaard. 
Although Spanos divests repetition of its religious significance (a step which again 
restricts the very possibilities he hails), he nevertheless points to an understanding 
of the term with regard to both its philosophical and literary implications. I hope 
to use Spanos, then, as Percy said he used his foster father, William Alexander 
Percy: "Surely it is the highest tribute to the best people we know to use them as 
best we can, to become, not their disciples, but ourselves."12
I return, then, to the question of time and autobiography, the question that 
launched me on this excursion in the first place. (I feel a bit like the narrator at the 
beginning of Melville’s behemoth Mardi—"We’re off!" he exclaims, and thereupon 
takes the reader on a metaphysical journey unparalleled in American literature.) 
Both Gusdorf and Olney see the autobiographer’s desire to redeem time as a prime 
motive for writing. I have already cited G usdorf s reference to this redemption:
The autobiographer’s recollection of the past "satisfies a more or less anguished 
disquiet of the mind anxious to recover and redeem lost time in fixing it forever."
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Olney makes the same claim, although more emphatically. He writes: "To redeem 
the time is one of the autobiographer’s prime motives, perhaps the prime 
motive—perhaps, indeed, the only real motive of the autobiographer."13 This 
comment comes in the context of T. S. Eliot’s line from Four Quartets "If all time 
is eternally present/ All time is unredeemable." Olney shows the sense in which 
different understandings of bios can render time either absolutely past or eternally 
present:
If bios is the historical course of a life, then at any given 
present moment of that life it is necessarily true that all 
things have flowed and that nothing remains: "is" has been 
transformed into "was" and has thereby been drained of all 
vitality, of all reality, of all life; "what was" no longer 
composes a part of ta onta, the present, the sum of things 
that are now existing or that are now being. If, on the other 
hand, bios is taken as the vital principle or the unique 
spark—life as transformed by being lived through this one- 
of-a-kind medium—then there is nothing but "is": there is no 
"was" in the picture and there is clearly no relation between 
"is" and "was". ("Some Versions" 239-40)
In either case, time becomes unredeemable. The autobiographer redeems his time
through the interplay of past and present, which takes place in memory. Although
Olney proposes different versions of redemption (some not involving memory at
all, and some so transforming memory as to make it unrecognizable), he suggests
that the "most complex resolution of the autobiographer’s dilemma" takes place in
memory:
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Time carries us away from all o f our earlier states of being; 
memory recalls those earlier states—but it does so only as a 
function of present consciousness: we can recall what we 
were only from the complex perspective of what we are, 
which means that we may very well be recalling something 
that we never were at all. In the act o f remembering the past 
in the present, the autobiographer imagines into existence 
another person, another world, and surely it is not the same, 
in any real sense as that past world that does not, under any 
circumstances, nor however much we may wish it, now exist.
("Some Versions 241)
It is this complex interplay between past and present in the act of memory that
redeems the time.
Olney’s insistence on the possibility of "recalling something that we never 
were at all" or the bringing into existence of "another person, another world" 
seems to echo part of what Spanos, following Heidegger, would call the movement 
of retrieval or repetition. (I say "part of' because the future—"anticipatory 
resolution"—also comes into play for Heidegger and Kierkegaard, as I will discuss 
below.) This retrieval seems to be a version of redemption, similar to, yet different 
from the one Olney suggests. It is a redemption in its most primitive meaning of 
"recovering that of which possession had been lost," as Nathan Scott puts it.14 
For if a recovery occurs, there is a sense in which it brings into existence another 
person and world, since the condition of loss means an absence or unawareness of
what is lost. Repetition, then, becomes an originary experience—the origin, in the
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case of autobiography, of the person brought into existence through the act of 
writing one’s life, in whatever form.15
Spanos approaches the question of retrieval or repetition from the
perspective of a hermeneutics of literary texts, which, in turn, derives from
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle.16 The following note, which includes a footnote
from Being and Time, helps to clarify both Spanos’s and Heidegger’s
understanding of the term:
The translators of Being and Time, Macquarrie and 
Robinson, translate " Wiederholeti' as "Repetition" (others, 
as "Retrieval") and add in a footnote:
this English word is hardly adequate to express 
Heidegger’s meaning. Etymologically, "wiederholen" 
means "to fetch again"; in modern German usage, 
however, this is expressed by the cognate separable 
verb "wieder . . .  holen," while "wiederholen" means 
simply "to repeat" or "do over again." Heidegger 
departs from both these meanings, as he is careful to 
point out. For him, "wiederholen" does not mean 
either a mere mechanical repetition or an attempt to 
reconstitute the physical past; it means rather an 
attempt to go back to the past and retrieve former 
possibilities, which are thus "explicitly handed down" 
or "transmitted." ("Hermeneutic Circle" 481, 
note 9)17
Heidegger writes of repetition with respect to "Dasein," the being that is 
there to question its own being, that always already has a vague sense of being, 
and thereby re-opens the question of ontology. His entire methodology as it is set
up in the opening sections of Being and Time calls for a repetition or retrieval of
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the question of being. Spanos, however, applies the category to literary criticism.
He shrewdly justifies this shift in emphasis by pointing out that for Heidegger
Dasein confronts the necessity of interpreting its own being, and the act of
interpretation itself, of course, falls into the domain of literary criticism. Just as
Heidegger de-structs (or de-structures) the western metaphysical tradition—which
has imposed an interpretation from without, from a standpoint beyond or after
the physical (meta-ta-physika), a standpoint devoid of temporality—to retrieve
new possibilities for Dasein, and hence for the question of being, so Spanos,
through his application of the Heideggerian method, that is, through, his emphasis
on time, retrieves new possibilities for the act of literature.18 He writes: "I want
to suggest a hermeneutics that remembers or retrieves the occasion—the
time—that engaged and interested [literary activity] and, in so doing, reactivated
the ongoing and interminable explorative process."19 It is so-called "postmodern"
literature, of course, that opens itself best to this hermeneutic activity:
Postmodern literature . . . becomes a kind of writing that is 
‘grounded’ in an ungrounded understanding of being, a kind 
of ‘de-structive’ writing, as it were, which remains marginal 
up to the middle of this century, but which increasingly 
thereafter becomes the central preoccupation of dramatists, 
poets, and novelists. {Rep 8)
It is important to emphasize, again, that this de-structive method is not, for 
Spanos (or for Heidegger), a nihilistic movement, one which wantonly destroys
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without any possibility of renewal. It is a method, rather, that "dis-closes" what
has been "fore-closed" by the metaphysical tradition. Whereas interpretation in
that tradition has worked from an atemporal, closed, circle—a repetition that
ceaselessly and mechanically repeats the same thing—Spanos works from
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle:
To put it positively, the hermeneutic circle is, paradoxically, a 
liberating movement, an opening towards being. It is finally, 
to use the important term that Heidegger borrows from 
Kierkegaard, a "repetition" or "retrieval" ( Wiederholen), a 
process of dis-covering and re-membering the primordial 
temporality of being and thus of the truth as a-letheia 
(unhiddenness), which metaphysical understanding and 
interpretation . . ., in closing time off-in coercing temporality 
into spatial icon (the circle)-and hardening this closure into 
"tradition," covers over and forgets. . . . Retrieval or 
repetition, that is, is neither a process of re-cognizing a 
(historical) text in the tradition for its own sake; nor is it a 
process of re-collecting an absolute or privileged origin (logos 
as presence) as agency of judging a text in the tradition. It is 
rather a discovering of beginnings in the sense of rendering 
the present interpreter . . .  a homo viator, of bringing him 
into an original, a careful explorative (open) relationship (a 
relationship of "anticipatory resoluteness") with the being of 
a text in the tradition. ("Hermeneutic Circle" 462, his 
emphasis)
I have quoted Spanos at length because I find this his most concise 
statement of the de-structive project which destroys only to open up new 
possibilities—the clearest statement of his use of repetition. Nevertheless, the 
quotation itself seems to call for some further clarification, something I can only
34
half-ironically and indirectly, half-seriously and directly provide by invoking 
Kierkegaard, who remains a very slippery character, and whose book, Repetition, 
gives only "hints and guesses,/ Hints followed by guesses" as to what the term 
might signify.20 I approach this task fully aware that indirection, as Kierkegaard 
knew, is the only genuine way to fathom this elusive category, since it belongs, as 
Stephen Crites points out, to the existential sphere, and that once reduced to the 
sphere of the aesthetic, it loses its potency. The power, and, of course, the 
difficulty of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous aesthetic works result from the 
paradoxical attempt to render the existential by means of the aesthetic. As Crites 
observes, "these communications in which Kierkegaard set out to evoke the 
existential categories in their opposition to the aesthetic were themselves self­
consciously aesthetic works."21 Thus, the irony of my treatment derives from 
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms (existential writers), and the seriousness derives 
from his commentators (writers on existentialism).
It is worth emphasizing, following Crites, that in his pseudonymous works, 
Kierkegaard does not try so much to disseminate knowledge as "to draw the 
reader into a consideration of his personal life" ("Author and Authorship" 39). 
This motive behind his works is what makes them "existence communications" (see 
"Pseudonymous"). At the same time, however, each work is an aesthetic 
fabrication. Kierkegaard presents his readers, then, with a drama enacted by the
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various pseudonyms he sets on stage: Judge William (a representative o f the 
ethical stage) urges the young A (the aesthete of Either/Oi) to choose; Johannes de 
Silentio {Fear and Trembling) seeks the Knight of Faith, whose movement he is 
unable to imitate in his own life; Constantin Constantius (Repetition) sets up an 
"interesting" experiment of repetition only to have his hopes dashed, while the 
young poet (his "nameless correspondent") achieves a repetition without too much 
effort. This Kierkegaardian drama is not intended to bring stasis or rest. Its 
primary aim, because it wants its reader to confront his personal life, is to bring 
the reader to a point of decision, to action, or as Spanos says above, into a careful 
relationship with being, a relationship possible only in time. It is only through 
action in time, after all, that repetition is possible (see "Against Christendom"). 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, then, as the title of Crites’s brilliant article 
suggests, are both "art" and "act"; they point to the existential by means of the 
aesthetic.
Repetition is cast from the point of view of Constantin Constantius. The 
book begins with his "report" after meeting a young poet who has fallen in love, 
but who does not love the girl for her own sake, only for the role she plays as his 
muse. The poet becomes increasingly depressed, and he seeks something to 
assuage his melancholy; his first efforts are unsuccessful. Constantin goes on to 
tell o f his own humorous attempts at repetition by returning to Berlin and trying
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to see that everything is the same as it had been on his last trip. This report is then
followed by letters from the poet, who has abandoned his fiancee, and who begins
the movement of repetition, at first deepening his melancholy, through reading the
Book of Job. The nameless poet achieves a repetition when he learns of his love’s
engagement to another man. And the work ends with Constantin’s addressing his
reader directly with reflections on the whole affair. Although the poet attains
repetition and Constantin does not, the nature of the movement remains obscure.
The book revolves around its subject without defining it directly.22 One of the
hints we are given comes at the very beginning of the book, where Constantin
compares repetition to recollection:
Say what you will, this question will play a very important 
role in modern philosophy, for repetition is a crucial 
expression for what "recollection" was to the Greeks. Just as 
they taught that all knowing is a recollecting, modern 
philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition. . . .
Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in 
opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is 
repeated backward, where as genuine repetition is recollected 
forward. Repetition, therefore, if it is possible, makes a 
person happy, whereas recollection makes him unhappy.22
This distinction between recollection and repetition, although insistent and 
central (because of Constantin’s "constant" reference to it at the beginning of his 
enigmatic narrative), remains rather cryptic. The situation is partially clarified 
when the pseudonymous author, a psychological experimenter, tells the reader,
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after he meets the poet in despair over the love affair, that his problem is one of 
recollection: "His mistake was incurable, and his mistake was that he stood at the 
end instead of at the beginning, but such a mistake is and remains a person’s 
downfall" (Repetition 137).
To say that the poet stands at the end of the relationship suggests that he 
has cast himself forward in imagination to a time when he and his love are old and 
grey, sitting around the hearth, reading bedtime stories to their grandchildren. 
Such a casting forward negates the present (the actual living through) of the affair. 
It ends the matter before it has actually begun: "If anyone can join in conversation 
about recollection’s love, [the poet] can. Recollection has the great advantage that 
it begins with the loss; the reason it is safe and secure is that it has nothing to lose" 
(Repetition 136). The poet, Constantin tells the reader, has cast himself clear out 
of his involvement with time. His recollection is not the "recollection forward" 
that is repetition, but rather the placing of the self at an advantaged viewpoint 
(outside itself) so that it might gain an overall view of the affair (its end) before it 
has actually begun. The poet is unhappy, to be sure, but he is secure in his 
unhappiness because he has taken no real chances, has made no choices in time. 
Thus, he has nothing to lose. It is already lost in the recollection.
Yet one has to be wary of Constantin’s point of view. One of the central 
ironies of the book, after all, arises from the fact that while Constantin writes of
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the nature of repetition, he never attains the movement himself. And whereas the 
poet cannot explain the "thunderstorm" that happens to him, he is granted a 
repetition. Part of the reason for this resides in the pseudonym itself. Since 
Constantin, the observer and reporter of the affair, is the "constant" one (note that 
constant is repeated twice in his very name), he is himself removed from the flux, 
the momentum of time. He has adopted, as Spanos has noted, an observer’s 
stance, a metaphysical viewpoint, the constancy of recollection. He projects, then, 
his own stance upon the poet. As "reporter," he can only write about the 
movement, an essentially aesthetic (recollective) activity, but he is unable to make 
the movement himself. The poet, on the other hand, because he really does suffer 
(despite Constantin’s preferred interpretation) and because he turns to the Book of 
Job (a book about a legitimate exception, as we shall see below), "step by step" and 
"educated by life . . . now discovers repetition" (Repetition, Supplement 304). Or, 
if we grant Constantin his interpretation and say that the poet really is lost in 
recollective despair, with everything that this situation implies, then the poet 
nevertheless breaks out of that recollection into the birth of repetition. In either 
case, Constantin remains all the more impoverished for his constancy, for his 
recollective posture.
Yet repetition remains nonetheless elusive. Further into the work, 
Constantin gives us more hints and guesses as to what he means by the term:
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The dialectic o f repetition is easy, for that which is repeated 
has been—otherwise it could not be repeated—but the very 
fact that it has been makes the repetition into something new.
When the Greeks said that all knowing is recollecting, they 
said that all existence, which is, has been; when one says that 
life is a repetition, one says: actuality, which has been, now 
comes into existence. If one does not have the category of 
recollection or of repetition, all life dissolves into an empty, 
meaningless noise. Recollection is the pagan view of life, 
repetition is the modern; repetition is the interest o f 
metaphysics and also the interest upon which metaphysics 
comes to grief. {Repetition 149)
Now if "time is the moving image of eternity" as Plato says in the Timaeus, 
then one’s existence in time can claim little value outside of the constant effort to 
cast off its shackles and so enter the immutable world of forms. One’s existence 
becomes the struggle to recollect what one already knows (but what has been 
forgotten) because one is himself a moving image of eternity who "has been." But 
this recollection demands as its terminus the stasis that is eternity, a return to 
originary time. It demands not that one enter with interest his own time, but 
rather a disinterested entry into that mythic time (illo tempore), which constitutes 
the origin of the cosmos.24 This is, to put it simplistically, the pagan view of a life 
of recollection as Constantin seems to see it, and it is the poet’s stance, in the view 
of the pseudonym, toward his love affair at the beginning of the book. It is the 
"aesthetic" strategy of dealing with time, the stance that begins with loss. It is also 
the stance that Frank and Spanos see as emblematic of the literature and criticism
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of modernism. For as Frank has shown, modernism seeks the stasis of myth, and 
myth as Nathan Scott writes "is that form in which the imagination undertakes to 
grasp the eternal present, the Time which is above and outside of time, the Great 
Time, in which all the concrete times and seasons of life eternally return to the
i i  25same.
Repetition is the postmodern view. It is a movement not out of time into 
an eternity which has been forgotten, and thus in need of being remembered, but 
rather a reduplication of the paradoxical entry of eternity into time (the infinite 
into the finite). As such, its primary thrust is not backward, but forward. It is not 
the stance of loss, but of gain.26 One attains himself: one becomes, by means of a 
careful, forward-looking interest which makes decisions in time. It is the 
"existential" strategy for dealing with human temporality. Although time is 
dreadful for both the aesthete and the existential (in the sense, as Crites puts it, 
that it sets forth infinite possibilities, freedom ["Pseudonymous" 2G5ff]), time is not 
something from which to flee. It is, rather, the place where dread can beckon one 
to himself. Spanos points out that for Kierkegaard and Heidegger, dread is an 
objectless condition. It is the feeling of not being at home (unheimlicheit), which, 
in despair and inauthenticity, Dasein seeks to objectify, that is, to convert to fear, 
which has an object ("Mod Lit Crit" 87, 102). It is this uncanniness that leads 
Dasein to interest, and Spanos emphasizes that term’s double significance: "to be
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between" and "to be a matter of concern" ("Hermeneutic Circle" 464). Repetition
as the "interest of metaphysics and also the interest upon which metaphysics comes 
to grief' suggests, then, that the proper movement of metaphysics is not from a 
disinterested stance "beyond the physical," wherein time and space (the individual) 
hold no sway, but rather from a concern within it. "To be between," in the 
middest, between, for example, the finite and the infinite, is the human condition 
of temporality, what the self already is.27 Without such interest, metaphysics 
founders because the self becomes not what it is, but, as Crites puts it, a "deficient 
polarization of spirit" ("Against Christendom" 68). The self flies either to the 
angelic infinite, which too often has been the case in metaphysics, or it sinks itself 
in the finite and takes up its home as a beast among beasts. In the movement of 
repetition, the individual becomes, then, what he already is through concerned 
action in time. Spanos summarizes the movement with respect to the individual in 
this way:
In "recollecting forward," repetition relies precisely on the 
interest, the intentionality of inter esse, of the unique, the 
existential individual as being-in-the-world, for its access into 
the meaning of being. It is not an objective mode, a 
contemplative act from without aeterno modo. It is, rather, 
a "subjective," a Care-ful, mode, in which the singular, or in 
Kierkegaard’s preferred term, the exceptional interpreter (as 
opposed to a universal observer like Constantius himself) is 
guided beyond the present by the intimation of spirit (the 
primordial question of being) residing in his "memory." As 
such, repetition is both a mnemonic and an anticipatory—i.e.
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a de-structive and ek-static—movement. ("Hermeneutic 
Circle" 465).
The "memory" that Spanos here refers to is precisely the "vague" sense of being 
that every individual always and already has, according to Heidegger. Repetition, 
then, is the movement in which this vague sense of being "stands out" from 
destructive chaos yet resists angelic form. It is between the pure form of 
recollection ("spatial form") and no form whatsoever.
The difference between repetition and recollection, finally, is a difference
between an entry into the temporality of human existence or a flight from it. In
the following passage, Crites provides a good summary of this fundamental
difference in terms of the aesthetic and existential:
Both the aesthetic strategy and the existential movement 
proceed from the impasse created by our peculiarly human 
temporality. The aesthetic strategy, however, proceeds by 
negating that temporality, the existential movement by 
intensifying it and through passion giving it a form that is 
itself temporalized. . . . Aesthetic apprehension wrests ideal 
possibility out of the actual through recollection. Existential 
movement projects a chosen possibility into the real world 
through action. ("Pseudonymous" 214)
Crites’s observation that the existential movement of repetition "gives a form that
is itself temporalized" could just as well be read as "giving a temporized form."
For what repetition allows is a continual recasting of the form that the self shall
inhabit, not in the sense of grasping after one possibility and then another—that
would be the aesthetic stance—but rather in the sense that the possibility that is 
chosen (or given) does not close off the self in a definite and mechanical replication 
of form, but rather opens the self to endless possibilities within that form itself. 
Form, then, is not imposed from above, as in the traditional metaphysical posture; 
it is not something which strives for stasis. Rather, it opens from below, if you 
will, from a stance between the finite and the infinite, which the self already is. 
Repetition, then, returns one to himself in such a way that a birth of the self 
occurs: new possibilities are projected because former ones have been disclosed 
and former possibilities are disclosed because the future enters with its new, 
indeterminate ones.
In repetition, the self becomes the clearest path to the universal. The self, 
the "exception" for Kierkegaard, inhabits the universal, not as a slave, but as a co­
creator who becomes. Toward the end of Repetition, in a letter addressed to "My 
dear Reader," Constantin acknowledges the relation between the exception and 
the universal. The "exception" is a category Johannes de Silentio develops in Fear 
and Trembling, published the same day as Repetition, with regard to Abraham, 
who surpassed the ethical, i.e., universal, injunction against murder in his 
willingness to undergo trial or ordeal by making a religious sacrifice of Isaac. In 
Repetition, the exception is Job, who despite his friends’ claims to the contrary 
(made on the basis of universal knowledge), is really not guilty and whose entire
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story can be seen as a test by God. It is by virtue of these exceptions that 
repetition is possible for the story’s poet, who is himself an exception (by virtue of 
his ordeal with his fiancee), although only a "transitional" one from the aesthetic 
through the ethical to the religious: "Such an exception is a poet, who constitutes 
the transition to the truly aristocratic exceptions, to the religious exceptions" 
{Repetition 228). This short recapitulation of Kierkegaard’s three stages (the 
aesthetic/poet, the ethical/aristocratic, and the religious), which, as I have pointed 
out above (following Crites), can best be understood as the aesthetic and the 
existential, helps clarify the relation between the exception and the universal 
without which repetition would be impossible. For true repetition, as the poet 
says, is "eternity" (221)—the paradoxical dwelling of the infinite in the finite, and 
thus an essentially religious category. It is, as Crites observes, a reduplication of 
the Incarnation: "if the eternal entered time in that past event, we meet it [in 
repetition] as the infinite possibility of the future. In the language of recent 
theology, the Christ-event is the eschatological event" ("Against Christendom" 
81).28
The poet does not make this fuller movement of repetition; rather, his is 
merely transitional. Nevertheless, it is a repetition. Through his suffering and his 
reading of Job, he makes the initial steps of the religious movement, in the 
etymological sense of religion: a re-binding, a re-connecting, a re-joining. His
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time is redeemed. Because Constantin remains on the aesthetic sphere, on the
other hand, he can only create a farce of repetition, his failed attempt at it through
his return to Berlin. He can never be the exception because he cannot "repeat" his
life. He is, however, capable of expressing the universal. The relation between the
universal and the exceptional, then, a relation whose tension Constantin cannot
bear, is a good expression of repetition, but also a superb statement of the act of
autobiography:
The exception also thinks the universal in that he thinks 
himself through; he works for the universal in that he works 
himself through; he explains the universal in that he explains 
himself. Consequently, the exception explains the universal 
and himself, and if one really wants to study the universal, 
one only needs to look around for a legitimate exception; he 
discloses everything far more clearly than the universal 
itself. . . . There are exceptions. If they cannot be explained, 
then the universal cannot be explained, either. Generally, the 
difficulty is not noticed because one thinks the universal not 
with passion but with a comfortable superficiality. The 
exception, however, thinks the universal with intense passion. 
{Repetition 227f 9
Thus Johannes de Silentio says that he can understand Hegel, whose philosophical 
system "is supposed to be difficult to understand," yet he cannot fathom the figure 
of Abraham, who, according to the age, "is a small matter" (F&T32-3). Hegel 
treats the universal without passion, with "comfortable superficiality." But 
Abraham, as the exceptional, receives the universal after he had surpassed it in his
willingness to sacrifice Isaac.
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In Repetition, this passion is not only the suffering the poet experiences for 
the pain he causes his beloved, but also the interest with which he questions his 
own existence: "One sticks a finger into the ground to smell what country one is in; 
I stick my finger into the world—it has no smell. Where am I? W hat does it mean 
to say: the world? . . . Who tricked me into this whole thing and leaves me 
standing here? Who am I? How did I get into the world?" (,Repetition 200). This 
concern heralds not only the radical dislocation which arrives in our postmodern 
world, but also the care with which the autobiographer questions his own time and 
place. For the two questions, "Where am I?" and "Who am I?" constitute the 
autobiographical dilemma, whether one takes as the prototypical autobiographical 
movement the story of Narcissus or the story of Anteaus, as Janet Varner Gunn 
suggests (although she sets up a polarity). In either case, it is the writer’s 
reckoning with his time, with a sense of loss or deprivation, which leads him or her 
to transform experience into art, with the hope, as the poet notes, that repetition 
will occur:
I am myself again. The "self* that someone else would not 
pick up off the street I have once again. The split that was in 
my being is healed; I am unified again. The anxieties of 
sympathy that were sustained and nourished by my pride are 
no longer there to disintegrate and disrupt. Is there not, 
then, a repetition? Did I not get everything double? Did I 
not get myself again and precisely in such a way that I might 
have a double sense of its meaning? . . .  I am born to myself. 
(Repetition 220-1)
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This is the sense in which autobiographers seek to redeem the time, and this is the 
sense in which autobiography can be understood as repetition.30
Kierkegaard, of course, wrote much of his philosophy as a response to
what he saw as the universal, speculative, Hegelian system, which is the ultimate
expression of the Cartesian body/mind split. Although he had a great respect for
Hegel, and although he applies the Hegelian dialectic in his own works, he applies
it to the one entity that Hegel left out of his philosophy—the single individual.
For Hegel’s is a philosophy of the universal, the System, and such a system can
encompass everything from above (from the end) without worrying at all about
the existing individual:
It is from this side . . . that objection must be made to 
modern philosophy; not that it has a mistaken 
presupposition, but that it has a comical presupposition, 
occasioned by its having forgotten, in a sort of world- 
historical absent-mindedness, what it means to be a human 
being. Not indeed, what it means to be a human being in 
general; for this is the sort of thing that one might even 
induce a speculative philosopher to agree to; but what it 
means that you and I and he are human beings, each one for 
himself.31
W ithout the single individual, for Kierkegaard, there cannot be faith, and without 
faith, there cannot be a single individual. Just as the existing individual cannot be 
subsumed by the System, by objective knowledge, neither can faith in Christianity.
For Christianity is not so much a matter of knowledge—it is not a System,
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although the philosophy of the age tries to make it so; rather, it is passionate 
inwardness which paradoxically turns one outward. And such passion belongs 
strictly to the single individual. It is Abraham, not Hegel, who is the stumbling 
block.
When the poet attains repetition, then, he moves out of his recollective 
(speculative) stance which separates mind and body, thought and existence, 
eternity and time, the infinite and the finite. The split is healed. He re-enters 
(retrieves/repeats) what he already is. This is not to say that he is a Christian in 
the full Kierkegaardian sense of Christianity; it is to say only that he has made the 
first movement back to himself, a movement which demands repetition in order to 
reach the threshold of faith, for Kierkegaard the highest expression of 
individuality.
Similarly, to say that autobiographers repeat their existence is not to say 
that they are all Christians, a ludicrous assertion. Rather, it suggests that the 
autobiographical posture is the same as that of repetition. The autobiographer 
does not remove himself from himself aeterno modo. Even Augustine and 
Newman, who write autobiographies of conversion, and who thus stand at the end 
of their movement rather than the beginning, nevertheless embody the repetitive 
posture. Augustine, incidentally, says he writes sub specie aeternitatis (apparently 
from the recollective posture) but he certainly exemplifies the repetitive nature of
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autobiography in his reflections on time and memory in Books X and XI. And 
although Newman once stated that his doctrinal struggles ended when he entered 
the Roman Catholic Church, he also said "to live is to change." The 
autobiographer, then, since he is an existing individual at the present time of his 
writing, since he is still trying to fathom and redeem his time by means of writing, 
cannot know the end of his story. He writes from his middle state {inter esse) in an 
attempt to define himself, to become the single individual for himself and for his 
readers. He tries, that is, to retrieve himself, to give a form to himself that will not 
close-off the possibilities for existence, will not continue the split(s) of existence, 
but rather a form that will close the split only to open possibilities. That form, of 
course, is the book which reaches an end that repeats or retrieves a beginning—not 
timelessly, but in time.
3. Autobiography, the Novel, and Percy
Under the entry for Walker Percy in The History o f Southern Literature, 
Lewis A. Lawson, perhaps the best of Percy’s students, writes that Percy "has not 
removed his name from the physicians’ register" because "he continues to diagnose 
and prescribe."12 The first book of criticism written on Percy, in fact, emphasizes 
his stance as diagnostician, Martin Luschei’s The Sovereign Wayfarer: Walker 
Percy’s Diagnosis o f the Malaise™ And a short sample of some titles Percy gives
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his own essays indicates that he views both the novel’s and the novelist’s role as
diagnostic, as an "instrument for exploration and discovery" (Signposts 219): "The
State of the Novel: Dying Art or New Science?"; "Diagnosing the Modern
Malaise"; "Physician as Novelist." But the novelist is not only a physician; Percy
also likens him to a wounded man "who has a better view of the battle than those
still shooting." Or, better still,
the novelist is less like a prophet than he is like the canary 
that coal miners used to take down into the shaft to test the 
air. When the canary gets unhappy, utters plaintive cries, 
and collapses, it may be time for the miners to surface and 
think things over. (MB 101)
Percy’s concern with diagnosis and his figures of speech, o f course, 
presuppose a radical disease. His view of himself as writer provides him a chance 
to "utter plaintive cries" so that his readers might begin to "think things over" and 
thus get a handle on the malady. The cries have to be uttered, for "it is only when 
one sees that something is wrong that one can diagnose it, point it out and name it, 
toward the end that the patient might at least have hope, and even in the end get 
well" (Signposts 196).
But why is there such desperation in the postmodern world? Why is there a 
need to "utter plaintive cries"? What is the root of this malaise? Is it a totally new 
phenomenon or does it have its origins in an earlier age? Why is the novelist well- 
suited to write about it? That is, what is it about the novel that gives it such
51
diagnostic potential? And how is all of this related to the question of 
autobiography and repetition?
As in the first section of this chapter, it may be useful to begin with a
limiting of terms, especially "postmodern." For if I wish to place Percy in the
company of postmodern writers and theorists, then some clear notion of the term
should be available. Fortunately, Percy provides his own definition:
To state the matter as plainly as possible, I would echo a 
writer like Guardini who says simply that the modem world 
has ended, the world, that is, of the past two or three 
hundred years, which we think of as having been informed by 
the optimism of the scientific revolution, rational humanism, 
and that Western cultural entity which until this century it 
has been more or less accurate to describe as Christendom. I 
am not telling you anything you don’t already know when I 
say that the optimism of this age began to crumble with the 
onset of the catastrophes of the twentieth century. If one had 
to set a date of the beginning of the end of the modern world,
1914 would be as good as any, because it was then that 
Western man, the beneficiary of precisely this scientific 
revolution and Christian ethic, began with great skill and 
energy to destroy himself. (Signposts 208)
Thus, the postmodern world can be understood only in relation to the modern one
that preceded it, characterized by the exuberance brought on by rational
humanism and the scientific revolution, the waning of Christendom.
It is entirely germane to my point that the modern period so described also 
witnessed the rise of both the novel and autobiography. And this was not only the 
age of the scientific revolution, but also of the American and French Revolutions.
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I have already cited Georges G usdorf s superb essay "Conditions and Limits of
Autobiography" in relation to the question of time. Autobiography arises, it will
be remembered, when the mythic structures that held the terrors of history at bay
broke down. Gusdorf reiterates this point when he contends that autobiography
emerged when "the traditional communal life" broke down, and "the individual
qua individual became important" (30). He continues:
At the cost of a cultural revolution humanity must have 
emerged from the mythic framework of traditional teachings 
and must have entered the perilous domain of history. The 
man who takes the trouble to tell of himself knows that the 
present differs from the past and that it will not be repeated 
in the future. (30)
James Cox corroborates G usdorf s comments about revolution. It is "interesting 
to note," Cox writes, "that its [the word’s (i.e., "autobiography’s")] appearance 
comes just after the age of revolution, when the modern self was being liberated as 
well as defined. At the time of the revolutions, Franklin and Rousseau were 
writing their memoirs and confessions, respectively." 34 This paradoxical 
conjunction of both liberation and definition provides an excellent recapitulation 
of the previous section of this chapter (autobiography as repetition), for the self is 
both defined and liberated in the act of writing one’s life. The perilous journey 
through time forms the stuff o f the autobiographer’s story. W ithout a 
(revolutionary) awareness of time, Gusdorf and Cox suggest, autobiography
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would find no place in the literary landscape. Autobiography defines and 
liberates, to be sure, yet the very necessity for definition, in the wake of liberation, 
is what I find rousing about the study of this field. The obsessive need to define 
oneself in the modern period points to a dislocation within the very period itself, a 
period, as Percy sees it, of overwhelming "optimism." If one is not dislocated, if 
one knows his place in the scheme of things, then there would be no need for self­
definition. Yet, as Gusdorf observes, evident at the time is an "impassioned new 
disquiet" (33).
This period also gave birth to that other problematic literary form—the 
novel—and it is my contention that the so-called "rise" of the novel also points to 
the disquiet, the dislocation of modern man. It is not especially surprising, then, 
that the insights of both Gusdorf and Cox are remarkably similar to those set 
forth by Georg Lukacs in his The Theory o f the Novel, for autobiography, like the 
novel, emerged in response to particular (modern) cultural forces.35 Lukacs’ 
distinction between the epic and novel seems apposite here. The epic represents 
the endless repetitions of cyclical history, what Kierkegaard might call the 
recollective posture; time is not problematical because immanence and 
transcendence are one and the same; travel through time, ostensibly adventurous, 
is not really so because the traveller through eternally-recurring (mythic) time 
takes no true risks. The novel emerges as a response to the perilous domain of
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linear, unrepeatable, time, wherein immanence and transcendence have been 
radically sundered ("the novel is the epic of a world that has been abandoned by 
God," [88]); the life of pure immanence or transcendence and the search for a 
blending of the two, while adventurous, also become burdensome (30, 56ff). The 
novel, then, as we are often reminded, likewise grapples with the question of time. 
For it was at the beginning of historical awareness, the beginning of the modern, 
revolutionary era, that the self proclaimed its independence from traditional and 
limited definitions only to find itself displaced and disoriented in time. And it is in 
this period that the self seeks a sense of stability by means of both the novel and 
autobiography.
Yet, like attempts at defining the novel and autobiography, attempts at 
defining the liberated self are protean. The novel seems as "opposed," to borrow 
Walter Reed’s word, to a comprehensive poetics as does autobiography.36 And 
nobody yet has fashioned an objective or comprehensive definition of the self, 
although attempts have been made to define it as well as the novel and 
autobiography. When the attempts do not evolve from hubris, when they do not 
claim an atemporal universality, each seems to enact a repetition or retrieval that 
opens possibilities that have been foreclosed in the traditional understanding. Be 
that as it may, the point I wish to make is that questions of the novel, 
autobiography, and the (modern) self, because of their historical provenance, are
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inextricably united, and each displays its own version of dislocation or 
displacement.
I have already mentioned the problems with setting limits to 
autobiography. The situation with the novel is much the same. Boundaries are 
obscure, even resisted, as the form reaches now in one direction, now in another. 
With the coming of the novel, we might say that literature, like the modern self, 
has been liberated, but in its liberation, it has (like the self) both foundered and 
thrived. It seeks a definition that seems always one step beyond its reach. Walter 
Reed cogently suggests that the novel is an "outsider" to traditional literary 
pursuits: "It is this sense of itself as an ‘outsider’ . . . that I would single out as the 
most basic feature of the novel as a literary kind. The novel is a deliberate 
stranger to literary decorum; it insists on placing itself beyond the pale of literary 
tradition" (3). The novel, liberated sometime during the height of renaissance 
humanism, cannot find itself defined within the boundaries of a poetics because it 
"opposes itself to the view of literature that a poetics implies. Not only does it 
oppose itself to types of literature more traditional than the novel. . . .  A novel 
characteristically opposes itself to other novels" (7). When the novel makes its 
appearance on the literary landscape, it de-structs, as Spanos might say, the 
traditional understanding of literature. But, again (perhaps I cannot avoid 
repetition in a study of this sort), this destruction is not a negative phenomenon.
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Instead, it opens new possibilities, possibilities that were foreclosed in traditional
literary production. "The novel rose," Reed argues,
first in Spain and then in England, out o f the attempt to 
create a vernacular literature addressed to the middle classes 
that neither submitted to the classical ordering of genres nor 
acknowledged the superiority o f that ordering by a 
traditional cultivation of native and popular modes. (12)
Just as it was necessary for the "individual qua individual" to come to the fore as a
condition for the possibility of autobiography, so, too, in the case of the novel.
Ian Watt, for example, says that it was essential for the ordinary activities of
ordinary individuals to become notable before the novel could claim attention, a
point not significantly different from either Lukacs’ or Reed’s.37 Furthermore,
the novel addresses itself to an audience entirely different from that o f traditional
literature—the single, isolated individual. Reed writes:
The audience for these literary fictions is both specific and 
uncertain. It is not a community of listeners attending to an 
epic "song," or a member of an aristocratic coterie glancing 
over poems circulated in manuscript. . . . Rather, it is a 
solitary, anonymous figure, scanning a bulk of printed pages, 
out of a sense of nothing better to do. (25)
The novel addresses itself to Cervantes’ "idle reader." And if idleness is the devil’s
workshop, as the Puritan adage goes, then the displacement of the self at the very
time the self was being liberated could be considered one aspect of the devil’s
work.
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Leaving for a moment the world of the eighteenth-century novel and the
beginnings of the modern world, I wish to return to the twentieth-century
postmodern world and the thoughts of Walker Percy. Like Kierkegaard, Percy
has had much to say about the dislocation of the self in the twentieth century.
And like Kierkegaard’s objections to the Hegelian System, Percy utters plaintive
cries about the regnant worldview of our time—modern science. Science, he says,
in words remarkably similar to those of his mentor, can utter truths about almost
every sector of the world; yet, "the sector of the world about which science cannot
utter a single word is nothing less than this: what it is like to be an individual living
in . . . the twentieth century."38 The scientist, like the Hegelian philosopher,
cannot "utter a single word about an individual thing or creature insofar as it is an
individual but only insofar as it resembles other individuals. . . . [Yet], the catch is
that each of us is, always and inescapably, an individual" (211, 212). The difficulty
of life in the twentieth century, Percy says, derives from a profound
transformation of the consciousness of Western man:
The consciousness of Western man, the layman in particular, 
has been transformed by a curious misapprehension of the 
scientific method. One is tempted to use the theological term 
"idolatry." This misapprehension, which is not the fault of 
science, but rather the inevitable consequence of the victory 
of the scientific worldview accompanied as it is by all the 
dazzling credentials of scientific progress [sic]. It, the 
misapprehension, takes the form, I believe, of a radical and 
paradoxical loss of sovereignty by the layman and of a
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radical impoverishment of human relations—paradoxical, I 
say, because it occurs in the very face of his technological 
mastery of the world and his richness as a consumer of the 
world’s goods. (210)
This loss of sovereignty—this impoverishment—echoes G usdorf s "impassioned
disquiet of modern man," and it points to Percy’s view of the novel as diagnostic.
Dislocation and impoverishment occur when the individual chooses to see 
himself not as "always and inescapably" an individual, but rather from the point of 
view of science, which cannot say one word about the individual qua individual: 
"To the degree that we allow ourselves to perceive ourselves as a type of, example 
o f  instance of, such-and-such a class of Homo sapiens—even the most creative 
Homo sapiens imaginable—to this same degree do we come short of being 
ourselves" (212). There is a "gap," then, in the normative cultural worldview. For 
Percy, this gap is best filled by the novelist: "If there is such a gap in the scientific 
view of the world . .  . and if the scientist cannot address himself to this reality . .  . 
[then] the novelist can, and most particularly the novelist" (213). The writing of 
novels, therefore, takes its place along the side of science as an endeavor which is 
"cognitive, a kind of finding out and knowing and telling" (207). And the novelist 
tells of what it is like to be a displaced and dislocated individual in the twentieth 
century, even when, especially when, one does not feel himself to be so dislocated.
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But this diagnostic role of the novel is not as new as Percy might lead one 
to believe. Let me return once again to the beginnings of the modern era, the era 
which, as Percy claims, is largely responsible for our state today, and to the origins 
of the novel. Might not the seeds of the malady Percy tries to diagnose reside 
there? It would seem logical that the beginnings of the transformation of the 
consciousness of Western man dwell in the time of the inception of modern 
science—the time of the "scientific revolution." In The Origins o f the English 
Novel 1600-1740, Michael McKeon cites numerous examples of what might be 
called the "idolatrous" exuberance displayed by some proponents of the new 
philosophy.39 The enthusiasm went to such extremes, McKeon observes, that 
some thought science could offer "solid history" in the place of "romance." As an 
example, McKeon cites Joseph Glanville who looks forward to the Royal Society’s 
collective and communal efforts to compose histories of nature: "the Histories o f  
Nature we have hitherto had, have been but an heap and amassment o f Truth and 
Falsehood, vulgar Tales and Romantick Accounts; and ’tis not in the power of 
particular unassociated Endeavors to afford us better" (McKeon 68). Ancient 
systems or endeavors "unassociated" with the new philosophy are considered 
fabulous "romances" while modern ones are heralded as "solid histories." Yet, 
McKeon points out that the very language used in extolling the endeavors of the 
Royal Society often mimics that o f the romances the Society claims to supersede:
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The enthusiasm of Glanville and Thomas Sprat leads both to 
speak of those "glorious Undertakers" o f the new philosophy 
as the new, "illustrious Heroes" of the modern age, greater 
than those of epic and romance, "generous Vertuoso’s, who 
dwell in an higher Region then other Mortals." This heady 
flirtation with the fanciful idealism of romance seems odd 
coming from sober empiricists; it expresses the disorienting 
experience of historical relativity with respect both to past 
dogmas and to future possibilities, which begin now to 
appear limitless. (69, my emphasis)
W hat McKeon says, it seems to me, is that science, an endeavor which at first
appears limitless in its application, carries with it the seeds of its own limitation,
disorientation or dislocation—the (post)modern predicament.
But disorientation is but one of the many instabilities which occurred 
during the time of the "rise" o f the novel. McKeon argues that the era exemplifies 
two broader "instabilities" which include as a facet the one noted above— 
instabilities with regard to "generic categories" ("questions o f truth") and "social 
categories" ("questions of virtue") (20). The novel emerges at this time, it gains its 
own limited stability, "because of its unrivaled power both to formulate, and to 
explain, a set o f problems that are central to early modern experience" (20). 
McKeon goes so far as to say that the new form triumphs as "an explanatory and 
problem-solving mode" (21). It tries to answer questions of truth and questions of 
virtue, and thus provide some stability, some definition, to the liberated self.
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McICeon’s line of thought, then, is not very different from Percy’s. The 
diagnostic model offered by Percy resembles the explanatory and problem-solving 
one set forth by McKeon. For diagnosis (to "know through") is but the attempt to 
explain and to solve some problem. The time of the rise of the novel is also a time, 
as McKeon would say, of the "categorical instability" of the self. Notions of self 
and place in society (questions of truth and virtue) become problematic. 
Dislocation ensues. Although this dislocation or instability does not attain the 
severity it achieves in the twentieth century, it, like the novel, displays what 
McKeon calls a "pregiveness." It does not "‘persist’ into the realm of the modern 
as an alien intrusion from without" (21). Rather, it is akin to what Marx calls a 
"‘simple abstraction’, a deceptively monolithic category that encloses a complex 
historical process" (20). Thus, the seeds of the impoverishment of the self, which 
Percy cites as the problem of life in the twentieth century, the problem which the 
modern novel may diagnose, reside within the era of the origins of the novel itself. 
Since, as Percy argues, the scientific method, despite (or because of) the 
enthusiasm of its early proponents, cannot utter a single word about an individual 
as such, but only about an individual as a specimen, instance or example of a 
general rule, the novel emerges to fill the epistemological gap, to treat the 
individual self as individual, lost in the wake of the scientific method. I do not, 
however, claim that the "early" novel treats the "existential" predicament of man as
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do modern novels. Rather, because of the "pregiven" status of the novel and of the 
problems it addresses, the problem of self which ripens in the twentieth century 
exists inchoately in the eighteenth. The beginning of the modern age is also the 
beginning of the postmodern one. In this particular epoch, the liberated self, the 
outsider, finds itself in the paradoxical situation of seeking definition in the two 
forms that resist definition, forms which arise to treat the individual as individual 
rather than as a specimen of the scientific method. These forms—the novel and 
autobiography—are themselves outside the traditional literary enterprise.
The novel and autobiography serve similar functions, then, and to say that 
Percy’s use o f the novel is autobiographical is to say that he uses it to retrieve or 
repeat possibilities of the self which the normative cultural understanding 
(immeshed as it is in science) forecloses. It is the individual as individual which 
Percy tries to retrieve from the deadening effects of an "idolatrous" worship of 
science. His novels "de-struct" the "deficient polarizations of spirit" (Crites) which 
such a worship of science fosters. The self, as Percy sees it, is neither purely 
transcendent (the recollective posture of science and art), nor purely immanent (a 
consumer of the world’s goods). Neither is it, as he writes in Love in the Ruins, a 
"mythical monster," a strange hybrid of the two in the fashion of Doctor Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde.40 Instead, the "repeated" self finds itself in the same posture as 
Spanos’s genuine interpreter--that is, a homo viator, a wayfarer, pilgrim or
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castaway whose feelings of uncanniness, not-at-homeness (unheimlicheit) compels 
him to look for signs of the transcendent in the realm of the immanent, and 
thereby to redeem his time. But in Percy’s postmodern world, the road to this 
redemption becomes clear, paradoxically, only in the aftermath of some sort of 
violence or situation of ordeal, some "de-struction" of ordinary contexts. So lost is 
the self to itself that it takes such a situation to wrest it from the shackles of 
complacency, at-homeness, and to restore it to its wayfaring state. Percy’s 
linguistic philosophy and a reading of his first two novels in light o f that 
philosophy provide a more practical understanding of repetition. In the next 
chapter, I explore this movement as it relates to Percy’s "semiotic" understanding 
of the self.
64
Notes to Chapter One
1. This definition is taken from the 1971 edition of the OED.
2. Cox, Recovering Literature’s Lost Ground (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
UP, 1989) see especially his article: "Recovering Literature’s Lost Ground 
through Autobiography"; Gunn, Autobiography: Toward a Poetics o f  
Experience {Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1987) 17; Gusdorf, 
"Conditions and Limits of Autobiography," Autobiography: Essays 
Theoretical and Critical, ed. James Olney (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 
44; Eakin, Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art o f  Self-Invention 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985) 3. Future references to these sources will 
be made by author and page number in the text itself.
3. Spanos borrows this term from Heidegger. See note 9 of the introduction 
for more on his use o f the term, especially "The Indifference of Differance. 
Retrieving Heidegger’s De-struction."
4. Indifference of Differance, 114.
5. I realize that what I say about autobiography could be just as readily 
applied to literature in general, since autobiography is both more and less 
than literature. Current debates about the revision of the literary canon 
and the polysemous nature of texts point to the same lack of boundaries 
evidenced in autobiographical texts. The study of autobiography itself 
displays an instance of the broadening of the literary canon, of what can be 
defined as "literary."
6. Citations will be noted parenthetically in the text.
7. Gusdorf 30.
8. "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," The Sewanee Review53 (1945): 221 - 
40; 432-56; 643-53. This is an essay in three parts. References to Frank’s 
essay will be made parenthetically in the text.
9. "Modern Literary Criticism and the Spatialization of Time: An Existential 
Critique," Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism 29 (1970): 90. Further 
references will be made in the text as Mod Lit Crit.
65
10. See especially Paul A. Bove’s essay "Cleanth Brooks and Modern Irony: A 
Kierkegaardian Critique," boundary 2 A (1972): 727-59. In his first two 
endnotes, Bove provides a good catalogue of critics who were becoming 
impatient with the New Critical positions.
11. "How Critics Contribute to Postmodernism: Some Thoughts on the 
Positions of Gerald Graff and William Spanos," Par Rapport 11 (1979): 
126. Further references will be placed in the text.
12. "Uncle Will," Signposts 56.
13. "Some Versions of Memory/Some Versions of Bios. The Ontology of 
Autobiography," Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical, ed. 
James Olney (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 240. Future references to 
this article will be made parenthetically in the text.
14. The Broken Center: Studies in the Theological Horizon o f Modern 
Literature (New Haven: Yale UP, 1966) 74.
15. This notion of repetition as origin is developed in F.H. Heinemann’s essay, 
"Origin and Repetition," Review o f Metaphysics 4 (1950-1): 201-14.
16. Although Spanos touches on repetition in several of his essays and, 
obviously, in his book, Repetitions, I will refer primarily to his article 
"Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic Circle: Towards a 
Postmodern Theory of Interpretation as Dis-closure," boundary 2 4 (1975): 
455-88. References to this essay will appear parenthetically in the text as 
"Hermeneutic Circle."
I have consulted a number of other sources on the question of Kierkegaard 
and postmodernism in general and repetition in particular, to which I do 
not directly refer. These sources have, nevertheless, helped me to 
understand this elusive term and its author: W.H. Auden, "Knight of 
Doleful Countenance," The New Yorker AA (May 25, 1968): 141-2, 146-8, 
151-4, 157-8; H.S. Broudy, "Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Indirect 
Communication," Journal o f Philosophy 58 (1961); 225-33; J. Preston Cole, 
The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1971); Harold A. Durfee, "The Second Stage of Kierkegaardian 
Scholarship in America," International Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1963): 
121-39; Jurgen Habermas, "Modernity Versus Postmodernity," New
66
German Critique 22 (1981): 3-14; Robert S. Hartman, "The Self in 
Kierkegaard," ournal of Existential Psychiatry 2 (1962): 409-36; Matthew 
Held, "The Historical Kierkegaard: Faith or Gnosis," Journal o f Religion 
37 (1957): 260-6; Henry Earl McLane, Jr., "Kierkegaard’s Use of the 
Category of Repetition: An Attempt to Discern the Structure and Unity of 
His Thought," diss., Yale University, 1961; Allan Megill, "What does the 
Term ‘Postmodern’ Mean?" Annals o f Scholarship 6 (1989): 129-51;
Edward W. Said, "On Repetition," The Literature o f Fact, ed. Angus 
Fletcher (New York: Columbia UP, 1976): 135-58; Calvin O. Schrag, 
"Kierkegaard’s Existential Reflections on Time," The Personalist 42 (1961): 
149-61; George J. Stack, "Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of 
Repetition," Journal o f Existentialism 7 (1966-7): 111-28; George J. Stack, 
"Repetition in Kierkegaard and Freud," The Personalist 58 (1977): 249-60;
J. Heywood Thomas, "Kierkegaard and Existentialism," Scottish Journal 
o f Theology 6 (1953): 379-95; Robert Widenmann, "Some Aspects of Time 
in Aristotle and Kierkegaard," Kierkegaardiana 1 (Copenhagen: 
Mundsgaard, 1971) 7-22.
17. See also Heidegger’s Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) 437.
18. Spanos uses the term "metaphysics" to his own ends. For Aristotle, the 
term referred only to the chronology of his writing. Thus, he dealt with 
metaphysics after he wrote about the physical universe.
19. Repetitions 6, hereafter to be cited in the text as Rep.
20. These lines are taken from "The Dry Salvages" by T.S. Eliot.
21. For a very Fine treatment of Kierkegaard’s indirect and pseudonymous 
authorship, see Stephen Crites’s "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and as 
Act," Kierkegaard: A Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. Josiah Thompson 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972) 183-229. I will also draw from 
Chapter 3 of Crites’ In the Twilight o f Christendom, "Kierkegaardian Faith 
against Christendom," (Chambersburg, PA: American Academy of 
Religion, 1972), wherein he develops the difference between repetition and 
recollection, and from a review essay "The Author and the Authorship: 
Recent Kierkegaard Literature," Journal o f the American Academy o f  
Religion 38 (1970): 37-54. These works will be cited parenthetically in the 
text, respectively as "Pseudonymous" "Against Christendom," and as
67
"Author and Authorship." For the distinction between the aesthetic and 
the existential, see "Pseudonymous" 199ff. Kierkegaard actually developed 
his writings around three spheres--the aesthetic, the ethical and the 
religious. Crites argues that since there is an exfoliation of dimensions 
within the major stages themselves, it is best to approach them under the 
broader headings of aesthetic and existential, the first comprising the realm 
of the interesting (pleasure or displeasure), the second in the realm of 
interest (concern, care). The quotation is also taken from 
"Pseudonymous," page 205.
22. Richard M. Griffith in "Repetition: Constantin (S.) Constantius," Journal 
o f Existential Psychiatry! (1962): 437-48, certainly appreciates the 
elusiveness of the term: "If I, who use the word repetition, pause to reflect, 
I despair that I speak nonsense. . . . Repetition feeds upon time which is its 
poison" (438). He goes on to say: "Fortunately, [Kierkegaard], like 
Socrates, said the same thing over and over again, but always differently. 
Thus, in a wider sense, what he said about repetition fills some thirty 
volumes" (440). And in a comment that could just as well be applied to my 
reservations about Spanos’s "secularization" of repetition, Griffith writes 
this about Jean-Paul Sartre: "[Sartre] flees before faith, believing, 
meanwhile, that he pursues freedom. How very silly. For could one chase 
the shadow of the fox without at once and at the same time pursuing the 
fox? Faith does not fault freedom. Indeed, freedom is the shadow of faith" 
(448).
23. This citation is taken from the Hong and Hong edition of Fear and 
Trembling / Repetition (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983) 131. All future 
citations will be from this edition and will be noted parenthetically in the 
text as Repetition or as F&T, depending on the book referred to.
24. I am indebted here to the thought of Mircea Eliade in general, but 
especially his examination of mythic time in Cosmos and History: The 
Myth o f the Eternal Return, trans. Willard Trask (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1959).
25. The Broken Center 46. It is interesting to note also that, besides Scott, 
several writers on biblical aspects of time point to an essential difference 
between the Greeks’ understanding of time and that of ancient Israel. The 
Greeks, as James Muilenburg writes ("The Biblical View of Time," The 
Harvard Theological Review 54 [1961]: 221-52) had a tendency to reduce
68
time to form, to spatialize it. The Israelites, however, had no "concept" of 
time; rather, it was lived: "In Israel the mystery and meaning o f time is not 
resolved by appeal to the cosmic world of space" (231). Other articles of 
interest on the subject include Fr. Robert Johann, S.J.’s "Charity and 
Time," Cross Currents 9 (1959): 140-9; Paul S. Minear’s "Thanksgiving as a 
Synthesis of the Temporal and Eternal," Anglican Theological Review 38 
(1956): 4-14 and his "The Time of Hope in the New Testament," Scottish 
Journal o f  Theology 6 (1953): 337-61. Lewis A. Lawson has written lucidly 
on Percy’s "biblical" anthropology with regard to time and words in time, 
"The Cross and the Delta: Walker Percy’s Anthropology," Walker Percy: 
Novelist and Philosopher, eds. Jan Nordby Gretlund and Karl Heinz- 
Westarp (Oxford: U P of Mississippi, 1991): 3-12.
26. See Michael Sprinker, "The End of Autobiography" Autobiography: 
Essays Theoretical and Critical, ed. James Olney (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1980), who writes: "Unlike recollection, which ‘begins with the loss’ 
{Repetition 136), repetition is a plenitude, a recovery of what recollection 
has lost by means of a transumption of the recollected object into an 
atemporal order" (330).
27. Kierkegaard develops a dialectic between the infinite and the finite in The 
Sickness Unto Death.
28. It is here, too, that I disagree with Spanos’s conception of repetition. For 
he would balk at any talk of Incarnation, since it is borrowed, as he might 
say, from the "archival, logos-as-presence language of the institutional 
church." Yet, Incarnation for Kierkegaard, as Crites points out, is not a 
call to an intellectual contemplation of doctrine; its nature as absolute 
paradox (of eternity entering time) cannot be grasped by the intellect. 
Incarnation, like repetition, remains elusive. Like repetition, Incarnation is 
the summons to decision by which the individual begins the act of self­
definition. Spanos would seem to see the term only in light of a doctrinal 
assent to the dual natures of Christ, human and divine. And yet his writing 
on repetition seems to me wholly in line with Crites’ and Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of Incarnation-as a call to decision. That is why I continue 
to call on his help in dealing with the term repetition.
There is a sense, too, in which repetition should not be connected with 
Incarnation, since, as the title of Crites’ article suggests, much of 
Kierkegaard’s writing was against Christendom, against the very
69
domesticated version of Christianity that Christendom implies. Thus, the 
philosophical word "repetition" would seem better suited to an age that 
already thinks it understands Incarnation or, better, thinks that all it has to 
do is understand it.
29. This relation of the universal and the exception parallels the thoughts of 
Barrett J. Mandel on autobiography, who argues that if the writer is 
genuine, the autobiographer reveals for his readers "meaning so deep as to 
seem lodged in metaphysical or ontological ground . . . the deepest personal 
meanings unknown even to the subject. . . "  This is from his essay "Full of 
Life Now," Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical, ed. James 
Olney (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 69.
30. Gusdorf has already alluded to the "doubleness" of the autobiographical 
act in his article: "Some Flemish or Dutch painters of interior scenes depict 
a little mirror on the wall in which the painting is repeated a second time; 
the image in the mirror does not only duplicate the scene but adds to it as a 
new dimension a distancing perspective. Likewise, autobiography is not a 
simple recapitulation of the past; it is also the attempt and the drama of a 
man struggling to reassemble himself in his own likeness at a certain 
moment of his history" (43). I will reflect more on this "distancing 
perspective" in Chapter Two with regard to Percy’s theory of signs and his 
first two novels.
31. See Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. 
Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1941) 109.
32. Eds. Louis D. Rubin, Jr., et al. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1985) 
509.
33. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1972).
34. Reco vering Literature’s Lost Ground: Essays in American A utobiography 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1989) 14-15.
35. The Theory o f  the Novel (Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology P, 1971). Citations will be made parenthetically in the text.
36. An Exemplary History o f the No vel (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981) 7. 
Future references will be made parenthetically in the text.
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37. The Rise o f the Novel (Berkeley: U of California P, 1957) 13ff.
38. In the development of this section, I will depend largely on Percy’s essay in 
Signposts "Diagnosing the Modern Malaise," pages 204-221. This essay 
has appeared in various forms, both as a monograph, published in 1985 by 
Faust Publishing in New Orleans, and as an article in Harpers (June 1986): 
39-45. Page numbers cited parenthetically in the text refer to the version in 
Signposts, which Percy delivered at Cornell University in 1985 at the 
Chekhov festival. The first quotation is from page 213. Referring to this 
same essay, John Edward Hardy has argued that "[Percy’s] comments do 
not form a coherent system for critical interpretation and evaluation of any 
works o f fiction, his own notably included." I cannot agree. In Chapter 
Two, I contend that Percy’s writing is "all o f a piece," that he works out his 
ideas both theoretically and novelistically. Percy’s continual references to 
himself as pathologist and diagnostician suggest the centrality of these 
images for understanding his own works.
In an interview with Bradley R. Dewey, Percy makes the connection 
between Hegel and science clear: "One big difficulty for me in reading 
Kierkegaard was that I had no philosophical training at all, especially 
about Hegel or the German idealists. That was a great obstacle and 
stumbling block for years. Kierkegaard was attacking Hegel. For a long 
time I thought that was irrelevant. I said, well, what difference does it 
make whether he successfully demolished Hegel or not, until I realized that 
you could very successfully extrapolate his attack on Hegel against what we 
might call scientism. The same thing he said about the Hegelian system 
might be said about a purely scientific view of the world which leaves out 
the individual. So once I made that extrapolation from Hegel, whom I 
cared nothing about, to a whole, scientific, exclusive world view, it became 
very relevant" (Con 117).
39. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1987). References will be made 
parenthetically in the text.
40. Taken from the Avon edition of LR, page 360 The entire quotation reads: 
"For the world is broken, sundered, busted down the middle, self ripped 
from self and man pasted back together as mythical monster, half angel, 
half beast, but no man."
Chapter Two
Repetition and Autos:
The Unfomralability of the Self
Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make 
of me! You would play upon me, you would seem to 
know my stops, you would pluck out the heart of my 
mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to 
the top of my compass; and there is much music, 
excellent voice, in this little organ, yet cannot you 
make it speak. {Hamlet III, ii)
1. A  Semiotics o f  the Self
Percy is a difficult writer to pursue. The study of his works demands 
something similar to what William Scheick says about the study of Jonathan 
Edwards. According to Scheick, the student of Edwards requires a "keen 
sensitivity to two and a half centuries of commentary as well as an informed 
awareness of at least the five disciplines—theology, philosophy, history, American 
studies, and literary criticism—which have generated that commentary."1 Percy’s 
works have generated criticism for only about three decades, yet he requires the 
same "keen sensitivity" to a broad spectrum of disciplines as does Edwards. Jan 
Nordby Gretlund and Karl-Heinz Westarp have edited a book on Percy entitled 
Walker Percy: Novelist and Philosopher2 But the designating terms could be
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more numerous: Walker Percy, not only novelist and philosopher, but also 
psychiatrist, pathologist, linguist, essayist, naturalist, critic, theologian, historian, 
semiotician, southerner, golfer, bird-watcher, and bourbon-drinker.
It is not without reason that Lewis Lawson calls his book Following 
Percy.3 The critic finds himself in the uncomfortable position of always trying to 
"catch-up" with Percy but never quite, as Percy himself used to say, "getting aholt" 
of him. His reading and interests seem to have known no bounds, not in the sense 
that he had "read everything" (although one is at times tempted to think so), but in 
the sense that they are all of a piece.4 He sunders traditional boundaries set up in 
professional circles and, from a posture somewhere between professional and 
amateur, challenges disciplines to open themselves to new possibilities. He "de- 
structs," that is to say, the closure imposed by "specialization" in "fields o f study" 
with the hope of retrieving possibilities that have been foreclosed or overlooked by 
such conventional methodologies. To rephrase an example discussed in the last 
section of Chapter One, Percy retrieves one of the novel’s earliest functions, yet 
repeats that function in such a way as to open new possibilities for the novel taken 
generically.
While the case seems fairly evident that Percy views the novel from a 
posture of repetition, his study of semiotics offers more fruitful territory for 
discussing the centrality of that category in his works. In "The Delta Factor," the
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introductory essay to The Message in the Bottle, Percy reflects on the origins of
the book itself:
It is the meager fruit of twenty years’ off-and-on thinking 
about the subject, of coming at it from one direction, 
followed by failure and depression and giving up, followed 
by making up novels to raise my spirits, followed by a new 
try from a different direction or from an old direction but at 
a different level, followed by failure, followed by making up 
another novel, and so on. {MB 10)
Written in the early 1970s, this comment both catalogues and foreshadows Percy’s 
continuing interest in semiotics. In 1983, with the publication of Lost in the 
Cosmos, after completing Lancelot and The Second Coming, Percy returned to 
what he once referred to as his "extra-literary pursuit," semiotics.5 And his final 
letter to Shelby Foote indicates that after the publication of The Thanatos 
Syndrome in 1987, Percy had once again returned to his favorite avocation. After 
some sobering reflections on his terminal illness and his "search for a cure," Percy
writes: "Like I say, it’s too damn much trouble, this running around looking for a
cure. I’m content to sit here and try to finish Contra Gentiles, a somewhat smart­
ass collection of occasional pieces, including one which should interest 
you—‘Three New Signs, All More Important than and Different from the 59,018 
Signs of Charles Sanders Peirce’—you want a copy?"6
Percy’s interest in semiotics, then, spans the thirty-six years of his writing 
career. The cycle—study of language, novel, back to language study—while not
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entirely consistent, nevertheless points to a "methodology of repetition." What 
Percy tries to do time and again in his writings on semiotics is to "sketch the 
beginnings of a theory of man" for an age that has no such consensus theory (MB 
10). He agrees with Alexander Pope that "the proper study of man is man"
(MB 10), but he focuses his attention on that unique characteristic o f human 
beings, their ability to utter words and sentences and have them understood or 
misunderstood by another person. Thus, he subtitles The Message in the Bottle, 
"How Queer Man Is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has to Do with the 
Other."
Percy is not interested so much in the formal aspects of language. Neither 
is he concerned primarily with the mechanics of linguistic transactions. Rather, he 
struggles to understand sign-users by means of their sign-using activity: "the book 
is not about language but about the creatures who use it and what happens when 
they do" (MB 11). In itself, this step is a retrieval of a possibility that the tradition 
has not explored. As Percy sees it, the two broad traditions that have grappled 
with a theory of language—the behavioral and the formal—miss the phenomenon 
itself: "American behaviorists kept solid hold on the world of things and 
creatures, yet couldn’t fit the symbol into it. German idealists kept the word as 
internal form, logos, and let the world get away" (MB 33).
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These traditions, as venerable as they are, can nevertheless be viewed as 
"deficient polarizations" of the phenomenon. On the one hand, behaviorists place 
man as an organism in an environment. Like other animals, we have needs that 
can be fulfilled by the manipulation of our surroundings—hence, the proliferation 
of countless items and techniques manufactured to help us "adjust." Homeostasis 
is the goal. Yet this same tradition cannot account for the very behaviorists who 
write down theories and submit articles with the expectation that they will be read 
and understood. The stimulus-response model, no matter how complicated, 
cannot account for the meaning that exchanges between a reader and a writer, an 
utterer and an interpretant, even if what is written or uttered is misunderstood or 
misinterpreted. According to Percy, then, the behaviorist remains outside of his 
own theory.
The formalists or idealists, on the other hand, place man within the 
confines of his own mind, within the cell of himself, radically disconnected from 
both the world and others, unable to enter the "ordinary lovely world." While this 
tradition offers sound theories regarding the building-blocks of language, such an 
abstracted posture nevertheless ends in solipsism. The self is stranded within itself, 
cut off from the very meanings its mind generates.
Percy’s methodology of repetition seeks a third way, not through an 
Hegelian, world-historical synthesis of opposites, which, of course, falls into the
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latter polarization, but from an observation of the phenomenon itself: "Instead of 
marking [man] down at the outset as besouled creature or responding organism, 
why not look at him as he appears, not even as Homo sapiens, because attributing 
sapience already begs the question, but as Homo loquens, man the talker, or 
Homo symbolificus, man the symbol-monger?" (MB 17) Percy’s interest in 
semiotics turns to the symbol-user himself—a retrieval of a possibility that has 
been overlooked in the tradition.
In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy again comes at the issue "from a different
level." The "warning-challenge-announcement-introduction" to the intermezzo
section suggests the retrieval Percy is about to undertake:
[This section] will irritate many professional semioticists by 
not being technical enough—and for focusing on one 
dimension of semiotics which semioticists, for whatever 
reason, are not accustomed to regard as a proper subject of 
inquiry, i.e., not texts and other coded sign utterances but the 
self which produces texts or hears sign utterances. (LC 85)7
The intermezzo can also be seen as Percy’s synthesis of his thirty years’ interest in
the field, a synopsis of the essays collected in The Message in the Bottle. As such,
it is his clearest statement o f his approach to semiotics—i.e., a semiotics of the self,
hence the title, "A Semiotic Primer of the Self." His own comments point to the
centrality it has with respect to his work as a whole: "Despite its offhand tone, [the
‘Primer’ is] as serious as can be. I have never (sic) and will never do anything
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thing as important. If I am remembered for anything a hundred years from now, 
it will probably be for that" (Con 285).
Not all critics share Percy’s enthusiasm. In The Fiction o f Walker Percy, 
John Edward Hardy, for one, writes that he "cannot agree" with Percy’s own 
assessment of the piece: "I imagine that Percy would have had difficulty in finding 
a publisher even for an essay collection like The Message in the Bottle, not to 
speak of Lost in the Cosmos, if he had not established a reputation as a 
novelist. . . . His greater talent is for fiction."8 Hardy’s point rings true. Yet, it 
may apply more readily to Lost in the Cosmos than to The Message in the Bottle. 
While there may have been no cause for a collection of such essays (in Message) 
had Percy not been a fiction-writer, it is important to remember that these essays 
gained placement in respectable scholarly journals on their own strengths. Thus, 
they were recognized as having something important to add to the study of 
language and the language-user regardless of Percy’s fiction-writing. Percy’s own 
enthusiasm for "A Semiotic Primer of the Self' reflects, I think, his awareness of 
the synthesis he had wrought, of his having brought together his many-years’ 
thoughts on the subject concisely, coherently, and humorously.9 Although I am 
in no position to forecast Percy’s reception one hundred years from now, I am 
more inclined than Hardy to accept his own excitement about this work.
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The subtitle of the "Primer," while jocular in tone, further points to its 
character of synthesis: "A Short History of the Cosmos with Emphasis on the 
Nature and Origin of the Self, plus a Semiotic Model for Computing 
Impoverishment in the Midst of Plenty, or Why it is Possible to Feel Bad in a 
Good Environment and Good in a Bad Environment" {LC 86). Percy 
reintroduces concerns that have been with him from his earliest days of publishing, 
but comes at the subject here in terms of a "History of the Cosmos." And the 
latter part o f the title not only echoes the long set of questions that begin "The 
Delta Factor," but also suggests one of Percy’s central themes. Why do his 
characters feel so bad when they have the best of possible surroundings? Percy’s 
attempt to work out this problem "semiotically" suggests that his fiction and 
nonfiction are also of a piece. While both can stand autonomously, they are 
nevertheless complementary.10
In the "Primer," Percy retrieves from the tradition of linguistic study the 
work of Charles Sanders Peirce. Just as Heidegger turned to the meditations of 
Descartes as he struggled to renew the question of being, so Percy turns to Peirce 
for help with his semiotics. Of course, Percy uses Peirce throughout his writings 
on language, not only at the time of writing Lost in the Cosmos. He was aware all 
along that he was building his own thoughts on Peirce’s shoulders. On February 
3, 1971, he wrote to Foote about his language philosophy: "I would even say that
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it is revolutionary: that one hundred years from now it could well be known as the 
Peirce-Percy theory of meaning (not Pierce but Peirce and so pronounced Perce- 
Percy)" (SHC). Peirce’s presence, however, seems to be stronger in Cosmos 
because the "Primer" begins with Peirce’s distinction between dyadic and triadic 
interactions.11
For Percy, the Cosmos has manifested a predominance of dyadic events.
His history, then, begins with an explanation of what they are:
From the beginning and for most of the fifteen billion years 
of the life o f the Cosmos, there was only one kind of event.
It was particles hitting particles, chemical reactions, energy 
exchanges, gravity attractions between masses, field forces, 
and so on. As different as such events are, they can be 
understood as an interaction between two or more entities:
A**B. Even a system as inconceivably vast as the Cosmos 
itself can be understood as such an interaction. (XC86-7)
With the appearance of organic life "some three and a half billion years ago" {LC
89), interactions both within a single organism and between two or more
organisms could still be understood dyadically. Organisms inhabit an
environment, to which they respond in order to maintain an inner balance,
homeostasis. An organism’s response to its environment and to other organisms
can be understood as a signal response, that is to say, dyadic. Since signals
announce their objects, such signal responses might include the response to flee,
the call to mate, or, as in the case of ants and bees, directions toward food. No
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matter how complex, and no matter how many variables involved, such 
interactions can still be expressed by the formula A**B.
Triadic behavior, on the other hand, did not enter the Cosmos until very 
recently, "perhaps less than 100,000 years ago, perhaps more." It is an event 
"different in kind from all preceding events in the Cosmos. It cannot be 
understood as a dyadic interaction or a complexus of dyadic interactions. . . .  It is 
that event in which sign A is understood by organism B, not as a signal to flee or 
approach, but as ‘meaning’ or referring to another perceived segment o f the 
environment" (LC 95-6).
Percy views Helen Keller’s experience at the well-house with Miss Sullivan 
as the paradigmatic triadic episode.12 Before the well-house event, Keller 
responded to Miss Sullivan’s words (spelled in her hand) as signals. But when 
Miss Sullivan put one of Keller’s hands underneath the water flowing out of the 
well and in her other hand spelled out w-a-t-e-r, Keller was quite literally bom  into 
the world of triadic behavior. She realized that the word was somehow connected 
to the thing, that it "meant" the cool liquid flowing over her hand. The connection 
between the word spelled, the actual thing, and Helen Keller herself form the 
angles of an irreducible triangle—hence, triadic behavior, or what Percy calls the 
"Delta Factor," the Greek letter itself (A) a symbol for irreducibility. For Percy, 
the three relations—between Keller and the word, Keller and the actual water, and
the word and the thing—cannot be explained dyadically.13 This event marks 
Keller’s crossing over the threshold of sign-use. No longer do Miss Sullivan’s 
words announce something to Keller; no longer are they signals. Instead, she has 
entered the realm of the triad—of meaning. Although she is still an organism in 
an environment with needs to be fulfilled, Percy emphasizes that her new found 
sign-use places her also in a world.
This idea of placement in a world is central to an understanding of Percy’s 
semiotics of self, and I will return to it shortly. For now, however, I wish to 
address Percy’s use of "sign." I have already noted that Percy follows Saussure in 
his later writings and uses signal and sign (as opposed to sign and symbol in his 
earlier writings) for the difference between announcement and conception. Yet 
when he begins to discuss triadic behavior and sign-use on page ninety-six of the 
"Primer," he seems to put Saussure’s distinction between signillant (signifier) and 
signifie (signified) to his own use. For Percy the former is the word itself and the 
latter is the referent or thing. But this is not Saussure’s meaning o f the terms. It is 
not until page 103 that Percy acknowledges Saussure’s use of the two terms; "The 
sign, as Saussure said, is a union of signifier (the sound-image of a word) and 
signified (the concept o f an object, action, quality)." Then he adds in a footnote 
that the signifie is neither a percept nor a concept, but something in between, a 
"‘concrete concept’ or an ‘abstract percept,’ or what Gerard Manley Hopkins
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called inscape." For Percy, then, the conjunction of the signifier and the signified, 
in its paradigmatic form (primordial form), places an object, action, or quality 
somewhere between the concrete and the abstract: "What comes to mind when I 
hear apple, what in fact the word articulates within itself, is neither an individual 
apple [percept] nor a definition of apple [concept], but a quality of appleness . . . "
Despite his somewhat equivocal use of Saussure, Percy places his thought 
precisely where he wants it to be. The sign itself exemplifies a state o f being 
between {inter esse). From Percy’s own standpoint between the behaviorists (for 
whom everything exists in the realm of the concrete), and the idealists or formalists 
(for whom the abstract holds priority), the sign exhibits its own inter esse. Thus, 
sign-use, in its primordial form, enacts a repetition for sign-users. It places them 
in a relation of interest—in the double sense of "being between" and "concerned." 
The paradigmatic sign-using event is itself a repetition.14
Every act of naming, the "Primer" continues, involves both a namer and a 
receiver of the name. The irreducible triad really involves two triangles—one for 
the sign-utterer and one for the sign-receiver: "Every triad of sign-reception 
requires another triad of sign-utterance. Whether the sign is a word, a painting, or 
a symphony—or Robinson Crusoe writing a journal to himself—a sign 
transaction requires a sign-utterer and a sign-receiver" {LC91). Miss Sullivan is 
not merely an ancillary participant in Helen Keller’s breakthrough to triadicity.
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For Percy, she relates as an ietersubjective "co-celebrant" to the being that 
primordial sign-use names. A child learning to name things from his parents 
stands in the same repetitive posture as Helen Keller. Sign-use is social in 
origin.15
As a result of this social nature, Percy offers a fresh view of consciousness.
In its etymological sense, conscious means "to know with." For Percy, this
"knowing with" carries a double reference—to the sign with which we "know" a
thing, and to the other (the namer) with whom we know it. Thus, the Cartesian or
Husserlian formula for consciousness—"I am conscious of this chair"—and the
Sartrean revision of it—"There is consciousness of this chair"—can be further
revised as "This ‘is’ a chair for you and me" (See MB 275-6). For Percy, sign-use
constitutes consciousness. Since
one is always conscious o/something as something—its 
sign—[then] it is part of the act of consciousness to place 
[that something] . . . .  The signing process tends to configure 
segments of the Cosmos under the auspices of a sign, often 
mistakenly. (L C 106)16
A particular interplay of light and shade may "look" like a rabbit, but upon closer
inspection it may turn out to be only the shadow of a bush. Furthermore, entities
denoted by such names as "unicorn" and "the boogerman" may find a place in the
world of the triadic sign-user even though they have no corresponding physical
existence. The sign-user inhabits and designates a world.
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But the Edenic, paradigmatic sign-using event of Helen Keller at the well-
house or of a child learning to name harbors a two-pronged snake in the grass.
On the one hand, the signifier is "interpenetrated" by the signified to the degree
that a devaluation occurs. No longer does the signifier reveal the signified, but
rather it seals it off. There takes place "a hardening and a closure of the signifier,
so that in the end the signified becomes encased in a simulacrum like a mummy in
a mummy case" (ZCT05). On the other hand, while the act of consciousness
places things in the world by means of signs, there is no sign that can encompass
the sign-user himself:
The fateful flaw of human semiotics is this: that of all the 
objects in the entire Cosmos which the sign-user can 
apprehend through the conjoining of signifier and signified 
(word uttered and thing beheld), there is one which forever 
escapes his comprehension—and that is the sign-user himself. 
Semiotically, the self is literally unspeakable to itself. . . . The 
self has no sign of itself. No signifier applies. All signifiers 
apply equally. (ZC107)17
The self, then, cannot be placed in the act of consciousness even though it is
conscious of itself. From the aspect of semiotics, then, the self is dislocated.
W ithout a consensus theory of the kind that informed Europe in the twelfth
century or New England in the sixteenth, the self literally has no place in the
Cosmos. It is unformulable, "lost in the cosmos," forever seeking its place.
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It may be useful to take this unformulability of the self as an analogue of 
the "dread that has no object" discussed in Chapter One. The transformation of 
dread into fear (the objectification of dread) bears a striking resemblance to the 
self seeking placement in the world. Placement is the key, but when the 
traditional modes of placement—Totemism, Eastern Pantheism, and Judeo- 
Christianity—are declared inadmissible by the postmodern world, the self is left 
with only two options—immanence or transcendence.18 In such a world, the self 
seeks to quell the dread of nonplacement by objectifying itself. It seeks a sign. In 
our post-religious and post-mythic age, the self seeks its sign either by taking its 
place as an immanent consumer of the goods that a scientific and technological 
culture provides for it—i.e., allowing goods and techniques to give it form—or by 
adopting the objective posture of science itself—i.e., transcending the world so as 
to make pronouncements about it.
Art offers another means of transcendence. The difference, however, 
between the transcendence of science and that of art is that whereas the scientist 
speaks to a relatively small transcendent community of scientists, the artist speaks 
"to the world of men who understand him" (L C 119). The artist names the 
unnameable and forms the unformulable. For an age in which the self finds no 
sign for itself, the artist provides the service of at least naming this predicament:
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If Kafka’s Metamorphosis is presently a more accurate 
account of the self than Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, it is 
the more exhilarating for being so. The naming o f the 
predicament of the self by art is its reversal. Hence the 
salvific effect of art. Through art, the predicament o f self 
becomes not only speakable but laughable. . . . Kafka and his 
friends laughed when he read his stories to them. (L C 121)19
But the transcendence that art provides is more ephemeral than that o f science.
The artist’s placement is more tenuous.
Scientists can remain "in orbit" as long as their community of fellow 
Olympians accepts their dicta. They have relatively few problems leaving that 
community momentarily and "reentering" the world. The artist participates in 
community at the time of creating his art, yet he suffers "spectacular reentries and 
flameouts" when he finishes his work and tries to reenter the ordinary world. 
These attempts at reentry bear witness to "nothing other than a pathology of the 
self in the twentieth century" (TCT21), one of Percy’s ultimate concerns as a 
writer.
It seems that I have raised what could be seen as a discrepancy in Percy’s 
thought. Is he a closet modernist hiding in the garb of a postmodernist? His 
comments about art providing an avenue of transcendence and about its salvific 
effect sound similar to the views of that high modernist James Joyce, whose 
Stephen Dedalus reveled in "epiphanic moments of transcendence" and who liked 
to speak of salvation by art. Is Percy inconsistent?
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If art is a sign that names the unnameable for its age, and if a sign is, as we 
have seen, somewhere between the abstraction and generality of a concept and the 
concreteness and individuality of a percept, then art cannot wholly exemplify the 
type of transcendence Stephen Dedalus speaks of. Abstraction and generality 
belong to the category of transcendence, since what they propose is definition or 
classification. Concreteness and individuality, on the other hand, fall into the 
category of immanence. If art provides a sign for the self in an age wherein the self 
has no sign, then the sign itself must partake of both immanence and 
transcendence, thus enacting the repetition outlined in Chapter One.
Furthermore, if a poet can "wrench signifier out of context and exhibit it in all its 
queerness" (ZC106), thus forestalling the interpenetration of the signifier by the 
signified, then art as a sign should resist this same interpenetration and so 
withstand the closure into form that Percy might seem to be espousing here by 
what could be taken as his tacit modernism, a Joycean, "transcendental" view.
In other words, if the self is unformulable, then the naming of this 
unformulability in a work of art, because the naming is itself a sign, cannot close 
the gap between the signifier and the signified. It is the nature of the sign to 
"devolve," for the signifier and the signified to interpenetrate. Yet it is the nature 
of art to counteract this interpenetration, to once again establish a distance 
between the two elements of the sign. As a sign itself, art endeavors to restore the
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sign to its rightful posture. The sign that art provides subverts the devolution of
the sign by restoring what Samuel Pickering might call "the right distance" 
between the signifier and the signified.20 In this space of the naming act itself, the 
self finds its transcendence, not as a Joycean abandonment of immanence, nor as a 
conflation of immanence and transcendence, but somewhere between the 
two—inter esse. For Percy, art enacts its "reversal" in the space of the naming act 
itself. The unformulable self can be restored to its posture of interest in the act of 
naming this same unformulability. Distance and difference are the keys.
In one of his interviews, Percy discusses this very issue of a gap or distance.
Referring, once again, to the Helen Keller episode, he says:
But the two couldn’t be more different; I mean the symbol 
water couldn’t be more different—whether spoken or spelled 
into her hand—than the liquid flowing over her other hand.
So you can hear her saying it, but there has to be a space, 
separation, or difference between the symbol and the thing in 
order for the thing to be grasped. (Con 227)
And in this same interview, when asked whether he agreed with Dedalus’s salvific
view of art and language, Percy responded:
No, unfortunately I’m much more pessimistic; I would see 
Kierkegaard as a good corrective of that. I could imagine 
Kierkegaard seeing—had he lived after Joyce—seeing Joyce 
as what he would call a hero of the aesthetic, seeing salvation 
through art and language. What is that great phrase that 
Stephen Dedalus uses in one place: "forge in the smithy of my 
soul the uncreated conscience of my race." Kierkegaard 
would say that’s the aesthetic sphere. {Con 231)
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There really is no discrepancy in Percy’s thought. What might appear as a 
relapse into modernist thinking finds its place in postmodernism.21 Like 
Kierkegaard, Percy tries to point to the existential by means of the aesthetic.
Thus, his novels do not provide a Joycean "moment of transcendence" as he seems 
to suggest toward the end of the "Primer." The form or the name that Percy offers 
to the unformulable self cannot place a self that is fundamentally dislocated. 
Percy’s comments in the interview and his repeated references to the 
unformulability of the self in both the "Primer" and in essays from The Message in 
the Bottle suggest that the gap between the signifier and the signified must remain 
so that the self will not flee the dread of its unformulability and objectify itself.
The only name that can place the self in this age—Homo viator-—places it 
paradoxically "nowhere," between the transcendence of art and science and the 
immanence of consumerism. From this interesting place, the signless autos 
retrieves possibilities in the hope of beginning again in the openness o f repetition, 
in the space of the sign itself. It is no accident that Lost in the Cosmos ends with 
the words: "Do you read me? Come back. Repeat. Come back. Come back. 
Come back" (256).
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2. The Openness o f  the Sign: Binx Bolling
This section and the one which follows provide some needed grounding for 
what has been handled up to this point on a highly abstract and analytical level. 
Two dimensions of the relation between repetition and the unformulability o f the 
self—the openness of the sign and placement in consciousness—lend themselves 
especially well to a reading o f Percy’s first two novels: The Moviegoer and The 
Last Gentleman.
By now, Binx Bolling must be as familiar to readers of American Literature 
as Quentin Compson. While this bemused, ironical, and detached son of the 
1950’s South tells his story in a subdued, laconic fashion, he nevertheless 
embodies, like the younger Compson scion, the spirit of his age. If Quentin bears 
witness to the decline of the rural, aristocratic, and stoic South, then Binx gives 
shape to the "malaise" that has struck the suburban, homogenized, consumer 
South. If Quentin succumbs to his disorientation, Binx explores his. Percy once 
told an interviewer that he viewed Binx as a "Quentin Compson who didn’t 
commit suicide" (Con 300). Thus, as Quentin wallows in his "love of death," Binx 
examines the death-in-life of a new age. And as the river closes over Quentin’s 
head, Binx looks for signs of a new possibility.
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Yet, like his creator, Binx eludes any facile designation. At once urbane,
charming, and calculating, he senses that something has gone wrong. Even that
knowledge, however, does little to inhibit his various stage impersonations. Time
and again, he tries to objectify his unformulable self. Sometimes, he takes the role
of a consumer: "I subscribe to Consumer Reports and as a consequence I own a
first-class television set, an all but silent air conditioner and a very long lasting
deodorant. My armpits never stink."22 At other times, he plays a scientist:
Until recently, I read only "fundamental" books, that is, key 
books on key subjects, such as War and Peace, the novel of 
novels; A Study o f History, a solution to the problem of 
time; Schroedinger’s What is Life?, Einstein’s The Universe 
as I  See It, and such. During those years, I stood outside the 
universe and sought to understand it. (59-60)
When he plays neither consumer nor scientist, Binx invokes or emulates the stars
of the silver screen: "Ah, William Holden, we already need you again. Already
the fabric is wearing thin without you" (14).
Yet Binx knows that such objectification of his dread cannot satisfy his 
"search." His ironic tone subverts the closure he would provide himself in such 
play-acting and opens him to his own despair. Even the titles o f the books he 
reads, set in the context of his scientific, "vertical" search, undercut the possibility 
he seeks. How could time be problematical, for example, if one has read a 
"solution to the problem of time"? For readers, Binx presents an exfoliation of
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quandaries. How can they grip someone who has no grip on himself? How can 
they trust a narrator who ironizes the keen eye with which he sizes up his world? 
How can they follow, in short, a lost narrator?23
John Edward Hardy has argued that The Moviegoer suffers as a work of 
fiction because "the reader is very often left to labor over gaps that he cannot be 
confident the author has recognized as such."24 Patrick Samway, S.J. suggests, 
on the other hand, in a structural analysis comparing the novel to a segment that 
appeared as a short-story, "Carnival in Gentilly,"25 that "the gaps . . . become 
pauses between elements of the code, the moments of silence that make music 
possible." Sam way further suggests that because The Mo viegoer and "Carnival in 
Gentilly" share a "palimpsest" relation, the novel is "about semiotics, about 
encoding and decoding signs. "26
Samway offers a sound corrective to Hardy’s frustration about "gaps," and 
there can be no doubt that The Moviegoer reflects Percy’s interest in semiotics.
Yet I find it equally valuable to look at Percy’s first novel in light of his concern 
with the study of semiotics, "not texts and other coded sign utterances but the self 
which produces texts or hears sign utterances" (LC85). A first-person narrative, 
The Moviegoer is ostensibly "produced" by Binx Bolling. In the Epilogue, Binx 
makes the only reference to his production of the text when he says "Reticence, 
therefore, hardly having a place in a document of this kind, it seems as good a time
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as any to make an end." (208). It may prove useful, then, to take a semiotic look 
at the narrator himself.
I have already mentioned Binx’s efforts to find a sign for himself by means 
of immanence and transcendence. I have also suggested that he ironizes his own 
attempts at such objectification. As a distancing tool, irony duplicates the space 
within the sign itself. Since irony creates a space between the ironist and the 
ironized, its expression by means of signs parallels the distance between the 
signifier and the signified at the very level of the sign. The "gaps" in the text, then, 
have a twofold origin. They arise as a result of the nature of the sign and as a 
consequence of Binx’s ironic posture. When Binx speaks o f his life as a perfect 
consumer, for example, the ironic tone with which he speaks distances himself 
from the closure that such a life implies—i.e., from the belief that the self can be 
informed by consumer items. Because his irony includes self-irony, he cannot 
close the gap between signifier and signified that such a sign for the self would 
offer. By means of irony, then, he paradoxically reinstates the unformulability of 
the self. What appears as a potential sign for the self is subverted by the narrative 
tone. Binx is left signless.
As ironist, Binx is especially adept at sizing up others. It is as though he 
cannot avoid seeing the despair of objectifying the self, the despair of
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27everydayness. Eddie Lovell, for instance, represents what Binx would be were
he not an ironist, for Eddie exists solely in the realm of the immanent:
Yes! Look at him. As he talks, he slaps a folded newspaper 
against his pants leg and his eye watches me and at the same 
time sweeps the terrain behind me, taking note of the 
slightest movement. A green truck turns down Bourbon 
Street; the eye sizes it up, flags it down, demands credentials, 
waves it on. A businessman turns in at the Maison Blanche 
Building; the eye knows him, even knows what he is up to.
And all the while he talks very well. His lips move 
muscularly, molding words into pleasing shapes, marshalling 
arguments, and during the slight pauses are held poised, 
attractively everted in a Charles Boyer pout—while a little 
web of saliva gathers in a corner like the clear oil o f a good 
machine. Now he jingles the coins deep in his pocket. No 
mystery here!—he is as cogent as a bird dog quartering a 
field. He understands everything out there and everything 
out there is something to be understood.
According to Binx, Eddie exists as an organism in an environment. At once a
"machine" and a "bird dog," he lives in the realm of signals. One thing announces
another. In his posture of complete immanence, he has annulled the possibility of
transcendence or distance. Eddie would have no difficulty describing himself, yet
what he would not realize is that his description would more than likely be a
signal. He would announce himself—as businessman, as husband, as
planner—and thereby close any gap regarding his self-identity.
Yet it is Binx’s posture that is interesting here. If Eddie observes and "sizes 
up" the terrain, Binx observes the observer. And if Eddie annuls the possibility of
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distance, Binx exists at an infinite remove.28 Eddie may be sunk in the immanent, 
but Binx is totally withdrawn from it. Neither displays the dialectic tension of the 
self. Rather, each has settled for a "deficient polarization"—one as consumer, the 
other as scientist. Without Binx’s posture of detachment, of course, the book 
would not exist. There has to be distance. The question remains, though, how 
much distance?
The temptation to flee the unformulable self is great, and while Binx is 
aware of such evasions in Aunt Emily (a Catonist), Uncle Jules (a "canny creole"), 
W alter Wade (a social climber), Sam Yerger (a stoic novelist), and Mercer (an old 
retainer turned Rosicrucian), he nevertheless cultivates his own evasions. In 
admitting his own flight from self, he continually throws into question his 
designations of others. He cannot damn them in moral iniquity because his 
predicament is similar to, or worse than, theirs. In fact, as Binx encounters each 
character, he is drawn to their own resolution of the predicament. While speaking 
with Eddie Lovell, he says "This is how one lives! My exile in Gentilly has been 
the worst kind of self-deception" (14). And when he visits with Aunt Emily he 
acknowledges that "this is where I belong after all" (21). He is drawn to the very 
despair he names.
Binx avoids himself, to be sure, but his evasions are more self-consciously 
created. Borrowing terms from Kierkegaard’s "Diapsalmata" in Either/Or; he
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practices what by now are familiar terms to students of Percy: rotations and 
repetitions. Binx defines rotation as "the experiencing of the new beyond the 
expectation of the experiencing of the new" (126). In rotation the unformulable 
self finds temporary relief from the dread of its unformulability by losing itself 
(closing itself) in the unexpected experience of the new. Rotation is an aesthetic
29category.
Repetition, on the other hand, is both an aesthetic and an existential
category. Binx’s rather clumsy definition reads:
A repetition is the re-enactment of past experience toward 
the end of isolating the time segment which has lapsed in 
order that it, the lapsed time, can be savored of itself and 
without the usual adulteration of events that clog time like 
peanuts in brittle. (68-9)
Even though Binx succeeds where Constantin Constantius fails—Binx says he has
"a successful repetition" (68)—he is nonetheless impoverished. Since Binx tries to
"neutralize" time, to make it "like a yard of smooth peanut brittle" (69), his
definition finds its place in the constancy of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic sphere. In
aesthetic repetition, the unformulable self avoids the issue of its unformulability by
viewing experience in closed, timeless "packages," as segments of lapsed time that
can be savored of themselves, determinately formulated so as to provide the
illusion that the self is also formulable. Such a repetition seeks to calm the "terrors
of history" by neutralizing them. It is, in effect, the recollective posture.
97
But early manuscripts of The Moviegoer suggest that Percy had in mind
existential repetition as well. A nearly illegible autograph note on the twenty-sixth
of fifty-seven pages of initial notes and outlines reads: "That [the?] repetition is
more than just a savoring of something. It also makes the present possible"
(SHC).30 Aesthetic repetition cannot make the present possible because it seeks
the Grand Moment of myth (in illo tempore)—the romantic IT. It seeks another
time. It is not insignificant that one short-story version of "Confessions of a
Moviegoer" was subtitled "From the Diary of the Last Romantic." Binx is the last
romantic because he has experienced the futility of seeking IT, some pre-packaged
experience of time. Binx recalls, for example, the melancholy he sank into after
travelling with friends:
It seemed like a fine idea, sleeping in shelters or under the 
stars in the cool evergreens, and later hopping freights. In 
fact, this was what I was sure I wanted to do. But in no time 
at all I became depressed. The times we did have fun, like 
sitting around a fire or having a time with some girls, I had 
the feeling they were saying to me: "How about this Binx?
This is really it, isn’t it, boy?", that they were practically 
looking up from their girls to say this. (34)
In "Confessions of a Moviegoer" itself, the moviegoer has more confidence in the
IT. After coming out of a movie he reflects:
This moment, the moment of the movies, the moment in 
which I live, is the Significant Moment. Where we [himself 
and actors] differ from other people is that they live in the 
moment as if it were like every other moment in their lives, a
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routine affair as if things and people were not any more 
worthy of noticing now than at any other time. The truth is 
that now everything is highly charged with meaning; 
everything is a Presence or a Power—that ordinary 
Brownstone there, that man on the subway: if the 
significance is not clear immediately, it soon will be. At any 
moment now, IT will begin. (SHC)
The romantic lives, not in the unformulable present, but in the expectation of the
formulated IT. He sets before himself a pre-packaged experience forever beyond
his reach, yet one whose attainment, he believes, would cancel the dread o f his
unformulable self. Living in the expectation that such an experience will set him
free, he awaits the day when fate will deliver it to him.31
Binx, of course, is onto the futility of the romantic. In the final version of 
the novel, he eschews the romantic quest, because, among other things, it "killed" 
his father.32 And on the bus trip back from Chicago to New Orleans, when he 
and Kate encounter a young man reading The Charterhouse o f Parma, he directly 
states the romantic’s dilemma: "The poor fellow. He has just begun to suffer from 
it, this miserable trick the romantic plays upon himself: of setting just beyond his 
reach the very thing he prizes" (189). The depression Binx experiences at times 
when he should feel the exhilaration of IT offers a clue to his search for new 
possibilities. Despite his self-consciously cultivated evasions, then, Binx holds out 
for something more, namely, existential repetition. One especially sly indication of 
this attitude occurs, once again, when Binx turns his irony upon himself.33
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He recalls his freshman year of college when "it was extremely important to
me to join a good fraternity." In an attempt to convince Binx that he should join
the Deltas, the somewhat grandiose Walter Wade takes him aside, and, although
he says he will not "hand [Binx] the usual crap about this fraternity business," he
does anyway: "When it comes to describing the fellows here, the caliber of the
men, the bond between us, the meaning of this little symbol—he turned back his
lapel to show the [fraternity] pin. . ." Then he dangles the IT in front o f Binx:
I’ll ask you a single question and then we’ll go down. Did 
you or did you not feel a unique something when you walked 
into this house? I won’t attempt to describe it. If you felt it, 
you already know exactly what I mean. If you didn’t—!"
Now Walter stands over me, holding his hat over his heart.
"Did you feel it, Binx?" (30-1)
Caught up in the romanticism of Walter’s rhetoric, Binx cannot avoid joining.
Yet, the rapture of his romantic capitulation ends in irony:
As it turns out, I did not make them a good man at all. I 
managed to go to college four years without acquiring a 
single honor. When the annual came out, there was nothing 
under my picture but the letters AT A—which was appropriate 
since I had spent the four years propped on the front porch 
of the fraternity house, bemused and dreaming, watching the 
sun shine through the Spanish moss, lost in the mystery of 
finding myself alive at such a time and place—and next to 
AT A my character summary: "Quiet but a sly sense of 
humor." (31)
In this passage Percy endows Binx with his own "quiet, sly sense of humor." 
For, despite the banality of the situation and the ironic tone, what is at issue here
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is precisely "the meaning of this little symbol"— AT A. The delta’s, o f course, depict 
Percy’s symbol for the irreducible triad of the sign. And psi provides the initial 
letter for "psyche," from which we derive our word for self or soul. Binx’s own 
identity, then, is connected to the "meaning of this little symbol," the only entry 
underneath his picture. Although Binx did not make a good fraternity man, he 
nevertheless embodies the truth about the self for Percy: While the self (T ) cannot 
be encompassed by a sign (A), it nevertheless finds itself immured in sign use (ATA) 
and so must look to the delta to understand itself. Binx manifests a repetitive 
posture as he watches "the sun shine through the Spanish moss, lost in the mystery 
of finding [himself] alive at such a time and place." It is important, first, that Binx 
"finds himself," and second that he finds himself "alive" and not "dead dead dead," 
as he so often finds others. The subtle self-irony provides the sign that opens the 
"mystery of time and place." Binx inhabits this time and place, and he finds the 
"right distance" to reveal himself—"lost"—in it. He finds himself, not in the Great 
Moment of myth, but in the ordinary everyday, which is quite different from the 
everydayness that precludes the possibility of a search. Thus, Binx is between 
(inter esse) the single sign (A) that can never formulate him and the sign use (ATA) 
without which he can know nothing at all and which provides the best avenue, 
according to Percy, to know oneself. Binx’s ironic naming and the distance that it 
creates parallels the gap between the elements of the sign itself, a gap that has to be
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there "in order for the thing to be grasped" (Con 227). While the romantic loses 
himself in the closure of his pre-packaged experience, Binx finds himself in the 
openness of the sign.
It is Binx’s subtle signification and irony in the narrative itself that prevents 
the interpenetration of the signifier by the signified and which leaves him open to 
new possibilities. Although he slips out of the "right distance" from time to time in 
his ironic posture, he nevertheless manages what Paul A. Bove and Ronald 
Schleifer, following Kierkegaard, have called "mastered irony."34 Unlike his 
father, who displays an "unmastered" irony and whose eyes "beyond a d o u b t. . . 
are ironical" (21) in the picture on Aunt Emily’s mantelpiece, Binx manages the 
distance of his ironic posture. He stands between the fatal romantic irony of his 
father and the banal seriousness of Walter Wade. He maintains his repetitive 
posture, which is itself another word for "mastered irony."
But even so subtle an expression of existential repetition nevertheless 
polarizes into the aesthetic in a work of art, as Percy says it must. It devolves into 
something to savor, the merely interesting, as opposed to the interest that 
comprises repetition.35 What such subtlety demands, however, is a decision on 
the part o f the reader. Although Percy says he "would like to think that [Binx] is 
an embodiment of a certain pathology of the twentieth century . . . it’s an open 
question." The reader must decide whether Binx is himself "a nut" or whether he
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expresses an "authentic mood of the time" (Con 302). Like Kierkegaard, Percy 
points to the existential by means of the aesthetic. Such an attempt is bound to 
provide an ambiguous sign. Just as it is impossible to determine whether the 
"ambiguous sienna color[ed] Negro" has received ashes on Ash Wednesday, the 
last day of the novel’s action (before the epilogue), so too it is impossible to close 
the gap in the sign that is the novel. In the openness of this sign, Percy allows for 
the possibility of repetition.
3. The Dislocated Self: Language, Place, and Will Barrett
To say that Percy’s characters are dislocated offers nothing new to the body 
of scholarship surrounding his works. And to portray Will Barrett as an example 
of this dislocation is not to say that Percy’s other characters do not suffer the same 
fate. Binx Bolling, Tom More, and Lancelot Lamar can all be seen as exiles in 
almost every dimension of their existence. Yet, Will Barrett of The Last 
Gentleman is the only character whose story begins and ends outside o f the south. 
Although Percy balked at the label "Southern Writer"—"is John Cheever a 
'Northern Writer?’"36—he nevertheless acknowledged that his novels, especially 
The Moviegoer, would not work without the backdrop of the south’s rich 
tradition:
Without the southern backdrop—Mississippi, Louisiana 
(New Orleans)—the novel doesn’t work—it doesn’t work at
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all. Try to imagine Binx Bolling in Butte, Montana. There 
has to be a contrast between this very saturated culture in the 
south, on one hand, whether it’s French, Creole, uptown 
New Orleans, or Protestant. It’s a very dense society or 
culture which you need for Binx to collide with. (Con 301)
For Percy to remove a character from this fertile ground, then, suggests a degree
of dislocation unequal to that of the other characters. In one of his early
interviews, Percy admits that Barrett is "a good deal sicker" than Binx, but, as with
Binx, "the reader is free to see him as a sick man among healthy businessmen or as
a sane pilgrim in a mad world" (Con 13). Not only is Barrett "sicker," his
story—both in The Last Gentleman and The Second Coming—is the only one
written from the third-person point of view, an indication, perhaps, that Percy
needs to distance himself from this addled young man in order to get the story
straight. To further emphasize his dislocation, Percy withholds his name from the
reader for the first ten pages of the novel. When he does give his name, he presents
the reader with a multiple choice: "[his] name was Williston Bibb Barrett or Will
Barrett or Billy Barrett" (21).37 And to complicate matters even more, the
narrator most often refers to Barrett, not by his name, but as "the engineer."
John Edward Hardy has argued convincingly that the novel’s opening, with 
its emphasis on place, is "clearly ironic." Not only is Will a "displaced" southerner 
living in New York, but the scene at Central Park, ostensibly constructed to 
provide a definite location for the action, nevertheless devolves into "no place . . .
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an anywhere and nowhere."38 This reading gains credibility when we learn some 
pages later that a spot in the southeast quadrant of the park has been marked as 
"ground zero," the center of a "series of concentric circles" (44), on a map depicting 
the explosion of a nerve gas bomb. Barrett, then, is thrice removed from place, 
and he seeks a sign that will locate him in the world: "Often nowadays people do 
not know what to do and so live out their lives as if they were waiting for some 
sign or other. This young man was such a person" (13). With his telescope of "an 
unusual design" (11), this nameless, displaced southerner awaits a sign at ground 
zero of "no place."39
The telescope is outfitted with a camera so that Barrett might photograph a 
peregrine falcon he had seen the day before. It does not return, so Barrett begins 
to dismantle the telescope. Yet "being of both a scientific and a superstitious turn 
of mind and therefore always on the lookout for chance happenings which lead to 
great discoveries, he had to have a last look" (12). What he finds proves to be the 
chance event he has been waiting for, the sign "as a consequence [of which] the rest 
of his life was to be changed" (11), readers are told on the first page of the novel.
The event that changes Barrett’s life is also, of course, the incident that sets 
the novel in motion. The passage merits close inspection: "There in the telescope 
sat a woman, on a park bench, a white woman dark as a gypsy. She held a 
tabloid. Over her shoulder he read: '. . . parley fails’" (12). The woman turns out
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to be Rita Vaught, and we learn that she leaves messages at the park bench for 
Kitty Vaught, the second woman Barrett sees through his telescope and with 
whom he falls in love.
Since it is the instrument through which Barrett sees his life-changing sign, 
the telescope itself merits analysis. We know very little about it at this point of the 
novel, only that it was of "unusual design" and that it could be fitted with a 
camera. This latter feature is noteworthy because it doubles its capacity for 
observation. The telescope narrows and amplifies the field of vision while the 
camera stabilizes and freezes it into a single image. We learn later that when 
Barrett purchased the telescope, he had looked upon it as something that would, 
like the sign it reveals, change him: "his life depended on it." The telescope also 
suits Barrett’s scientific/magical temperament: "[its] lenses did not transmit light 
merely. They penetrated into the heart of things" (31). The instrument both 
reflects and creates the world in its "brilliant theater o f lenses" (12). In so doing, it 
recovers things. When Barrett turns his instrument toward a building, for 
example,
it was better than having the bricks there before him. They 
gained in value. Every grain and crack and excrescence 
became available. Beyond a doubt, he said to himself, this 
proves that bricks, as well as other things, are not as 
accessible as they used to be. Special measures were needed 
to recover them. The telescope recovered them. (32)
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The telescope is Barrett’s instrument for recovering and discovering the world. 
Through its lenses, Barrett knows the world.
The character and power of this "unusual" instrument—it is itself the agent 
in many of the passages that describe it—suggest that it can be read as an 
analogue or a metaphor for the novel itself. Like the subtle expression of Percy’s 
linguistic philosophy in Binx’s AT A, the description of the telescope suggests 
Percy’s views about the diagnostic function of the novel. The telescope, after all, is 
a scientific instrument, and, as I tried to show in Chapter One, Percy uses the 
novel "scientifically."
Like the telescope, the novel magnifies a section of the world; it wrests it 
from its usual context so that it might be seen afresh and named. The novel strives 
to recover the world. Later in the story, when Barrett is on the road with Jamie, 
Kitty’s sixteen-year-old brother who is dying, he observes a man on a "fifty-foot 
Chris-Craft beat up the windy Intercoastal." He calls Jamie over to see what he 
sees in the telescope:
"Look how he pops his jaw and crosses his legs with the crease of his 
britches pulled out of the way."
"Yes," said Jamie, registering and savoring what the engineer 
registered and savored. Yes, you and I  know something the man in the 
Chris-Craft will never know. (130-1, Percy’s emphasis)
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Jamie and Will meet in what they see through the telescope in the same fashion as 
reader and writer meet in the reading of a novel. We know more about Will 
Barrett than Will knows about himself. The novel establishes an intersubjective 
community between reader and writer in its very naming. And since a name is also 
a sign, the novel also resists closure or stasis.
It is significant, then, that Barrett’s ostensible use for the telescope, to 
photograph the peregrine falcon, fails. Made versatile by the addition of the 
camera, the telescope promises not only to magnify the falcon but also to stabilize 
it, to close it within the rigid boundaries of a photograph. That Barrett does not 
capture the falcon on film both foreshadows his coming peregrinations and points 
to the limits of the novel itself. Like the falcon, Barrett is himself a sign of 
instability. Just as the falcon has "abandoned its natural home in the northern 
wilderness and taken up residence on top of the hotel," so Barrett has left the 
south and taken up residence in the New York City YMCA. Neither remains, 
however. The "peregrine did not return to his perch" (12), and Barrett soon begins 
his travels, which end in the "no-place" of the desert. Just as the telescope 
sees—but cannot place—the falcon, so the novel names—but does not 
place—Barrett. Both are wanderers, pilgrims without a home, displaced. The 
names they are given place them "nowhere."40
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But if the ostensible purpose for Barrett’s using his telescope fails, the 
manifest purpose does not. The telescope, again like the novel, serves its 
voyeuristic function well. It observes without being observed. It amplifies 
unobtrusively.41 At one point, Barrett declares his appreciation of English 
detective stories, "especially the sort which . . . depict the hero as perfectly 
disguised or perfectly hidden. . . . Englishmen like to see without being seen." The 
telescope is the novelist’s tool par excellence. If neither the novel nor the telescope 
can place their respective pilgrims from their concealed viewpoints, then both can 
at least help to name this same predicament. What the telescope does observe, and 
what the novel ultimately points to as well, is precisely what Barrett sees when he 
takes his one last look: ". . . parley fails."
This rich, polyvalent fragment would deserve little consideration were it not 
in a novel by Percy, and at the all-important beginning.42 Parley derives from the 
French parler the ecclesiastical Latin parabolare, both meaning "to speak." 
Parabolare, in turn, derives from the Latin parabola, a speech, from which we get 
the word parable. In English, parley can be used either as a verb, "to have a 
conference or discussion," or as a noun, "a talk or conference for the purpose of 
discussing a specific matter."43 Percy is especially sly in his use of the term, for 
the fragment remains so open that it encompasses both the etymological and the 
usage definitions.
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Since the word appears as a part of a tabloid headline, it apparently refers 
to a meeting or conference. The time of the novel is never precisely set. There is a 
mention of John Kennedy’s death, and one scene refers indirectly to the riots that 
occurred at the University of Mississippi after desegregation. So the time would 
appear to be the early 1960’s. The fragment, then, could refer to any number of 
failed parleys that undoubtedly took place during that era: about the mounting 
Cold War, about the riots themselves, about the escalation of the United States’ 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict, anything.
Given Percy’s interest in the language phenomenon, however, a more 
fruitful reading arises from evidence inside the novel itself and from his comments 
in the "Primer" about the devolution of the sign and placement. W hat we learn as 
The Last Gentleman progresses is that Will Barrett finds himself in the midst of a 
number of failed parleys, in every sense of the word. Will’s thwarted relationship 
with Kitty, their aborted attempts at love-making (a connotative meaning of 
parley), Will’s relation to Dr. Gamow (his psychoanalyst), the relationship 
between Kitty and Rita Vaught (Kitty’s overseer and general "helper" who 
displays ambiguous sexual intentions), between Rita and Sutter Vaught (Rita’s ex- 
husband, a failed doctor turned pornographer), between Will and Sutter, between 
Sutter and Val Vaught (a nun who works with the rural Tyree people), between 
Will and his father, and even the picaresque adventures of Will with Forney Aiken
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and company, with the ladies on the highway, and with the black bar-owner and 
the white policemen in his hometown—all suggest the centrality of t p-1 his tabloid 
fragment. These relationships display the failure of speaking. Words are 
bankrupt. The one notable exception to this general collapse is the relationship 
between Jamie and Will, whose co-celebration of what is develops in light o f their 
complementarity: "Jamie read books of great abstractness . . . .  The engineer, on 
the other hand, read books of great particularity" (130).
Meanwhile, this breakdown of words has to do with the devolution of the
sign. When the signified becomes entombed by the signifier and when the
repetitive posture of primordial sign-use is lost, intersubjectivity in consciousness
also wanes. In other words, when speaking fails, love fails. The problem is not
that the characters do not try to speak. On the contrary, words flow freely
between them. It is the peculiar posture from which they speak that concerns
Percy. Since he explores the conditions that accompany the end of the modern
world, he also examines the causes and effects of the breakdown of language. In
the words of the epigram:
. . . We know now that the modern world is coming to an end 
. . .  at the same time, the unbeliever will emerge from the fogs 
of secularism. He will cease to reap benefit from the values 
and forces developed by the very Revelation he denies . . .
Loneliness in faith will be terrible. Love will disappear from 
the face of the public world, but the more precious will be 
that love which flows from one lonely person to another. . .
I l l
the world to come will be filled with animosity and danger, 
but it will be a world open and clean.44
The posture that creates the condition for the failure of words, love, and faith
evolves from an imbalance of immanence and transcendence. For Percy, the
postmodern world bears witness to transcendence or immanence taken separately,
or it evinces some strange hybrid of the two, but it has lost any sense of organic
unity between them. With such a radical disjunction, Percy suggests, it is
inevitable that parleys often fail.
Rita, for example, illustrates one facet of this extensive bankruptcy. Since 
she blends immanence and transcendence from a transcendent posture, she 
embodies an Hegelian, scientific-humanist attitude. Her "mode of reentry" 
consists of a general beneficence which masks an essential isolation. Kitty is onto 
her—"I knew exactly how to make her like me!" (96)—although she remains awed 
by her:
Rita is a remarkable person . . . .  She showed me something I 
never dreamed existed. Two things. First, the way she 
devoted herself to the Indians. I never saw anything like it.
They adored her. I saw one child’s father try to kneel and 
kiss her foot. Then she showed me how a thing can be 
beautiful. She kept Shakespeare’s sonnets by her bed. And 
she actually read them. Listen to this, she would say, and she 
would read it. And I could hear it the way she heard it! Bare 
ruin’d choirs, where late the sweet birds sang. Poetry: who’d 
have thought it? We went for walks. I listened to her but 
then (is this bad?) I began to see how much she was enjoying 
teaching me. (96)
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Percy seems to have endowed Rita with a part of his adoptive father’s 
character. Although she does not portray the stoical melancholia o f William 
Alexander Percy—this facet of his character is given to Will’s father, as I will 
discuss below—it is significant that Kitty’s description of her parallels Percy’s own 
comments about "Uncle Will." In the introduction to Lanterns on the Levee,
Percy tells of the way Will Percy used to read to him or play music for him. He 
began, he says, to see things the way his teacher saw them: "The teacher points 
and says Look, the response is Yes, /see."45 He also calls Will Percy "the most 
extraordinary man I have ever known" (xviii).
Like Will Percy’s beneficence toward the blacks in the Delta, Rita’s work 
with the Indians is indeed generous. It evolves from the stoic’s attitude of noblesse 
oblige, something which Walker addresses in "Stoicism in the South." The stoic’s 
attitude, Percy argues, essentially isolates him. His "generosity" masks the 
sentiment that doing others "an injustice would be to defile the inner fortress 
which [is] oneself." One cares for others not because they are individuals but 
because not caring for them would wound "the wintry kingdom self."46 The 
stoic’s end is a solipsism which seeks to protect the self from the vicissitudes of 
history. Rita’s name for the camper in which Jamie and Will 
travel—"Ulysses"47—and her comment on that name point to her transcendent 
posture: "He was meant to travel beyond the borders of the Western world and
113
bring us home" (82). As for Will Percy, so for Rita: intersubjectivity fails, and the 
world slips away.48
Sutter exemplifies a different permutation of the insolvency of words. As a 
physician, he participates in the transcendent scientific community. He has even 
published a paper, an act which confirms his initiation into that sovereign 
society.49 The title of the essay points to his own predicament with placement on 
the immanent-transcendent continuum: The Incidence o f Post-orgasmic Suicide in 
Male University Graduate Students. The paper itself is divided into two sections 
with subtitles: "Genital Sexuality as the Sole Surviving Communication Channel 
between Transcending-Immanent Subjects," and "The Failure of Coitus as a Mode 
of Reentry into the Sphere of Immanence from the Sphere of Transcendence" (See 
LG5 8).
Sutter has recognized the radical bifurcation that has occurred in the wake 
of the failure of words, and he exists as its most poignant exemplar. Percy argues 
in Lost in the Cosmos that a corollary of such a collapse is the ascendence of sex in 
various forms. When signs devolve, when the transcendence that sign-use provides 
falters, the only avenues to transcendence become sex and violence. It is notable 
that almost every failed parley cited above (pp. 109-10) involves a correlate to sex. 
The exceptions, the scene at the hometown bar and Will’s relationship with his 
father, which ends in his father’s suicide, find their correlate in violence. Yet, an
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element of sex, too, exists in the story of Mr. Barrett’s suicide. On the night of his 
death, he denounces the fact that his "class" had become "the fornicators and 
bribers" (258) they once opposed, and he leaves Will confused on the business of 
lady and whore (144). In The Second Coming, Percy unites sex and violence more 
trenchantly in Barrett’s reflections on his father’s suicide, indicating perhaps a 
confirmation of his own theories and a breakthrough to understanding his own 
father’s death.50
Sutter becomes a pornographer because he is trapped in the transcendence 
of his science. He seeks reentry to the immanent realm by means of what he sees 
as the purely immanent, sex. Thus, he manifests a strange hybrid of the 
immanent-transcendent dialectic, an angelism-bestialism that Percy will develop 
more fully in Love in the Ruins. Yet, Sutter despairs in his Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde existence. When this mode of reentry fails him, he considers violence. He 
contemplates suicide.
It is useful to point out again that Percy explores the postmodern 
predicament with regard to place. The Last Gentleman evolves not so much as a 
jeremiad, although its tone in parts can be seen as cantankerous, but as a search 
for possibilities. For Percy, a pilgrim finds his end only at the end of his life. That 
some characters reach a dead end suggests either that they have quit their search 
for new prospects or that the logical conclusion of the postures they embrace bears
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witness to death-in-life. Alienation and homelessness are natural states, not 
psychological disorders. Although an adept satirist, Percy does not condemn 
characters who try to find a home, not even Lancelot Lamar. Rather, as Louis 
Rubin has argued, he writes o f them from the standpoint of having been there 
himself:
Walker’s [fiction] is not Jansenist; it is not written from a 
position of theological privilege located far above the 
struggle, judging the poor deluded sinners and consigning 
them to the fire . . . .  [He] includes himself among the 
sinful.51
The posture that remains most open to possibility is that of the pilgrim, one who is
at home in homelessness, such as the addled wayfarer of The Last Gentleman.
Will Barrett not only drifts into one failed parley after another, but finds
himself, quite literally, in the middle of them. Perhaps the first indication of this
middle state manifests itself with Dr. Gamow’s "ambiguous chair":
[Dr. Gamow] learned a great deal about a patient from the 
way he sat in the chair. Some would walk in and sit straight 
up, swivel around to face the doctor across the desk like a 
client consulting a lawyer. Others would stretch out and 
swivel away to face the corner in conventional analytic style.
It was characteristic of the engineer that he sat in the 
ambiguous chair ambiguously: leaving it just as it was, 
neither up nor down, neither quite facing Dr. Gamow nor 
facing away. (32)
Neither new-style client (a la Carl Rogers) nor old-style analysand, Barrett resists 
formulation. That he abruptly terminates his analysis suggests the limits o f the
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52psychoanalytic process, about which Percy has written cogently elsewhere. 
Although he tells himself that he will "engineer the future of [his] life according to 
the scientific principles and the self-knowledge [he has] so arduously gained from 
five years of analysis" (39), the narrator’s very tone betrays him. The "scientific 
principles" of analysis cannot fathom this pilgrim’s alienation.
But the "ambiguous chair" is only one of many examples o f Will’s "being 
between." After he declares his love for Kitty and wins the affection of Jamie, he 
steps between almost all of the established relationships in the Vaught family.
Rita considers him a rival to the attentions of Kitty and so devises a plan that 
would allow him to travel with Jamie. Unknown to Will, Rita’s interests focus on 
separating the new lovers. But Pappy (Mr. Vaught) has already proposed a plan 
to Will, and so Will finds himself between both Kitty and Rita and between the 
wishes of Pappy and Rita. Sutter, who wants to take Jamie to die in the desert of 
Santa Fe and who represents something of a father-figure to Will, has no use 
either for serving as Will’s guide or for his sister’s (Val’s) desire to see Jamie 
baptized. Val, however, has charged Barrett with that very task. Will, then, is 
placed between Sutter’s nihilism and Val’s faith.
Will is also caught between the present and his past. Because he is subject 
to amnesia, fugues, and deja vus, he is disoriented in time. He often forgets, but 
when he does remember, he recalls "the remote past first" (51), often unwittingly.
117
Time and again, he experiences unannounced intrusions of the past into his
present consciousness. In a way, Will serves as his own analyst. He doesn’t
necessarily "engineer" his life, but he endeavors to be what Dr. Gamow tried to be
to him: "it was easy to believe t h a t . . .  he served his patients best as artificer and
shaper, receiving the raw stuff of their misery and handing it back in a public and
acceptable form" (35). The reference to Wallace Steven’s idea of shaping and
making complements an earlier reference to Freud:
A German physician once remarked that in the lives of 
people who suffer emotional illness he had noticed the 
presence of Liicken or gaps. As he studied the history of a 
particular patient he found whole sections missing, like a 
book with blank pages. (18)
Although Freud was Austrian, the allusion seems fairly clear.53 The psychiatrist
fills in the gaps, gives shape to the "raw material" that is a person’s life, as Freud
did in his case histories. The psychiatrist, in other words, fashions the story (the
parabola) of the patient. He writes the patient’s life.
The danger of such a role—a reason this parley may fail—resides in the fact 
that a patient may lose sovereignty over that same story. While analysis ostensibly 
proposes a recovery of patients’ lost sovereignty, the process may result in their 
further alienation. When the psychiatrist insists too strongly on filling in blank 
pages, on fashioning a well-made story, the story may serve the wishes of the 
analyst himself rather than the needs of the patient. In the case of Dora, for
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example, Freud seems less concerned with Dora as an individual than with Dora 
as an instance of his own theories. He masters her story.54
Commentators on Percy’s fiction often note the pleasure he takes in turning 
Freud upside down. Percy himself once admitted that this was one of his narrative 
strategies.55 That Percy writes the story of a character with severe gaps in his 
memory suggests his attempt to endow Barrett with his own sovereignty. As his 
experience with the "ambiguous chair" implies, Barrett is not made to fit any 
theory which places the ideal before the actual. For Percy, such theories are 
bankrupt: they lead only to romanticism and despair. Percy struggles against the 
bankruptcy of words by telling a story whose words point to their own 
inadequacy—Barrett himself is a romantic—yet which nevertheless provide the 
only means by which to know anything at all. That Will Barrett quits analysis 
even though he still suffers from gaps points to his inchoate sense of the perils of 
the analytic process.
At the same time, however, Will recognizes the necessity of fashioning a 
story, and he looks to those who his "radar" tells him know better than he. Sutter 
is such a person. Frustrated that Sutter won’t play analyst for him, Will reflects: 
"Damnation, if I am such an old story to him, why doesn’t he tell me how the 
story comes out?" (178) Sutter, however, recognizes that any attempt to satisfy 
this ubiquitous, although impossible, desire would serve only to alienate Barrett
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further. In his casebook, he carries on a dialogue with Val, whom he imagines
speaking to Will:
Look, Barrett, your trouble is due not to a disorder of your 
organism but to the human condition, that you do well to be 
afraid and you do well to forget everything which does not 
pertain to your salvation. That is to say, your amnesia is not 
a symptom. So you say: Here is the piece of news you have 
been waiting for, and you tell him. What does Barrett do?
He attends in that eager flattering way of his and at the end 
of it he might even say yes! But he will receive the news from 
his high seat of transcendence as one more item of 
psychology, throw it into his immanent meat-grinder, and 
wait to see if he feels better. (276)56
Sutter leaves Will to his Liicken, and Barrett is left to piece together the story of
himself as he shuttles between the past and present.
One of the main gaps in Barrett’s story, of course, concerns his father’s 
death. Fragments of the incident recur throughout the course of the narrative.
But once Sutter takes Jamie to Santa Fe, leaving Barrett to travel through the 
South on his own, he is all the more haunted by deja vus and intrusions of his past. 
When he arrives at his hometown, Ithaca, Mississippi, and when he finds himself 
before his childhood home, the place of his father’s death, the story demands form 
more insistently. Although his father has won a victory over the "bribers and 
fornicators," all is not well. The boy and his father stroll outside in the night as 
they listen to Brahms:
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As he turned to leave, the youth called out to him. "Wait."
"What?"
"Don’t leave."
"I’m just going to the corner."
But there was a dread about this night, the night of victory.
(Victory is the saddest thing of all, said the father.) The 
mellowness of Brahms had gone overripe, the victorious 
serenity of the Great Horn Theme was false, oh fake fake. 
Underneath all was unwell. (259)
The elder Barrett ultimately states his philosophy of life: "In the last analysis you
are alone" (259). Although Will repeats his plea several times— Wait. Don’t
lea vei—his father nevertheless kills himself. But the story has finally taken shape
in his memory.
Some years later, as he stands at the place of this horrible memory, past
and present merge such that the future seems possible to him. His hand strays to
an old ironhorse hitching post around which an oak tree has grown. As he
reflects, Will briefly adopts a repetitive posture:
Wait. While his fingers explored the juncture of iron and 
bark, his eyes narrowed as if he caught a glimmer of light on 
the cold iron skull. Wait. I think he was wrong and that he 
was looking in the wrong place. No, not he but the times.
The times were wrong and one looked in the wrong place. It 
wasn’t his fault because that was the way he was and the way 
the times were, and there was no other place a man could 
look. It was the worst of times, a time of fake beauty and 
fake victory. Wait. He had missed it! It was not in the
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Brahms that one looked and not in solitariness and not in the 
old sad poetry but—he wrung out his ear—but here, under 
your nose, here in the very curiousness and drollness and 
extraness of the iron and the bark that—he shook his 
head—that— (260)
Louis D. Rubin, Jr., has written beautifully on the significance of this 
superb passage. What Will realizes as his hand explores the "juncture of iron and 
bark" is that "his father’s ideal of aristocratic virtue, however nobly motivated, 
was actually a romantic escape from the compromised actuality of human life in 
time."57 That Brahms is playing in the background only reinforces the elder 
Barrett’s isolation. For the music sets up a romantic ideal of perfection which in 
its "massive harmonics pronounce[s] an ultimate resolution superior to merely 
human difficulties and leaving no further occasion for striving or disruption" 
(Rubin 211). The music, Rubin argues, sets up an ideal of perfection which 
parallels the supposed ethical perfection of the Southern aristocrat. The victory 
over the "rabble" and the music’s own victory are fake because each points to a 
static perfection that annuls a "vital relationship with ongoing experience"— 
change in time (Rubin 213). The era of the Southern aristocrat has waned, if there 
ever was one; and, although Rubin does not make the connection, to try to hold 
on to such standards reinforces what Kierkegaard calls the despair to will to be
58oneself in despair.
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In a passage that closely parallels the plight of Mr. Barrett, Kierkegaard
writes:
In despair the self wants to enjoy the total satisfaction of 
making itself into itself, of developing itself, of being itself; it 
wants to have the honor of this poetic, masterly construction, 
the way it has understood itself. And yet, in the final 
analysis, what it understands by itself is a riddle; in the very 
moment when it seems that the self is closest to having the 
building completed, it can arbitrarily dissolve the whole thing 
into nothing. (69-70)
Mr. Barrett, o f course, dissolves the edifice at the moment of both his and the
music’s victory.
His son, however, is still building his edifice, not a "poetic, masterly 
construction," not a "well-made story" which has no gaps. Rather, from his being 
between (inter esse) past and present, between the failed parleys of the Vaught 
family and, finally, between Father Boomer and Jamie at the story’s conclusion, 
Barrett holds out, however unwittingly, for the possibility that "nowhere" might 
provide. That Barrett ultimately "misses," as Percy says, the significance both of 
Jamie’s baptism and of his experience in front of his father’s house does not 
devalue the signs themselves. For in the telescope that is the novel, the reader sees
and knows something that Barrett himself does not. This parley does not fail.
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Notes to Chapter Two
1. See Critical Essays on Jonathan Edwards (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1980)
ix.
2. (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1991).
3. (Troy, New York: The Whitston Publishing Company, 1988).
4. I do not wholly agree with John Edward Hardy, The Fiction o f Walker 
Percy (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1987), who says that Percy’s "own 
comments [in his non-fiction pieces and interviews] do not form a coherent 
system for critical interpretation and evaluation of any works of fiction, his 
own notably included" (19). Percy’s methodology in both his fiction and 
nonfiction, as I hope to show, reflects his attempt at repetition or retrieval, 
and thus makes his work "all of a piece." Lewis Lawson maintains the 
same thing in his review of Hardy’s work, "Hardy Thinking on Percy," The 
Southern Literary Journal 21 (1989): 113-118.
5. The quotation is taken from a letter Percy wrote to Lewis Simpson and 
which Simpson used in "Walker Percy’s Vision of the Modern World," the 
Flora Levy Lecture in the Humanities, University of Southwestern 
Louisiana, Spring 1991.
6. Percy’s letters and manuscripts are available at the Southern Historical 
Collection at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, hereafter to be 
cited in the text as SHC. This letter is dated Saturday, July 29, 1989. Percy 
died less than a year later, on May 10, 1990.
Foote could never understand Percy’s interest in linguistic philosophy. He 
wrote a letter to Percy on July 10, 1953 (from which the following 
quotation is taken), not long before Percy was to publish his first 
philosophical essay, "Symbol as Need": "I of course know nothing of 
Symbolic Forms. Go your way. But it seems to me that any philosophy 
that tries to co-relate [sic] (if that means unify in any sense) Art, Religion, 
Language, etc is bound to wind up an unholy mess-most especially if 
psychiatry is included, which doesn’t match with anything but logic and 
even perverts that sophistically to its uses." Foote’s papers are also held in 
the Southern Historical Collection, but, unfortunately for students of
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Percy, Foote did not save as many letters from Percy as Percy saved from 
Foote.
7. The entire page, up to the point I cite, reads: "The following section, an 
intermezzo of some forty pages, can be skipped without fatal consequences. 
It is not technical but it is theoretical-i.e., it attempts an elementary 
semiotical grounding of self taken for granted in these pages. As such, it 
will be unsatisfactory to many readers. It will irritate many lay readers by 
appearing to be too technical-what does he care about semiotics?" (LC 85)
In an interview with Jo Gulledge in 1984, "The Reentry Option: An 
Interview with Walker Percy" (Con 284-308), Percy says he was "curious to 
know how [the intermezzo section] worked, especially that brief page that 
says you don’t have to read this. Some tell me they took it as a dare and 
therefore said, ‘I’m going to read it.’ Most of them did, at least the ones I 
talked to. Some of them were put off and put the book down. Some of 
them skipped it, but I think most of them read it" (294).
At this point it also becomes necessary to regularize my use of terms. In his 
earlier writings Percy followed Susanne Langer’s and Peirce’s distinction 
between sign and symbol: "Signs announce their objects. Thunder 
announces rain. The bell announces food to Pavlov’s dog. When I say 
James to a dog, he looks for James; when I say James to you, you say, 
"What about him?"-you think about James. A symbol is the vehicle for 
the conception of an object and as such is a distinctively human product" 
(MB 293). Peirce used "sign" to denote the dyadic behavior of organisms 
and "symbol" to denote the triadic behavior of humans (see L C 88, note).
In his later writings, however, Percy adopted Saussure’s use of "signal" to 
denote that which announces its object, and "sign" to denote the vehicle for 
the conception of an object. I will follow Percy’s later usage from here on.
8. Hardy 19.
9. It is noteworthy, furthermore, that the manuscript material surrounding
Lost in the Cosmos begins with material that eventually finds its way into 
this intermezzo section, suggesting, as does its final placement in the 
published edition, its centrality. See the Percy Papers at the SHC.
10. This blending of the two dimensions of Percy’s work is not new. Almost
every writer who has grappled with Percy’s fiction has had recourse to his
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nonfiction. Hardy is a notable exception, although he himself refers to 
Percy’s linguistic pieces from time to time. Such a blending lends itself well 
to what Patrick Samway, S.J. has called the "palimpsest" quality of Percy’s 
works, especially as it develops in the relation between "Carnival in 
Gentilly" and The Moviegoer. Samway’s essay is forthcoming in 
Shenandoah and Les Cahiers de la Nou veile.
11. For a good overview of Percy’s relation to Peirce, see J. P. Tellote, "Charles 
Peirce and Walker Percy: From Semiotic to Narrative," The Southern 
Quarterly 18 (1980): 65-79.
12. See Helen Keller, The Story o f M y Life (New York: Doubleday, 1954). 
Percy refers to Keller’s acquisition of language repeatedly in his essays, not 
just here.
13. Percy’s penchant for drawing diagrams, somewhat stifled in The Message 
in the Bottle, is given free rein in Lost in the Cosmos, especially in this 
intermezzo. Perhaps Percy was thinking about what he wrote in "The 
Delta Factor" some ten years or so before: "I used to have a professor in 
medical school who, when a student gave a particularly murky answer, 
would hand him a piece of chalk, escort him to the blackboard, and say, 
‘Draw me a picture of it’" (MB 14). Although I do not find Percy’s prose 
in this section particularly murky, the "pictures" are both humorous and 
helpful. I will resist including them here in the hope that my summary 
comments are adequate.
14. Helen Keller’s description of the well-house episode is worth recounting in 
its entirety, as Percy does in "The Delta Factor" (35), for even her diction 
points to the repetition that she has experienced:
"We walked down the path to the well-house, attracted by the 
fragrance of the honeysuckle with which it was covered. Someone was 
drawing water and my teacher placed my hand under the spout. As the 
cool stream gushed over one hand, she spelled into the other the word 
water, first slowly then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon 
the motion of her fingers. Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as of 
something forgotten-a thrill of returning thought; and somehow the 
mystery of language was revealed to me. I knew then that "w-a-t-e-r" 
meant the wonderful cool something that was flowing over my hand. That
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living word awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy, set it free! There 
were barriers still, it is true, but barriers that could in time be swept away.
I left the well-house eager to learn. Everything had a name, and 
each name gave birth to a new thought. As we returned to the house every 
object which I touched seemed to quiver with life. That was because I saw 
everything with the strange, new sight that had come to me. On entering 
the door I remembered the doll I had broken. [She had earlier destroyed the 
doll in a fit of temper.] I felt my way to the hearth and picked up the 
pieces. I tried vainly to put them together. Then my eyes filled with tears; 
for I realized what I had done, and for the first time I felt repentance and 
sorrow.
I learned a great many new words that day. I do not remember 
what they all were; but I do know that mother; father, sister, teacher were 
among them-words that were to make the world blossom for me, "like 
Aaron’s rod with flowers." It would have been difficult to find a happier 
child than I was as I lay in my crib at the close of that eventful day and 
lived over the joys it had brought me, and for the first time longed for a 
new day to come."
15. This aspect of Percy’s semiotics opens his entire oeuvre to a discussion in 
light of "intersubjectivity," which Mary Deems Howland carries out in The 
Gift o f  the Other: Gabriel Marcel’s Concept ofIntersubjectivity in Walker 
Percy’s Novels, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1990). It should be clear by 
now that neither repetition nor intersubjectivity holds priority in Percy’s 
works. Rather, they are complementary categories.
16. In "The Un-naming o f the Beasts: The Postmodernity of Sartre’s La 
Nausee," Chapter 2 of Repetitions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP,
1987), William Spanos argues that Roquentin’s paradigmatic experience of 
consciousness in the park sets the world adrift in all its viscosity. Unlike 
the placing that takes place in the act of consciousness for Percy, Sartre, 
Spanos rightly claims, sets the world radically loose. Percy himself says 
that one of the central scenes in The Last Gentleman, which will be 
explored later in this chapter, "was written as a kind of counterstatement" 
to Sartre’s novel (Signposts 221).
17. Again, this is not a new insight for Percy. He expresses it several times in 
The Message in the Bottle. "What is [postmodern man] then? He has not 
the faintest idea. Entered as he is into a new age, he is like a child who sees 
everything in his new world, names everything, knows everything except
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himself' (9). Or again: "It is the requirement of consciousness that 
everything be something and willy-nilly everything is something— with one 
tremendous exception! The one thing in the world which by its very nature 
is not susceptible of a stable symbolic transformation is myself! I, who 
symbolize the world in order to know it, am destined to remain forever 
unknown to m yself (283).
18. Percy’s essay "Why I Live Where I Live," first published in Esquire 93 
(April 1980): 35-37 and reprinted as the lead essay in Signposts addresses 
this very issue of placement in relation to his adopted home town of 
Covington, Louisiana, which he calls a "pleasant nonplace." Patrick 
Samway, S.J., shows how Percy’s fiction finds its way ultimately to this 
"nonplace" in his "A Writer at Home in Louisiana," an article that will 
appear in Cross, Crosier, and Crucible: A Volume Celebrating the 
Bicentennial o f a Catholic Diocese in Louisiana (1793-1993), Glenn R. 
Conrad (General Ed), (Lafayette, La.: Center for Louisiana Studies, 
forthcoming April 25, 1993). John Edward Hardy has also written a 
critical piece on the notion of placement in Percy’s fiction: "Percy and 
Place: Some Beginnings and Endings," The Southern Quarterly 18 (1980): 
5-25. And Richard Pindall finds a connection similar to my own in 
"Toward Home: Place, Language, and Death in The Last Gentleman," 
Panthea Reid Broughton, ed., The Art o f Walker Percy: Stratagems for 
Being, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1979) 50-68.
19. Foote often tried to get Percy excited about Dickens, but Percy preferred 
the naming capacity of the postmodern novel: "It’s something to do with 
the nature of the times that I’m more at home with a Robbe-Grillet novel 
about one disoriented man getting off a ferry boat onto an island he can’t 
quite remember than with this great Dickensian parade of people [Bleak 
House]' (SHC).
20. See the title essay in Pickering’s The Right Distance (Athens: U of Georgia 
P, 1987): 11-18.
21. In his biography of Percy, Pilgrim in the Ruins: A Life o f Walker Percy 
(Simon & Schuster, 1992), Jay Tolson argues that Percy struggled to 
overcome a modernist vision of art for art’s sake, sometimes too strongly 
proffered by his friend, Shelby Foote.
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22. The Moviegoer (New York: Ivy Books, 1990) 4. Future references to this 
edition will be made parenthetically in the text.
23. John Edward Hardy, especially, underscores Binx’s status as an unreliable 
narrator. Ralph C. Wood suggests that part of Binx’s slipperiness arises 
from the fact that he "satirizes the satirist." See The Comedy o f  
Redemption: Christian Faith and Comic Vision in Five American 
Novelists, (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1988).
24. The Fiction o f Walker Percy, 56.
25. Forum (University of Houston) 3 (1960): 4-18.
26. Forthcoming in Shenandoah and Les Cahiers de la Nouvelle.
27. For an especially good treatment of Percy’s use of this Heideggerian term, 
see Edward G. Lawry’s "Literature as Philosophy," The Monist 63 (1980): 
547-57.
28. Richard Gray makes a comment similar to this in his Writing the South: 
Ideas o f an American Region (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986) 257.
29. For more on the existential modes that The Moviegoer explores, see 
Anthony Quagliano, "Existential Modes in The Moviegoer," Research 
Studies (Wash. State U.) 45 (1977): 214-23 and note three o f the 
Introduction.
30. Percy makes the distinction between aesthetic and existential repetition in 
"The Man on the Train" (MB 83-100). He also mentions "Kierkegaard’s 
distinction that true religious repetition has nothing to do with travel but is 
‘consciousness raised to the second power’" (96). My essay is concerned 
with the latter two types, of course.
31. In Jo Gulledge’s interview, Percy elaborates on what he means by the 
romantic: "Most people cannot conceive planning or initiating a course of 
action which would truly be an exercise of freedom. Although maybe they 
ought to. Most people are thinking of or are waiting for something magical 
to happen" (Con 306).
32. For more on Percy and Romanticism, see Lewis Lawson, "English 
Romanticism . . . and 1930 Science in The Moviegoer," Following Percy 83-
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107; Panthea Reid Broughton, "Walker Percy and the Myth of the 
Innocent Eye," in William L. Andrews (ed), Literary Romanticism in 
America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1981): 94-108; Christina 
Murphy, ""Exalted in this Romantic Place’: Narrative Voice and the 
Structure of Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer," Publications o f  the 
Mississippi Philological Association (1984): 55-68; and Richard Pindall, 
"Basking in the Eye of the Storm: The Esthetics o f Loss in Walker Percy’s 
The Moviegoer" boundary 2 A (1975): 219-30.
33. All quotations cited here are taken from pages 30-1 in the text.
34. See Bove, "Cleanth Brooks and Modern Irony: A Kierkegaardian 
Critique," boundary 2 A (1976): 727-59; and Schleifer, "Irony and the 
Literary Past: On the Concept o f Irony and The Mill on the Floss," in 
Ronald Schleifer and Robert Markley (eds), Kierkegaard and Literature: 
Irony, Repetition, and Criticism (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1984): 183- 
216. See also the editors’ introduction, "Writing W ithout Authority and 
the Reading of Kierkegaard."
35. "The Man on the Train," MB 97.
36. Percy made this comment in a taped interview with Rebecca Presson ("New 
Letters on the Air": University of Missouri at Kansas City, November 
1989).
37. The Last Gentleman (New York: Avon Books, 1978). All citations are 
taken from this edition and will be given parenthetically in the text. In 
"Narrative Triangulation in The Last Gentleman," Simone Vauthier points 
out the exfoliation of names given to Will Barrett. See Panthea Reid 
Broughton, ed., The Art o f Walker Percy: Stratagems for Being, (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1979) 69-95.
38. The Fiction o f Walker Percy, 59. In "Will Barrett Under the Telescope," 
The Southern Literary Journal 20 (1988): 16-41, Lewis Lawson shows 
brilliantly that "the very centralness o f the place argues that it is the navel 
of the world, the image of Paradise" (22), which does not entirely discount 
Hardy’s view. For if Will is subject to "scientific romanticism" as Lawson 
displays, then Paradise would be no place on Earth.
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39. Martin Luschei emphasizes "ground zero" is his Chapter on The Last 
Gentleman, "Ground Zero to Santa Fe," in The Sovereign Wayfarer (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1972): 111-168.
40. As in T. S. Eliot’s Four Quartets, the play on "nowhere"/"now-here" is 
intended. To be "now-here" is precisely the autobiographical and repetitive 
stance. See Chapter One.
41. Many critics and reviewers have remarked on the subtle beauty of Percy’s 
prose. In a very short untitled review, to cite only one example, James 
Dickey writes: "His power of phrase is breathtaking, and is the more so 
because it is quiet," American Scholar 37 (1968): 524
42. Percy toiled over all his works, but especially over the beginnings, as the 
manuscripts at the SHC display.
43. Etymology and definitions taken from Webster’s New World Dictionary, 
1984.
44. The epigram is from Romano Guardini’s The End o f the Modern World.
45. (Louisiana State UP, 1973) xi.
46. "Stoicism in the South," Signposts 85.
47. It is interesting to note that Percy models the journey in The Last
Gentleman on that of The Iliad and The Odyssey. Will’s home, like that of 
his classical predecessor, is Ithaca. In a paper delivered at a symposium, 
"The Achievement of Walker Percy," sponsored by the University Press of 
Mississippi, Lewis Lawson shows how women in The Moviegoer find 
parallels in classical literature: "Walker Percy’s Novels: Paradise Lost, 
Paradise Regained," delivered April 20, 1991. One wonders if Percy seeks 
the same stability that Jeffrey M. Perl argues the Modernists found in their 
return to the classics, The Tradition o f the Return (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1984). William Spanos argues that Perl’s book domesticates the idea 
of return, and so finds its source in an atemporal Hegelian dialectic, 
Repetitions (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State UP, 1987): 261, note. In 
another of his typically brilliant essays, "Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer. 
Cinema as Cave," Lewis Lawson connects Plato’s cave allegory with both 
Toynbee’s notion of "withdrawal and return" and with moviegoing. Since 
Toynbee’s notion is based on a dispassionate Hegelian dialectic, it is similar
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to the idealist ascent of the allegory. In Plato’s story, Lawson writes, "only 
the dutiful return [from their view of the ideal] to live among the wall- 
watchers, and they only to instruct. It is otherwise with the Percy 
movement . . . .  Unlike Plato’s movement, Percy’s does not culminate with 
a communion that can be attained by the mastery of an abstract scheme.
An individual remains a moviegoer, or a wall-watcher, as long as he 
distances himself from his ultimate world by the very way in which he looks 
at it" (91-2). Lawson would seem to place Percy’s thought in league with 
that of Spanos, although the latter would have no dealings with an 
"ultimate world."
48. Critics, of course, have noted Percy’s struggles with his adoptive father and 
his attempts to work through them in his fiction. See, for example, Lewis 
Lawson’s "Walker Percy’s Southern Stoic," and " The Moviegoer and the 
Stoic Heritage" in Following Percy. See also William Rodney Allen’s 
book, Walker Percy: A Southern Wayfarer (Jackson, UP of Mississippi, 
1986). Although she is trapped in her transcendent ethical code, and 
although she embodies certain characteristics of Will Percy, Walker does 
not provide Rita the central role he gives Barrett’s father or Aunt Emily of 
The Moviegoer, who are more obvious incarnations of Will Percy.
49. The figures of speech are not inappropriate since Percy writes in the 
"Primer" that "the scientist is the prince and sovereign of the age" (LC  
116).
50. These are the older Barrett’s reflections in The Second Coming.
"In the case of love, more is better than less, two twice as good as one, and 
most is best of all. And if the aim is the ecstasy of love, two is closer to 
infinity than one, especially when the two are twelve-gauge Super-X 
number-eight shot. And what samurai self-love of death, let alone the little 
death of everyday fuck-you love, can match the double Winchester come of 
taking oneself into oneself, the cold-steel extension of oneself into mouth, 
yes, for you, for me, for us, the logical and ultimate act of fuck-you love 
fuck-off world, the penetration and union of perfect cold gunmetal into 
warm quailing mortal flesh, the coming to end all coming, brain cells which 
together faltered and fell short, now flowered and flew apart, flung like 
stars around the whole dark world." (New York: Ivy Books, 1980) 136.
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J. Gerald Kennedy has written an excellent article on The Second Coming 
which deals with Will’s unfolding memories about his father’s suicide, "The 
Semiotics of Memory: Suicide in The Second Coming" Delta (Montpellier, 
France), 13 (1981): 103-25.
51. "Walker Percy: 1916-1990," Southern Literary Journal 23 (1990): 6. One of 
Jay Tolson’s primary theses in his biography of Percy is precisely this point, 
that Percy’s fiction embodies the struggles he went through himself. This is 
not a startling thesis—all writers transmute their struggles into their 
works—but Tolson does well to show its efficacy with regard to Percy.
52. See Percy’s "The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry," Signposts 251-62.
53. See Lawson’s "Will Barrett Under the Telescope" 17.
54. W hat I suggest here is similar to what James Olney has written about the 
relationship between freed slaves and their abolitionist editors. In their 
zeal, abolitionists often repressed the slaves’ stories; they "mastered" the 
telling of their tales. See "’I Was Born’: Slave Narratives, Their Status as 
Autobiography and as Literature," in The Slave’s Narrative, Charles Davis 
and Henry Louis Gates, eds. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985): 148-75.
55. John C. Carr, "An Interview with Walker Percy," in Con 68.
56. Sutter’s comments about news parallel the title essay of The Message in the 
Bottle in which Percy develops his distinction between knowledge and 
news.
57. "The Boll Weevil, the Iron Horse, and the End of the Line." In A Gallery o f  
Southerners (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1982) 210. Future 
citations will be made parenthetically in the text. Linda Whitney Hobson 
has also written on this passage: "’Watching, Listening and Waiting’: The 
Mode of the Seeker in Walker Percy’s Fiction," The Southern Literary 
Journal20 (1988): 43-50.
58. See The Sickness unto Death, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds), 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 67ff.
Chapter Three
Repetition and Bios:
Surviving Life in a Century of 
Gnosticism and Death
"When 'socialist man’ speaks, man 
has to be silent."
—Eric Voegelin
"Let me recite what history teaches, 
history teaches."
—Gertrude Stein
In the Flora Levy Lecture he delivered in the Spring of 1991, Lewis 
Simpson recalled his burgeoning relationship with Walker Percy.1 Built largely 
on an exchange of letters in which Simpson solicited contributions for The 
Southern Review, their association was, as Simpson characterized it, 
"professional." Yet they sometimes exchanged personal notes as well. Percy once 
responded to Simpson’s "note of congratulations on his seventieth birthday" with 
the following:
I’ve got news for you. It’s not all bad being in your 
71st year. So you young fellows can relax.
As a matter of fact, I feel it’s a gift, a free ride.
Nobody in my family ever lived so long. What it [takes] is 
Early Times and clean living.
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Simpson himself entered his seventy-first year less than two months later. He 
notes, however, that there was more of "generational concord between Walker and 
me than the coincidental proximity of our birthdays." He and Percy shared the 
"drama of a generational sensibility." Based on an early exposure "to the density 
of the modern European literary mind" as it developed after the catastrophe of the 
first world war and the period between the world wars, they both participated in a 
"generational cultural dialectic" which held forth the possibility o f either 
apocalyptic "doom" or a "recovery of memory and history."
Having experienced this dialectic in their reading, both men express it also 
in their writing. In The Dispossessed Garden, for example, Simpson cogently 
explores the possibility for the recovery of memory and history in the face of 
modernity.2 And in his works, Percy strives to retain the unity of the dialectic.
For him, apocalypse implies recovery. Destruction opens the possibility for 
renewal: "The prospect [of the ultimate catastrophe] gets one’s attention . . . .  If 
the Bomb is going to fall any minute, all things become possible, even love."3
Percy’s comments reiterate what he writes in "The Loss of the Creature."
In this essay, he contends that science and romanticism have so entombed the 
"creature" in theory—a pre-packaged IT—that it takes the destruction of everyday 
contexts to recover the actual. Thus, the "savage" in Huxley’s Brave New World 
stands in an ideal posture for recovery: "[When he] stumbles across a volume of
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Shakespeare in some vine-grown ruins and squats on a potsherd to read it, [he] is 
in a fairer way of getting at a sonnet than the Harvard sophomore taking English 
Poetry II" {MB 56). The ruins allow a recovery of what everyday contexts too 
often foreclose.4
When Percy tells Simpson that he feels his seventy-first year is a "free ride," 
that "nobody in my family ever lived so long," he seems to evince a blend of doom 
and recovery, or at least of ruefulness and celebration. On the one hand, he exults 
in the very possibility of joking about his age. Yet, his exultation is darkened by a 
shadow of regret. He seems to brood over the very necessity of surviving in this 
era, something that many of his progenitors, most notably his father, could not 
do. As Jay Tolson’s biography makes clear, Percy had good reason for both 
sentiments.5 A scion of the Percy line, he inherited a proclivity toward 
melancholia, depression, and suicide. As a son o f the South, he struggled against a 
romantic tradition that placed the ideal before the real. Tolson shows how Percy 
watched his father try—and ultimately fail—to live up to the Southern code of 
honor, loyalty, and nobility. He likewise reveals the despair that characterized his 
adoptive father’s assessment of the twentieth century, an evaluation that itself 
denied the possibility of change in time.6 Percy celebrates his seventy-first year 
because he has overcome both the southern code and his family. He holds to a 
view of himself as a "pilgrim in the ruins," a seeker of the possibility of recovery
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amidst the "catastrophe" and "doom" of the twentieth century. He is a survivor of 
what he often called this "century of death."7
I have already tried to show how Percy’s characterization of the age holds
true with regard to its exaltation of science. As a result of the misapprehension of
the scientific method,
[creatures] are rendered invisible by a shift of reality from 
concrete thing to theory which Whitehead has called the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. It is the mistaking o f an 
idea, a principle, an abstraction, for the real. As a 
consequence, the "specimen" is seen as less real than the 
theory of the specimen. {MB 58)
This "loss of the creature" characterizes the "malaise" of the age. In The
Moviegoer; Binx Bolling defines malaise in these same terms. It is "the pain of
loss. The world is lost to you, the world and the people in it, and there remains
only you and the world and you no more able to be in the world than Banquo’s
ghost" (106). Part of this loss, another facet of the dis-ease of the twentieth
century, can be related to the resurgence of gnostic thought, a stepbrother to the
deification of science, and a stance against which Percy’s works, as autobiography,
struggle. For if autobiography displays the repetitive movement which brings one
into a relation of interest in time, then it moves away from an atemporal and
otherworldly gnostic purity and into the vicissitudes of history.
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With characteristic lucidity, Cleanth Brooks and Lewis Lawson have 
already pointed out how gnosticism finds a place in Percy’s fiction, especially in 
Lancelot. I hope to show that Percy’s entire corpus, fiction and essays, counters 
a gnostic attitude, especially as it manifests itself in the angelism/bestialism of the 
Weimar Republic and the Nazi Holocaust. Before I can do this, however, the term 
itself demands some stability. For gnosticism, like repetition and autobiography, 
defies facile definition. Christopher Lasch, for example, has written that 
gnosticism "remains an elusive thing," a "hydra-headed" movement difficult to 
define. The scholarly attempt to delimit it, he argues, leads only to a "proliferation 
of definitions" which grows out of a more fundamental "controversy about its 
origins."9 In a thorough and illuminating article, Henri-Charles Puech likewise 
points to the difficulty of arriving at a stable view of gnosticism, and he 
acknowledges that part of its elusiveness results from a confusion about its roots.
Puech shows that although it was long considered solely as a Christian 
heresy, gnosticism "came to be understood as a determinate genus, widely 
distributed in both space and time, of which heretical Christian Gnosis represented 
only a particular species."'0 For Puech, "determinate genus" refers not to a single 
expression of gnostic thought; rather, it provides a "category of philosophico- 
religious thought" for understanding the multiplicity of expressions or "styles" 
which can be subsumed under the name "gnostic" (55). Although broad and
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diverse in its manifestations, gnosticism nevertheless exhibits a common "attitude,"
itself difficult to define:
If it were possible to [define it] in a few words, we should say 
that Gnosis (from the Greek word gnosis, "knowledge") is an 
absolute knowledge which in itself saves, or that Gnosticism 
is the theory that salvation is obtained by knowledge. But 
this definition, true and central as it may be, remains 
inadequate. (55)
Puech, therefore, approaches an understanding of this attitude through an 
exploration of the gnostic’s stance toward time, a strategy that also proves useful 
for comprehending Percy’s relation to this enduring mode of thought.
Puech argues that a gnostic view of time remains distinct from that of both 
Hellenism and Christianity. For the Greeks, as I discussed in Chapter One, time 
was conceived "above all as cyclical or circular, returning perpetually upon itself, 
self-enclosed" (39-40). Because of this emphasis on eternal return, the Greeks 
developed two sentiments toward time: they either admired the beauty and order 
of the cosmos, in which everything finds it place, or they grew weary of the 
"monotonous [and] crushing" repetition (45). This latter view is, o f course, the 
sentiment of the Stoa.
But the stress on the eternal return had another effect as well. History 
manifested little interest for the Greeks. They were unconcerned with the 
particular and singular. It is the immutable world of form, the general or the
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ideal, that concerns them. Although continuity exists between the particular and 
the general—the former participates in the latter and thus establishes a relation 
between the temporal and the atemporal orders—the particular carries little 
significance in itself. Furthermore, because a circle is without beginning, middle, 
or end—and because any point on a circle can be taken indifferently as beginning, 
middle, or end—the Greeks possess no "central reference point by which to define 
and orient a historical past and future" (43). Events in time, then, eternally repeat 
a cosmic pattern which itself elicits awe or boredom, two sentiments Kierkegaard 
would later pronounce subsumable under his aesthetic category.
If the Greeks placed little value on events in time, then Christianity founds 
itself on a unique historical event. Time is not cyclical; rather, it is linear, "finite at 
its two extremities, having a beginning and an absolute end" (46). Events in time 
do not eternally recur. They are irreversible. As a result, life in time becomes full 
of significance. An individual’s passage through time bears the utmost meaning. 
The past is gathered up into the present and both point to a fixed end in the future. 
The future, in turn, gives direction to the past: "Whether near or far, the 
eschatological end orients the past toward the future and binds the two together in 
such a way as to make the unilateral direction of time a certainty" (51-2). In other 
words, the end gives shape, direction, and meaning to the beginning—the 
beginning finds its source in the end—and the end is prefigured in the beginning.
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Unlike the Greek notion of time, the Christian view posits a beginning and end 
that are both distinct and united. At opposite poles of the line, the beginning and 
the end are wholly separate yet wholly connected by the line itself, which is 
history.11 Christians await the end of time to discover meaning, yet, even as they 
wait, they draw meaning from the end to determine present action. They stand 
between what already fills time, but what has not yet reached the fullness to come. 
The parallels between primitive Christianity’s view of time and Kierkegaard’s 
category of repetition seem clear. Both acknowledge inter esse as the genuine 
human placement.
The gnostic attitude toward time is neither historical nor cosmic, neither a 
straight line nor a circle. Instead, Puech argues, it is best viewed as a "broken line" 
(40). Whereas Hellenism proffers a continuity between the temporal and the 
atemporal, and Christianity posits a movement in and toward fullness, gnosticism 
proposes a radical bifurcation between the temporal and the atemporal, between 
fullness and history. The gnostic view is primarily dualistic. Because time 
partakes of the material and visible world, and because this world was created by a 
"feeble, narrow-minded if not ignorant" god (59), it has no relation to the invisible 
and spiritual domain which is truth.12 The Greek either stands in awe of time or 
grows weary of it, and the Christian waits in eager anticipation, but the gnostic 
"condemns, rejects, [and] rebels" (60). Time is, "in the last analysis, a lie" (61).
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Puech notes that in one gnostic system
time was born from the hysterema, a defectus or defectio, a 
labes—a deficiency, error, or fault—from the collapse and 
dispersion in the void . . .  of a reality which had previously 
existed one and integral, within the pleroma, [the original 
fullness]. (66)
That hysterema and labes derive from the same words that describe organs of the 
female reproductive system indicates the radical and generative evil that pervades 
the sexual act for some gnostics (others were extremely licentious), an act which 
only continues our defective, evil life in time.13 The perpetual cycle of a 
generation which is a degeneration (a creation which is a fall, or a birth-into-death 
and a death-in-life) is recapitulated in even the smallest unit of time. Each 
moment "arises only to be engulfed in the next moment, in which all things appear, 
disappear, and reappear in a twinkling" (66). Time is hell, the region where one’s 
"capacity for seeing and hearing is ‘narrow,’ limited to what is purely actual and 
close at hand" (66).
Given such a view of time, its extreme dualism and its preoccupation with 
evil, it is no wonder that gnosticism proposes an atemporal salvation. Salvation, 
in fact, liberates the gnostic from time. It sets free the "spiritual" or "perfect" man 
from the bonds of time. Instead of displaying the fullness of time, salvation 
"shatters time" and "destroy[s] the world" (70).14 The gnostic seeks a return to a 
lost home, a perfect realm beyond or before the world in which "his substance was
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pure of all mixture or adulteration" (73). Gnosis provides the vehicle for such 
liberation.
For the "perfect man" entombed in defective matter, gnosis provides an
"absolute Truth, a total Knowledge, in which all the riddles raised by the existence
of evil are solved" (73). Through this exhaustive knowledge, the gnostic answers
the triple question: "Who am I and where am I? Whence have I come and why
have I come hither? Whither am I going?" (Theodotus, qtd. by Puech 73-4). What
begins as a knowledge for freeing the spiritual self enchained in deficient time ends
in a totalized "mythological" knowledge. Gnosis not only yields the answers to the
individual’s origins and destiny, but it provides an atemporal
knowledge of the whole universe, visible and invisible, o f the 
structure and development of the divine as well as the 
physical world. Some of the Gnostics actually call it a total 
"science"—in the positive sense of the word— . . .  an 
exhaustive and purely rational explanation of all things. (75)
Through gnosis, the gnostic enters into an elite group, either "a class o f gnostikoi,
‘knowers,’ or of pneunmtikoi, ‘spiritual men’" (54). He thus surpasses time and
reenters his "primitive, permanent state" in the total and closed "articulated
atemporality" which gnosis supplies (76, 84).15
This "articulated atemporality" provided by the "science" of gnosis sounds 
very similar to Percy’s reflections on "theory." The passage I cited above from 
"The Loss of the Creature," for example, corresponds precisely with the totalized,
143
atemporal gnosis Puech describes. Like the gnostics, modern western civilization
turns to "positive science" for knowledge of the self and the world. While the
western world heralds the "sacredness and dignity of the individual," its "idolatry"
of science nevertheless fosters a posture which devalues both the world and the
individual creatures in it. A scientific attitude precludes the possibility o f "seeing"
a single entity because it places theory before it. In a "theorist-consumer" age,
another variant of Percy’s transcendent-immanent dialectic, neither theorist nor
consumer concerns himself with individuals:16
The scientific method is correct as far as it goes, but the 
theoretical mindset, which assigns significance to single 
things and events only insofar as they are exemplars of 
theory or items for consumption, is in fact an inflation of a 
method of knowing to a totalitarian worldview and is 
unwarranted. (Crisis 18)
The world is quite literally lost in theory. Because it is more tractable than life in
time, theory supplants that life with its own "articulated atemporality." Time is
nullified, and the world is surpassed in the transcendence of the scientific posture.
Furthermore, Percy argues that this "loss of the creature" sets up a radical
dualism between experts and consumers. Experts know and plan, while consumers
need and experience. The consumer’s most exalted moment, itself desperate,
comes when he wholly matches his very self to the expert’s theory:
There is the neurotic who asks nothing more of his doctor 
than that his symptom should prove interesting. When all
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else fails, the poor fellow has nothing to offer but his own 
neurosis. But even this is sufficient if only the doctor will 
show interest when he says, "Last night I had a curious sort 
of dream; perhaps it will be significant to one who knows 
about such things. It seems I was standing in a sort of 
alley—" (I have nothing else to offer you but my own 
unhappiness. Please say that it, at least, measures up, that it 
is a proper sort of unhappiness.) (MB 56)
Such a posture suggests, paradoxically, that the "true" self of the consumer has
nothing to do with time and matter. I say paradoxically because, by definition, the
consumer partakes of the world’s goods. But the consumer’s surrender to the
expert suggests that the true self is located somewhere outside the world and time,
i.e., in the theory that the expert holds. Seeing itself as deficient, the material self
of the consumer flees to its "true," theoretical self in the hope of gaining approval
from the ones who presumably know all about him, the gnostikoi.
This reading of Percy’s essay gains more credibility when placed in the
context of Harold Bloom’s understanding of gnosis. Bloom likens gnosticism to
an information theory:
Matter and energy are rejected, or at least placed under the 
sign of negation. Information becomes the enabler of 
salvation; the false Creation-Fall concerned matter and 
energy, but the Pleroma, or Fullness, the original Abyss, is all 
information. (30)
Consumers, then, place themselves in the hands of those who have information, 
high-priests o f the pleroma. Salvation will be theirs if they can but educate
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themselves, make "informed choices," and so participate in the elite club of 
knowers. Percy’s diagram of the "lay reader of Freud" in "A Semiotic Primer of 
the Self' closely parallels Bloom’s view of gnosticism (see L C 118). The lay reader 
leaves the world to enter Freud’s orbit. But while Freud managed to maintain a 
more or less steady orbit, the lay reader cannot sustain his transcendence and so 
suffers from a "decayed orbit." The lay reader makes only a temporary entrance 
into the fullness of information; he is obliged to reenter the world. As a supreme 
knower, Freud was not so obliged.
It should also be noted that the extreme dualistic posture of the gnostics 
reflects the Cartesian dualism that Percy once identified as "responsible for all our 
evils" (Con 247). In the Jefferson Lecture of 1989, his final public lecture, Percy 
chides the humanistic sciences for ignoring the bifurcation set up in their own 
methods. Much of this lecture concerns itself with the chasm between "mind" and 
"matter" (Descartes’ res cogitans and res extensa). Percy argues that such a rift "is 
not in principle closable—that is, not by the present regnant principles" of the 
sciences as they are now practiced (Signposts 274). Percy himself does not make 
the connection between Cartesian and gnostic thought, but the parallels seem 
nevertheless evident. Mind (the transcendent sphere) is enchained in matter (the 
immanent sphere) from which it either continually struggles to flee or in which it 
becomes totally absorbed and thus forgets any possibility of transcendence. The
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"fateful rift," which forms the "San Andreas Fault in the Modern Mind," mirrors 
not only the "three-hundred-year-old dualism" that began with Descartes 
{Signposts 274), but also the gnostic attitude that has persisted since ancient times 
and which now pervades our modern era, thanks, in large part, to Descartes.17
While I will explore the relation between gnosis and Percy’s work in more 
detail below, especially with regard to a "method of knowing" which is inflated "to 
a totalitarian worldview," I want first to examine briefly some aspects o f the 
primitive gnostic attitude that have been transformed in the modern era. For this 
task, I turn to not just to Harold Bloom but to Eric Voegelin as well, both of 
whom complement Puech’s lucid reflections.18 It should be noted from the 
outset, however, that Voegelin and Bloom adopt different attitudes in their 
analyses. Whereas Voegelin regrets and cautions against the pervasive gnosticism 
of modern culture, a stance similar to Percy’s, Bloom neither castigates nor 
celebrates it.
A self-proclaimed "Gnostic Jew," Bloom looks for the "irreducibly 
religious" element in experience—be it of "‘the divine’ or ‘the transcendental’ or 
simply ‘the spiritual’" (28)—and he argues convincingly that, in America, that 
element is essentially gnostic.19 Bloom goes on to say that "the most Gnostic 
element in the American Religion is an astonishing reversal of ancient gnosticism: 
we worship the Demiurge as God. . . .  As for the alien God of the Gnostics, he has
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vanished" (32). In primitive gnostic systems, the Demiurge was the creator of the
material world, the "ignoramus" who, far removed from the true, totally other 
God, established the cosmos and time. That this lesser god now receives our 
veneration signals a movement away from the absolute transcendence o f primitive 
gnosticism. The gnostic still flees time and the world, but he flies not so much into 
the primordial Abyss of the alien God as into the isolated self: "The American 
finds God in herself or himself, but only after finding the freedom to know God by 
experiencing a total inward solitude" (32). The self thus sealed within itself tries to 
escape the contamination of time.20
Voegelin points to another reversal that manifests itself in the modern
gnostic attitude. While he argues that the essential thrust of the modern gnostic
impulse retains its emphasis on salvation through knowledge, he suggests a new
development in the gnostic’s attitude toward the world. Like Bloom, Voegelin
notes a "recession from transcendence":
Gnostic speculation overcame the uncertainty of faith by 
receding from transcendence and endowing man and his 
intramundane range of action with the meaning of escha- 
tological fulfillment. In the measure in which this 
immanentization progressed experientially, civilizational 
activity became a mystical work of self-salvation. The 
spiritual strength of the soul which in Christianity was 
devoted to the sanctification of life could now be diverted 
into the more appealing, more tangible, and above all, much 
easier creation of the terrestrial paradise. {New Science 129)
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For Voegelin, modern manifestations of gnosis do not disentangle one from a 
defective world; instead, they are applied to this world in the hopes of correcting it. 
Thus, Voegelin does not explore so much the gnostic self as he does the collective 
nature of modern gnosticism and its attempt to create a terrestrial paradise. Like 
Bloom, Voegelin suggests that western civilization has forgotten the alien God and 
worships the Demiurge. Salvation occurs in a perfected time. However, the evil 
that the primitive gnostic saw as inevitably bound to the material world is now 
considered remediable through collective civilizational activity in time. Bloom 
presents the vital expressions of this transformation, but Voegelin displays the 
morbid ones. For Voegelin, as for Percy, a collective activity based on gnosis 
leads to a "totalitarian worldview" which stands as a corrective to the "impurities" 
of life. Attempts to create such a total vision lead to the annihilation of those who 
cannot be subsumed by the vision. In the twentieth century, of course, the overt 
impulse to create a society based on gnosis found its most obvious manifestation 
in Nazi Germany.
Like Voegelin, Percy cautions against such an unrestrained gnosis. Yet, 
like Bloom, he contends that it is all we have. But whereas Bloom asks us simply 
to "face the fact" that we are gnostics, Percy looks for another possibility.21 He 
offers no programmatic anodyne for an escape from our gnostic flight. Programs 
are often themselves part of the problem. Instead, he diagnoses and names the
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predicament. It is significant that "diagnose" (from dia, "through, between" and 
gignoskein, "to know") itself contains the root form of gnosis.22 The word itself, 
then, points to Percy’s (and Bloom’s) contention that one must begin where we 
are—in the midst of a gnostic society. However, while Bloom suggests that we 
look for salvation through atemporal knowledge, Percy argues that the road to 
salvation lies between knowledge and time. The category of "news," as Percy 
develops it in the "The Message in the Bottle," displays this state of "being 
between," the inter esse of repetition.
In this "parable" about islands and castaways, Percy develops a distinction 
between "news" and "knowledge." He defines a "piece of knowledge" as 
"knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, . . . [which means a] knowledge which can be 
arrived at anywhere by anyone and at any time" (MB 125). It derives from the 
objective-empirical, scientific posture which for Percy, following Kierkegaard, falls 
into the aesthetic sphere. Indifferent to time and place, pieces o f knowledge are 
subject to verification and confirmation by anyone, on any island: "Water boils at 
100 degrees at sea level"; "Being comprises essence and existence." A piece of 
news, on the other hand, "expressfes] a contingent and nonrecurring event or state 
of affairs which event or state of affairs is peculiarly relevant to the concrete 
predicament of the hearer of the news" (MB 126). Although a type of knowledge, 
news "cannot possibly be arrived at by any effort of experimentation or reflection
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or artistic insight" (MB 126). Instead, news is "strictly relevant to the predicament 
in which the hearer of the news finds himself (MB 127). News, then, is 
determined by the hearer’s posture in time and place.
For persons who adopt the scientific, objective-empirical, posture, news is
irrelevant because they stand outside and above the world as "knower[s] and
teller[s]." They do not recognize themselves as being in a predicament in time and
place. At best, Percy argues, news items heard from this posture "occupy the very
lowest rung of scientific significance: they are particular instances from which
hypotheses and theories are drawn" (MB 128). The posture of the castaway
(another word for homo viatoi), however, manifests the interest which makes
news items relevant. Neither scientist nor complacent consumer, the castaway
hears news because he finds himself in a predicament, somewhere between being
"at home" and homeless:
To be a castaway is to be in a grave predicament and this is 
not a happy state of affairs. But it is very much happier than 
being a castaway and pretending one is not. This is despair.
The worst of all despairs is to imagine one is at home when 
one is really homeless. (MB 144)
The castaway longs, waits, and searches for news that speaks o f this grave
predicament, a message occluded by the culturally dominant postures o f the
scientist and consumer.
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Percy goes on to make a further distinction between "island news" (akin to 
knowledge because it is "relevant to the everyday life o f any islander on any island 
at any time" [MB 143]) and "news from across the seas," which speaks uniquely to 
the castaway by addressing his deepest longings. Like knowledge, island news is in 
the sphere of the immanent, but news from across the seas is "in the sphere of 
transcendence and is therefore paradoxical" {MB 147). The castaway is "he who 
waits for news from across the seas" {MB 146). As news, such a message requires 
a message-bearer. It involves an act of communication between one person and 
another. But the message and the message-bearer are not to be accepted 
uncritically. The castaway accepts the message, first, because he is in a 
predicament, and the newsbearer’s words are relevant to it. Secondly, "simply by 
the gravity of his message" {MB 147), the newsbearer displays the authority to 
speak, and so the castaway should listen to him. Thirdly, the message-bearer must 
speak in "perfect sobriety and in good faith" {MB 148).
Although Percy never refers explicitly to gnosticism in this remarkable 
essay, his diagnosis of a society and its denizens for whom the relevance of news 
has been annulled suggests an implicit critique of the gnostic stance. A society 
founded on knowledge cannot hear of or see the very predicament it longs to 
anneal. Island news and knowledge sub specie aeternitatis "immanentize" the 
eschaton through their promise of salvation. They are forms of what Bloom
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classifies as gnosis—information. Percy does not suggest that the castaway ignore 
such information. On the contrary, it is valuable for day-to-day island existence. 
But when society and the individual consciousness are such that information seems 
the only avenue toward salvation, both fall prey to the temptation of self­
salvation. On the personal level, such a stance deludes one into believing that he is 
"at home," that he knows the "whole story" of himself, something, as we have seen 
in the discussion of autobiography, that one can never know. At the level of 
history, it fosters a "totalitarian" view which eliminates differences in the name of 
purity. The castaway rejects these self-enclosed island salvations and waits for the 
news that speaks of his true homelessness.
While Percy’s works—both novels and essays—are a form of island news 
and not news from across the seas, they nevertheless try to reestablish in his 
characters and in the reader a posture whereby news from across the seas would 
again be relevant. His "diagnosis" of the modern malaise suggests a "treatment" 
that stands between knowledge and time. For Percy, as for Kierkegaard, such a 
stance finds its truest expression in the "news" of faith, a form of knowledge which
23redeems time. Since he sees himself as "without authority" to deliver news from 
across the seas, however, he writes his island news so that he might at least name 
the ultimate despair of life lived in the purely aesthetic sphere.24
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Percy, then, does not offer yet another call—"Come!"— which would annul
the difficulties of life in time. He does not offer knowledge sub specie aeternitatis,
an "articulated atemporality," which promises salvation. Rather, in a society
where gnosis reigns unrestrained, where
everyone is an apostle of sorts, ringing doorbells and bidding 
his neighbor to believe this and do that. In such times, when 
everyone is saying "Come!" when radio and television say 
nothing else but "Come!" it may be that the best way to say 
"Come!" is to remain silent. Sometimes silence itself is a 
"Come!" (MB 148)
Percy’s works find their fullest expression in what they do not say. This silence 
questions the presumed closure and wholeness of a gnostic culture and allows for 
the possibility of repetition. The "gaps" in The Moviegoer and The Last 
Gentleman, as I tried to show in the last chapter, provide openings for the 
possibility of this "silent speaking." And in that silence which inevitably follows 
an end, after characters have made their decisions and after readers have read the 
last word, the possibility for a new beginning manifests itself.25
Lewis Lawson’s essay, "Walker Percy’s Silent Character," makes this point
abundantly clear in the context of Lancelot™ Lawson shows how Father John,
ostensibly a mere receptacle for the ranting of Lancelot Lamar in his prison cell,
actually occupies a central place in the novel by means of his silence:
The priest has tried to tell Lance something by his silence 
throughout their five days together and is telling him once
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again by his decision to minister in Alabama. . . . Father 
John has stood there those five days then as a silent 
invitation, as a character who could be no more eloquent, 
and Lance, knowing what the silence says, has fought to 
protect himself by his noise. The next step is up to Lance.
(195)
Lawson could just as well have said that the next step is up to the reader. For 
Percy also wants the reader to decide in the silence which follows this ending. Will 
the reader accept the self-actualized apocalypse and renewal of Lance—the logical 
end of his radically gnostic vision—or will he choose the silent "Come!" of Father 
John? Like Lance, the reader is left in silence.27
Percy’s anti-gnostic stance, then, is less articulated than it is suggested. 
Although there is mention of the "peculiar gnosis of trains" in The Moviegoer, and 
Tom More is described as a victim of "gnostic pride" in Love in the Ruins, these 
are, as Cleanth Brooks points out, the sole references to gnosticism in Percy’s 
works.28 Percy even commented once that he "hadn’t thought o f gnosticism" 
when he wrote Lancelot (Con 211). Yet, as Lawson’s "Gnosis and Time in 
Lancelot' reveals, there are direct parallels between this, the darkest of Percy’s 
novels, and the analysis of gnostic time provided by Puech. Lance’s "narrow view" 
from his cell, for example, only grants truth to "what is at hand," as does the 
disjointed time of the black and white videotaped "movies" Lance has made for 
material evidence of the crime that involves, in his skewed view, pure
155
materiality—his wife’s sexual infidelity. In every turn of the novel, especially in 
the climactic explosion of Belle Isle Plantation, Lance tries to "shatter time" by 
projecting gnosis for the eradication of sexual evil. He tells Father John: "I had to 
know. If Merlin [a movie director] ‘knew’ my wife, I had to know his knowing 
her" (L 95). Lance knows the end of his story (and history) because he will himself 
bring it about. He wants "the whole picture" (L 103). Father John’s silence 
counters his delusions of wholeness.29
In one way or another, all of Percy’s main characters move out of a gnostic 
attitude into the openness of repetition. Binx abandons his vertical search—the 
scientific search which annuls time—in favor of the horizontal search in time. Will 
Barrett, who hopes to engineer his life according to the scientific principles of 
psychoanalysis, longs for the news that would speak of his alienation. In the same 
novel, Sutter Vaught expresses the licentiousness characteristic of some gnostic 
sects. Tom More of Love in the Ruins hopes to cure the "riven self and the riven 
world" by means of the ultimate scientific instrument—the lapsometer. At the end 
of the novel, he is "chastened" by Fr. Smith in the confessional, and he returns to a 
less grandiose life with Ellen. That book also portrays the radical dualism and 
polarity which are consequences of life in a gnostic society. In The Second 
Coming, the older Will Barrett contrives a plan that he believes will produce firm 
knowledge of the existence of God. Barrett receives an answer, but not in the way
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he had anticipated. And Tom More of The Thanatos Syndrome contends with
doctors, who, in totalitarian fashion, would purify the state of its imperfections. 
More, however, remains a true psychiatrist, a "doctor of the soul," who, instead of 
applying gnostic theory, listens to the individual stories o f his patients. Lancelot, 
then, is not the only book in which Percy deals with gnosticism.30
It is interesting to note, however, that whereas Percy’s earlier fiction and 
essays counter the doom of a gnostic attitude and offer a recovery "silently," his 
later works deal with it more or less explicitly. This movement from silence to 
outright portrayal can best be seen, I think, by examining Percy’s complicated 
response to the most overt of gnostic societies in this "century of death," Nazi 
Germany.
In one of his letters to Shelby Foote, Percy comments on the strengths and
weaknesses of William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice.
I found not so much bad Faulkner as occasionally crappy 
cliche: ". . . her graceful undulant walk." He had a lot of 
nerve taking on the Holocaust and for this I admire
him nobody’s been able to handle it, not even the
survivors, maybe especially not the survivors. I suspect that 
it can’t be handled, that is, the dead weight and mystery of 
the horror can’t be got hold of by esthetic categories—and 
when you try, bad things happen, both to the writer and the 
subject. . . . The only way you can write about such a thing is 
not to write about it. (SHC)
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Written in 1979, this letter suggests Percy’s own "silent" handling of the
Holocaust. In his early essays, "The Loss of the Creature" (1958) and "The
Message in the Bottle" (1959), for example, Percy writes about the end result of
unrestrained gnosis by "not writing about it." In one of his last published essays,
however, the one I have already cited from Crisis, he makes an overt connection
between theory and Naziism:
Marx and Stalin, Nietzsche and Hitler were . . . theorists.
When theory is applied, not to matter or beasts, but to man, 
the consequence is that millions of men can be eliminated 
without compunction or even much interest. Survivors of 
both Hitler’s holocaust and Stalin’s terror reported that their 
oppressors were not "horrible" or "diabolical" but seemed, on 
the contrary, quite ordinary, even bored by their actions, as if 
it were all in a day’s work. (Crisis 16)
In expository prose, one expects a writer to be overt. Yet, the shift from indirect
and subtle argument to clear refutation seems curious. If the best way to write
about the "dead weight and mystery of the horror" of the Holocaust is not to write
about it, then why does Percy begin writing explicitly about it in his later works,
especially in The Thanatos Syndromdl
In The Moviegoer and The Last Gentleman there are no conspicuous
references to the Holocaust even though the former contains very strong
denunciations of "scientific humanism," especially toward the end. In disgust with
himself and his "dark pilgrimage," Binx reflects on "the very century of merde, the
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great shithouse of scientific humanism where needs are satisfied, everyone becomes 
an anyone, a warm and creative person" (199-200).31 And Percy’s second novel 
reveals the only options left in a gnostic culture—immanence and 
transcendence—but allows the reader to arrive at his own conclusions about such 
a bifurcated reality. Percy writes about the Holocaust in these first two novels by 
"not writing about it." He implies that, in a culture where "everyone becomes an 
anyone," it becomes very easy to treat others like the merde Binx finds around 
him. In such a culture, people can be disposed of "without much compunction."
It is not surprising, then, that as a wayfarer and exile, Binx keeps a keen eye on the 
Jews: "Ever since Wednesday I have become acutely aware of Jews. There is a clue 
here, but of what I cannot say" (76-7). Neither is it surprising that at the moment 
he rails against the "century of merde," he also "know[s] less than [he] ever knew 
before" (199), a good sign for someone trapped in the gnosis of contemporary 
culture.
The dialectic of immanence-transcendence in The Last Gentleman points 
both backward and forward. It restates Binx’s wavering between consumer and 
scientist, and it anticipates "More’s Syndrome," the chronic "angelism/bestialism" 
that besets the characters of Love in the Ruins. Following Pascal (Qui fait l ’ange, 
fait la bete) who, in turn, borrows his language from the tradition of the Great 
Chain of Being, Percy suggests that those who would wish to know like the angels
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inevitably produce some form of bestialism. Hitler’s Third Reich followed the
flowering of the arts and sciences during the Weimar Republic.
The first overt reference to the Holocaust in Percy’s fiction occurs in Love
in the Ruins, and it alludes to this very point. Tom More reflects:
Once I was commiserating with a patient, an old man, a 
Jewish refugee from the Nazis—he’d got out with his skin 
but lost his family to Auschwitz—so I said something 
conventional against the Germans. The old fellow bristled 
like a Prussian and put me down hard and spoke of the 
superiority of German universities, German science, German 
music, German philosophy. My God, do you suppose the 
German Jews would have gone along with Hitler if he had let 
them? (LR 141)
Percy seems to suggest here that angelism/bestialism has struck modern 
consciousness so deeply that even a victim of its most horrible manifestation can 
miss its significance.
Of course, not all survivors of the German Lagers resemble Percy’s "Jewish 
refugee." Primo Levi, for one, recognizes very clearly the gnostic 
angelism/bestialism of modern culture, especially as it manifested in the German 
quest for purity. In The Periodic Table, for example, Levi (not unlike Percy in 
that he was a chemist turned writer) continually refers to the antagonism between 
spirit and matter and in fact makes that theme part of the framework of his 
exceptional book. ’2 At one point, reflecting on the boredom of his chosen career,
he writes:
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Chemistry, for me, had stopped being . . .  a source [of 
certainty]. It led to the heart of Matter, and Matter was our 
ally precisely because the Spirit, dear to Fascism, was our 
enemy; but, having reached the fourth year of Pure 
Chemistry, I could no longer ignore the fact that chemistry 
itself, or at least that which we were being administered, did 
not answer my questions. (52)
Levi’s identification of fascism as "Spirit" corresponds to Percy’s comments about
theory and a "totalitarian worldview." Just as the spirit of fascism wishes to create
pneumatikoi, spiritual men inflamed and dedicated to its cause, so theory creates
gnostikoi, knowers who become founts of pure information, the theory that keeps
fascism vital. In either case, the impurity of matter ("intractable matter," as Levi
calls it at one point) is fallaciously transformed by the purity of theory.
Elsewhere in The Periodic Table, Levi considers the different reactions of
zinc in its pure and impure forms to acid. Acid "gulps it down" when impurities
are present. Yet, zinc "resists the attack" when in its pure form (33). Levi reflects:
One could draw from this two conflicting philosophical 
conclusions: the praise of purity, which protects from evil 
like a coat of mail; the praise of impurity, which gives rise to 
changes, in other words, to life. I discarded the first, 
disgustingly moralistic, and I lingered to consider the second, 
which I found more congenial. In order for the wheel to 
turn, for life to be lived, impurities are needed. . . .
Dissension, diversity, the grain of salt and mustard are 
needed: Fascism does not want them, forbids them; . . .  it 
wants everybody to be the same. (33-4)
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Fascism strives for a gnostic purity, a condition unstained by time. It wants to 
subsume differences into the original singularity of the pleroma. It is significant 
that Levi, like Percy, turns to writing in order to combat and reflect on his 
immersion in a gnostic culture. In fact, Levi once wrote that his experience of the 
Lager and his writing about it gave him a "reason for life."33 Language combats 
gnostic purity because it combines elements of matter and spirit, impurity and 
purity. As triadic behavior, it may be the bridge—as Percy suggests time and 
again, but most emphatically in the Jefferson Lecture—between the chasm 
Descartes created when he posited res extensa and res cogitans. It is no accident 
that book burnings occur in totalitarian regimes. The angelism/bestialism in 
Percy’s Love in the Ruins, then, points to the same antagonism between spirit and 
matter (purity and impurity) that Levi writes about. The attempt to create a 
society founded on the pure knowledge provided by More’s lapsometer can lead to 
the bestialism of the German Lagers.
In Lancelot and The Second Coming, references to Hitler and the 
Holocaust become more explicit, but they still occupy a secondary place in the 
narratives. Lance’s ranting against this "age of interest" in which no one is 
responsible for his actions (145) leads him to search for a "single sin," something 
conspicuously absent from the twentieth century:
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What about Hitler, the gas ovens and so forth? W hat about 
them? As everyone knows and says, Hitler was a madman.
And it seems nobody else was responsible. Everyone was 
following orders. It is even possible that there was no such 
order, that it was all a bureaucratic mistake. (145)
Even so terrible an event as the Holocaust can be explained away in this aesthetic
age. Lance implies that the very possibility of explaining it away itself contributes
to its occurrence. When psychological categories are applied ("Hitler was a
madman"), no one is responsible. The gnostic, to recall Puech, bases his freedom
on gnosis, even "at the risk of falling into nihilism, anarchism, amoralism, or even
licentious immoralism" (70). Such ethical categories become meaningless,
however, to an age in the grip of such a liberating knowledge. Lance cannot find
sin in Hitler’s atrocities because the age will not allow him to. Thus, he will enact
his own ethical "order" based on a "stern code, a gentleness toward women and an
intolerance of swinishness, a counsel kept and above all a readiness to act" (167).
Although he tells Father John that his will be an entirely new order—"Don’t
confuse it with anything you’ve heard of before . . . .  Don’t confuse it with the
Nazis" (165)—he, like the Nazis, wants to bring about his own apocalypse and
recovery. He destroys time in the name of gnosis in order to bring about the
closure o f history in a self and a society of his own making.34
In The Second Coming, Percy returns to the implicit link between scientific 
humanism and the Holocaust. While he circumscribes the issue in The
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Moviegoer—i.e., he writes about it by "not writing about it"—the link becomes 
explicit in The Second Coming. In large part, the novel follows the older Will 
Barrett’s attempts to come to terms with and place the memory o f his father’s 
death by suicide. Barrett "remembered everything," the narrator tells us (72). 
Almost anything serves as a signal which fires his memory: a triangular patch of 
land reminds him of missed opportunities with Ethel Rosenblum, a high-school 
classmate and would-be sweetheart, and the sound of stretching barbed wire 
announces the hunting trip during which his father first tried to kill himself and 
Barrett. In his car, Barrett carries physical reminders of his father—two guns.
One is a Greener, the shotgun with which his father ultimately took his life and 
which comes to represent to Barrett his father’s "love of death" (136). The other is 
a Luger, a pistol his father had taken from an SS colonel, and which provides 
Barrett clues to the unnamed malaise, the "death-in-life" out of which his father 
knew no escape but suicide.
The Luger signals a connection between his father’s humanism and the
Holocaust. Recalling the "colonel’s black cap with its Totenkopf insignia and
some pictures" his father had taken along with the Luger, Barrett reflects on his
father’s stories of World War II:
Strange that he, my father, often spoke of the Ardennes and 
the Rhine and Weimar but never mentioned Buchenwald, 
which was only four miles from Weimar and which Patton
took three weeks later, never mentioned that the horrified 
Patton paraded fifteen hundred of Weimar’s best humanistic 
Germans right down the middle of Buchenwald to see the 
sights. Patton, of all people, no Goethe he who said to the 
fifteen hundred not look you sons of Goethe but look you 
sons of bitches (is not this in fact, Father, where your 
humanism ends in the end?). Yet he, my father, never 
mentioned t h a t . . .  (121)
Even the Faulkneresque rhythms imply what the words themselves make explicit.
Humanism is not enough, be it of Barrett’s father or of one of Percy’s "literary
fathers."35 Humanism, in fact, leads to the horrors of the Lagers, for it signals
the "recession from transcendence" and the "immanentization of the eschaton"
that "collective civilizational activity" enacts. For Percy, it leads to the gnosis
which "shatters time" by means of "articulated atemporality" (theory), a
comprehensive "science" which inflates knowing to a "totalitarian worldview." In
the name of such humanism, millions of people can be killed "without
compunction or even much interest."
W hat occupies a rather small place in The Second Coming, however, moves 
to the foreground in Percy’s last novel, The Thanatos Syndrome. Here, the 
references to the Holocaust and to Germany are explicit and numerous. Although 
Percy returns to his befuddled Anglo-Saxon psychiatrist-protagonist, Tom More, 
two other main characters are of obvious German descent: John Van Dorn, 
referred to throughout the novel simply as "Van Dorn," and Father Smith, whose
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"Confession" and "Footnote" provide the central anti-gnostic message of the
novel. Germany seems very much on Percy’s mind as the book unfolds. Percy
himself travelled there in the summer of 1934. But it is the Germany of the
Weimar Republic (1919-33) that finds emphasis in the novel, not that of the
National Socialists. The Nazis and the Holocaust do occupy a significant place,
but they are used mostly as examples. As in The Second Coming, they signal the
end of an unchecked humanism. The bestialism of the Nazi Lagers marks the end
of Weimar angelism. In the name of atemporal theory which purports to advance
humankind, the Weimar scientists lay the groundwork for the rise of a Hitler. As
Father Smith tells Tom More:
If you are a lover of Mankind in the abstract like Walt 
Whitman, who wished the best for Mankind, you will 
probably do no harm and might even write good poetry and 
give pleasure. . . .
If you are a theorist of Mankind like Rousseau or Skinner, 
who believes he understands man’s brain and in the 
solitariness of his study or laboratory writes books on the 
subject, you are also probably harmless and might even 
contribute to human knowledge. . . .
But if you put the two together, a lover of Mankind and a 
theorist o f Mankind, what you’ve got now is Robespierre or 
Stalin or Hitler and the Terror, and millions dead for the 
good of Mankind. ( TS129)
It was the Weimar doctors, who, in the name of the betterment of mankind,
allowed the termination of lives "unfit for living." Percy’s acknowledgment of
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Frederic Wertham’s "remarkable book," A Sign for Cain, in the Prologue to The
Thanatos Syndrome only amplifies what Father Smith makes explicit about a
society in the grip of gnostic theory.36
Wertham’s book, subtitled "An Exploration of Human Violence," contends
that one reason for the proliferation of violence in the modern age may be a result
of an improper understanding of it. A proper vision eschews the notion that
violence is fated or that it is purely accidental in nature:
Looked at superficially, it may appear that there is a lot of 
inevitability about violence. But the more we concentrate 
scientifically on a concrete question in the general stream of 
violence, the more we find that pure coincidence, accident, 
and chance disappear and causal sequences of events emerge.
(22)
Every act of violence, then, has a long history of contributing factors. "Social 
customs, institutions, theories, and beliefs" all play a role as "violence-fostering 
factors" (43-4). The violence unleashed by the Nazis upon the Jews and other so- 
called "impurities" was not so much a "freak" accident of history as it was a logical 
end of modes of thought that had preceded it. Although Hitler provided the 
impetus for its enactment, the Holocaust had its roots in the science and research 
begun during the Weimar Republic, especially with the publication in 1920 of The 
Release o f the Destruction o f Life Devoid o f Value, a proto-euthanasia manual. 
Wertham writes:
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The book advocated that the killing of "worthless people" be 
released from penalty and legally permitted. It was written 
by two prominent scientists, the jurist Karl Binding and the 
psychiatrist Alfred Hoche. The concept of "life devoid of 
value" or "life not worth living" was not a Nazi invention, as 
is often thought. It derives from this book. (161)37
Once the question of the "value of life" reaches the floor, Wertham argues, a
plethora of "legitimated" violence follows.
In The Thanatos Syndrome, Father Smith refers directly to this book in his
"confession." It was given to him by one of the doctors he met during his trip to
Germany in the 1930’s, and it created a "heated argument" in the scientific
community he came to know:
(The argument] seemed to be between those who believed in 
the elimination of people who were useless, useless to anyone, 
to themselves, the state, and those who believed in euthanasia 
only for those who suffered from hopeless diseases or defects.
. . .1 must confess to you that I didn’t warm up to those 
fellows, distinguished as they were. But I must also confess 
that I was not repelled by their theories and practice of 
eugenics. (246-7)
Here, Father Smith "confesses" his attraction to the gnostic theory that eliminates 
the impure in the name of purity. This confession foreshadows the more emphatic 
one he makes at the end of his discourse, that he would have joined his friend who 
entered the Schutzstaffel had he been a German and not an American: "I would
have gone to the Junkerschule, sworn the solemn oath of the Teutonic knights at
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Marienberg, and joined the Schutzstaffel. Listen. Do you hear me? I  would have 
joined him" (248-9, Percy’s emphasis).
The confession of his attraction to the theory of eugenics reflects an
intellectual assent to gnosis, but his desire to enter the SS signals a volitional
assent. In his interview with Jan Nordby Gretlund, Percy, following Gabriel
Marcel, comments on the positive aspects of mass movements:
M arcel. . . had the nerve to say [that] we tend to overlook 
something positive about the mass movements. It is easy to 
say how wrong they were. It is easy to overlook the positive 
things: the great sense of verve and vitality. This I was very 
much aware of in Germany in 1934. ( Con 208)
Percy in no way condones the actions of the Nazi regime; he is well aware of the
"dead weight and mystery of the horror" that the Nazis perpetrated on those they
considered unfit for life in the Third Reich. Yet, he also recognizes the appeal of
mass movements to an age which proclaims the self autonomous. In such an age,
the self becomes ever more isolated and thus longs for a sense of commonality of
purpose that would relieve it of its loneliness. Like war, mass movements provide
such a common purpose. They provide avenues for the self to feel part of
something beyond itself.
It is noteworthy, then, that Father Smith "confesses" to Tom More. The 
word confess derives from the Latin prefix com, "together," and fateri, "to 
acknowledge." Father Smith did not ultimately join the SS; rather, together with
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Tom, he acknowledges his attraction to them. He breaks the isolation of the self 
in his confession, through his speaking to another person, not through he violence 
of war or through another mass movement. Wertham writes that "communication 
is the opposite of violence. Where communication ends, violence begins" (50). 
Like St. Augustine, then, Father Smith confesses his sins, and in so doing, he 
confesses the life he has chosen over the death of a possibly violent past. When 




He shrugs, appearing to lose interest. "In the end one must 
choose—given the chance."
"Choose what?"
"Life or death. What else?" (257)
Father Smith chooses and confesses life over the death o f gnostic certainty. 
When he asks Tom, "Do you think we’re any different from the Germans?" he 
suggests a parallel between the Nazis and the projects undertaken by Van Dorn 
and the other well-meaning scientists in the novel. Such projects based on 
"angelic" knowledge have already led to the bestialism of child-molestation at 
Belle Ame Academy. But Father Smith suggests that the "qualitarian centers"
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which euthanize people unfit for life and the Blue Boy project which eliminates 
social problems through mixing heavy sodium ions with drinking water mark the 
beginnings of a gnosis that will end in the gas chambers— thanatos. At one point 
in the novel, Tom More tells his colleagues the reason for Father Smith’s refusal to 
support their endeavors: "He thinks you’ll end by killing Jews" (351).
In Percy’s last work of fiction, then, he launches a frontal attack on the 
gnosis of scientific humanism. The question remains, however, why the change in 
tactics from indirect to direct confrontation? Why write explicitly about the "dead 
weight and mystery of the horror" now, when in 1979 he argued that the best way 
to write about it was "not to write about it," to deal with it silently?
It seems to me that three responses could be set forth, each related to the 
views of time outlined earlier in the chapter. On the one hand, the change in tactic 
reflects a movement similar to the linearity of time as viewed in the Christian 
perspective. The Thanatos Syndrome stands at the end as the fulfillment o f what 
Percy has been writing about all along. This last novel reflects the "either/or" that 
Percy writes about throughout his career, the choice between eros or thanatos, and 
the novels along the way find their source in them. Each novel, furthermore, 
"repeats" this end in its unique fashion. Percy writes about the same thing all 
along but his themes find their ultimate fulfillment in his last work. Another 
perspective might be compared to the circularity of the Greek version of time.
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Percy says all he has to say in the beginning, in The Moviegoer, and then repeats 
in his other novels what has been established as the "ideal" in that novel. The later 
novels are lesser incarnations of this first, primordial one. Still another view could 
be likened to the gnostic’s view of time. Percy radically breaks from his earlier 
"silent" treatment of the Holocaust and embarks on an overt refutation of the 
gnosis that leads to it. In this perspective, The Thanatos Syndrome stands alone 
as an "alien" amidst Percy’s other works. This alien character relates to the 
confessional quality of the novel, the "acknowledgment together" by author and 
character of their attraction to the gnosticism against which they rail. I mean to 
say that Percy breaks with his commitment to "not writing about the Holocaust" 
in order to deal with (and ultimately condemn) his own attractions to the vitality 
of German life that he experienced during his trip in 1934.
38In an interview with Phil McCombs, Percy once admitted that although 
his experiences in Germany were nowhere near "so dramatic as Father Smith’s" 
(809), he nevertheless transformed them in composing The Thanatos Syndrome. 
Like Father Smith, Percy stayed with a family whose son "was dead serious. . . .
[He was] graduating from the Hitler Jugend and going into the Schutzstaffel"
(809). And just as Father Smith was impressed by the young man he befriended, 
Percy admits that "this youth was the one who made an impression on me" (809). 
There can be little doubt, then, that Percy uses Father Smith as a mouthpiece for
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his own views against the scientific humanism which seeks to engineer society in 
the name of "doing good." Furthermore, Percy’s comments to Gretlund indicate 
that, like Father Smith, he was profoundly attracted to the verve that pervaded 
Germany during Hitler’s rise to power. Jay Tolson cites a comment by Shelby 
Foote regarding this trip: "[Walker] was tremendously impressed by what he saw 
there. Tremendously impressed."39 Tolson goes on to argue that character and 
writer coalesce in the pages of The Thanatos Syndrome, especially in the 
reflections on Germany. He suggests that what so impressed the young Percy, 
whose "cynicism could verge on nihilism" (115), was the "sense of purpose of the 
true-believing Nazi" (118). It is not unreasonable to propose, then, that Father 
Smith’s confession is also Walker Percy’s confession. Often preoccupied by 
"troubling questions about life’s meaning" (Tolson 113), Percy found himself 
deeply impressed and attracted to the resolve "unto death" of the National 
Socialists. When Father Smith says that he "would have joined" his friend, Percy 
himself seems not too far behind the persona.
If The Thanatos Syndrome is viewed as an "alien," then, its difference 
derives from the alien within Percy himself, that "other" who surfaces and finds 
expression in the character of Father Smith. In his previous novels, the other 
seems to be projected onto the culture at large. In this final one, he quarrels with 
himself. While it is no doubt true that his earlier works also evince this quarrel
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with himself, the overt "confessional" quality of The Thanatos Syndrome suggests 
that Percy’s inner struggle with gnosticism had at last surfaced. The movement 
from indirect to direct confrontation signals a deeper willingness on Percy’s part to 
acknowledge together with his reader that he is himself a product of the very 
culture he castigates, this "century of death."
His diagnosis of our gnostic culture, then, stands not only between time 
and knowledge, but also between (inter esse) the "unwarranted totalitarian view" 
and the sense of purpose (concern) that such a view provides. He condemns the 
totalitarian view while at the same time standing in awe of its power to give 
direction to an otherwise formless life. Percy’s works ultimately reject the self- 
actualized and self-contained closure of history that a gnostic apocalypse and 
recovery would supply, and they point to that repetition which provides a sense of 
purpose without positing an absolute knowledge of an end. Apocalypse implies 
recovery; an end offers a new beginning. However, neither can be encompassed by 
the totalized, articulated atemporality which is theory. In his final works, Percy 
breaks his silence only to confess. And the confession of a life, of course, is one of 
the sources of modern autobiography.
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horizontal—views but atemporally, according to the hierarchical and 
vertical schema of Greek rationalism" (53). Four Quartets draws its 
meaning from the fullness of its end—"Not fare well,/ But fare forward, 
voyagers"—just as the end is foreshadowed in the beginning. The last 
section of "Little Gidding" recapitulates the entire poem in such a way that
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Eliot manifests in the work is not ultimately circular but a spiralling 
linearity. As in Christianity, so, too, in the poem. The line that connects 
the beginning and the end is history. Both Nathan Scott in his The Broken 
Center and James Olney in Metaphors o f Self make points similar to, but 
more thorough and eloquent than my own.
12. In A History o f Christian Thought, 3 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1970) vol. 1, Justo L. Gonzalez has this to say of gnostic dualism: "Gnostic 
speculation sets out from a single eternal principle, from which other 
principles or aeons are produced in a declining process, until—usually 
through an error of one of the lower aeons—the material world is 
produced. Thus appears the derivative dualism" (131).
13. The Greek hystera means "uterus or womb," but hysteresis means "a 
deficiency"; and labes shares the same root, Jabi, which in Latin can mean 
both "to slip, to fall," as in labile, and "a lip, or lip-like organ," as in 
labium. Although these etymological connections are my own and not 
Puech’s, they seem to be implied in Puech’s later comments on sexuality 
and the Gnostics. They also find corroboration in Harold Bloom’s lucid 
analysis of Ann Lee, the foundress of the Shakers, in The American 
Religion: The Emergence o f the Post-Christian Nation (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1992): "Ann Lee began as a desperate, lower-class English wife, 
who had gone through four painful births, lost all four infants, joined a 
band of Shaking Quakers (in dissent from the main body of Quakers), and 
was imprisoned for disturbing the peace in Manchester during the summer 
of 1770. With waking eyes, she beheld Adam and Eve in the initial act o f  
human sexuality and suddenly understood that lovemaking itself 
constituted the Fall from Paradise. By 1774, Ann Lee had removed herself 
and her followers to America. She died in 1784, only about forty-eight 
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parenthetically in the text.
177
14. Bloom calls this "perfect man" and "spiritual man" the "pneumatic self." 
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to understand, an obsessed society wholly in the grip of a dominant 
Gnosticism" (49).
The etymology is taken from Webster’s New Universal Unabridged 
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The epigraphs to "The Message in the Bottle," one from Thomas Aquinas 
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"The act of faith consists essentially in knowledge and there we find its 
formal or specific perfection." (Aquinas, De Veritate)
"Faith is not a form of knowledge; for all knowledge is either knowledge of 
the eternal, excluding the temporal and the historical as indifferent, or it is 
pure historical knowledge. No knowledge can have for its object the 
absurdity that the eternal is the historical." (Kierkegaard, Philosophical 
Fragments)
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your novels have to end at that point? In other words, essentially what 
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a form of the "meaningful silence" Schleifer and Markley speak of. Pat 
Bigelow relates the question of silence and writing to Kierkegaard in 
Kierkegaard and the Problem o f Writing (Tallahassee: Florida State UP, 
1987).
26. Following Percy 178-95, to be cited parenthetically in the text.
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Chapter Four
Repetition and Grapheiir. 
Metaphor and the Mystery of 
Language and Narrative
Shakespeare had it easy: he had the language, a new 
language busting out all around him, and he didn’t 
even have to make up stories; the stories were around 
him too. We have to do it all, including the 
impossible or all but impossible task: make up a 
language as you go along. All you have to do to be a 
good novelist is to be like God on the first day.
—Walker Percy to Shelby Foote 
October 19, 1973 (SHC)




In Fiction and Repetition, J. Hillis Miller writes that his book concerns not 
so much "what" texts mean but "how" they mean.1 He explores narrative 
patterns, and what he finds is that narratives depend on repetition to generate 
meaning:
This book is an exploration of some of the ways [novels] 
work to generate meaning or to inhibit the too easy 
determination o f a meaning based on the linear sequence of 
the story. . . . Any novel is a complex tissue of repetition and
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of repetitions within repetition, or of repetitions linked in 
chain fashion to other repetitions. (2-3)
Miller’s comment sounds similar to some advice Walker Percy got from Caroline
Gordon when he was going through his years of novelistic apprenticeship. Percy
sent his manuscripts of "The Charterhouse" and "The Gramercy Winner" to
Gordon, who obviously read his work very carefully; she responded to his first
novel in about forty pages o f singled-spaced prose. Many of those comments did
not relate specifically to Percy’s work, but dealt generally with novels, the task of
the novelist, and writing. In short, she set forth her "theory" of the novel and
applied it to Percy’s own work. One item she passed on seems especially pertinent
to the question of repetition and writing. Gordon relates part of a conversation
she had with a rural black preacher who told her about his technique of delivering
sermons: "First I tells’em I’m going to tell’em. Then I tell’em. Then I tell’em I
done told’em" (SHC).
From one perspective, the preacher’s comment would seem to give moral 
latitude to the centuries-old problem of sleep and the sermon. It would also 
suggest a reason for the sometimes lifeless structure of some works of literary 
criticism, which often follow the Introduction ("I tells’em I’m going to tell’em")- 
Body ("I tell’em")-Conclusion ("I tell’em I done told’em") format. Yet, viewed 
differently, the comment can quicken both homiletic and critical practice. For the
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preacher’s words do what they say. The "what" and the "how" interpenetrate. The 
repetition of the verb "to tell," for example, is not a repetition without a difference. 
The threefold "tell’em" is compressed and encompassed by "tells’em" and 
"told’em," which mark the transition from the ideal or the possible to the actual. 
And "done told’em" repeats the auxiliary form of "going to tell’em," yet, while the 
auxiliaries are obviously different, the progression of sounds from "done" to "told" 
and the repetition of sounds in "going" and "told" ("go" and "to") signals on a 
smaller scale precisely what Miller writes about on a larger one. Furthermore, the 
self-enfolding and extended rhythms of the first and the last phrases find 
counterpoint in the pithy rhythm of the middle sentence, which nevertheless 
stresses the same verb. The middle sentence, in turn, is repeated in the first part of 
the third sentence. In his comment, the preacher engages in what has often been 
considered the golden rule of all homiletics, and he thus displays his own moral 
integrity: he practices what he preaches! Gordon passes on the remark to Percy 
because, like Hillis Miller, she sees this repetition as efficacious in writing as well.
In order for repetition to work in writing, though, it has to be seen as more 
than a simple restating. It has to be a restating that incorporates identity and 
difference, limits and possibilities, the ideal and the actual. It has to be like the 
coach horn Constantin Constantius praises in Repetition: "Long live the 
stagecoach horn! It is the instrument for me for many reasons, and chiefly because
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one can never be certain of wheedling the same notes from this horn. A coach 
horn has infinite possibilities" (175).2 To approach repetition and graphein in the 
context of Percy’s own narrative technique, then, I will inevitably have to repeat 
myself—with difference.
Chapter One has already dealt with something of the "how" of repetition, 
autobiography, and Percy’s works. Chapters Two and Three engaged the "what." 
Yet, in Percy, the "how" and the "what" cannot be so easily separated. I agree 
with John W. Stevenson who has argued that "the distinctive character of [Percy’s] 
style is the particular way he uses language and the way this language controls and 
discovers its proper form. I suppose I am trying to say that Percy’s art (his craft) 
is as much a part of his theme as is the theme itself."3 Thus, I hope to show that 
repetition is not only a theme of Percy’s work, but that it informs his narrative 
style as well. I have already suggested such a notion when I argued that, like 
Kierkegaard, Percy uses the aesthetic to approach the religious. Another way of 
saying this is to say that inter esse finds embodiment in an "interesting" style. That 
style, furthermore, is fundamentally autobiographical.
In Chapter One, I refer to James Olney’s assertion that the essential 
autobiographical movement takes place in memory, in the interplay o f past and 
present. In the context of their present consciousness, autobiographers grasp 
together into narrative form their past experience. But this "grasping together" (I
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borrow the concept from Paul Ricoeur4) in memory and narrative is never a 
simple recapitulation of past events. The story and the life are never identical. 
Rather, a distance, a gap, a difference always exists between the past as it was lived 
and the past as it is written. Yet, as different as they are, lived life and written life, 
some connection must exist between them, else why bother to write in the first 
place. Thus, autobiography repeats the life of its subject (the self) in a way that 
joins identity and difference without a simple synthesis of the two. Furthermore, 
as the terminal root of the word "autobiography" itself, graphein provides the link 
between the autos and bios. It enacts the repetition I have already addressed (the 
"what"), while it also engages in its own repetition (the "how"). Thus, some 
further thoughts on Percy’s views of the self and life—and their relation to 
autobiography in general—will be necessary to examine repetition and writing. 
Most notably, I will return to some aspects of his language theory, especially with 
regard to metaphor and naming. In so doing, I, too, hope to link identity and 
difference. I hope to sound the coach horn. That is, I hope to practice what I 
preach.
1. Metaphor and the Mystery o f  Language
Percy’s fascination with language extends to every facet of his life and 
work, especially his analysis of "death-in-life." Although the resurgence of gnostic
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thought has much to do with the "Century of Death" I outlined in the last chapter, 
the death of language, as Percy sees it, also contributes to the "peculiar malaise" he 
analyzes in his works. A central issue of all of his fiction, but more explicitly in 
The Thanatos Syndrome, concerns what Father Smith calls "the evacuation of 
signs." "[Words] don’t signify anymore," he tells Tom More (121), and he goes on 
to make a direct link between the deprivation of signs and the murder o f the Jews, 
for him, the only sign that has not been evacuated. Father Smith implies that 
when signs have been deprived, so too has the sign-user. Given such a state, any 
level of bestialism becomes possible.
If the entrance into sign-use marks the passage into full humanity and thus 
elevates the sign-user from an animal-like existence, as in the case of Helen Keller, 
then a loss of the signifying capacity of language divests humans of their unique 
humanity. For Percy, Keller’s experience at the well-house is paradigmatic. 
Everyone who is able to read these words has crossed the same threshold. I have 
already suggested that this primordial naming event is itself a repetition because it 
links concept and percept, the ideal and the actual. Somewhere along the way, 
however, words lose their signifying potential. They become evacuated. The 
signified and the signifier interpenetrate. It is important to note that this potential 
devolution rests in the same primordial naming act. Thus, naming possesses a 
dual nature. It has a capacity to reveal and conceal or, as Charles Bigger writes, it
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is both a "call by Being and a violence against Being."5 That with which we know 
the world is also that which blocks that same knowing.6
In the "Intermezzo" of Lost in the Cosmos, to repeat more ground, Percy 
implies that art, as a naming event, also displays this same duality. t)n  the one 
hand, it resists the interpenetration of the signifler by the signified; it frustrates the 
evacuation of signs. On the other hand, it is limited in this same capacity because 
of its very use of signs. The epigraphs that head this chapter further indicate the 
dual nature of art as naming. According to the first, novelists, like God, create ex 
nihilo. When they name, they create in a sense an entirely new world. According 
to the second, novelists, like humans, are limited by texts that have gone before 
them. They rename or renovate what has been named but forgotten, or they name 
something that has been, but which has never been named before. The first 
reiterates Percy’s call for the novelist to "sing a new song." The second indicates 
the limits of that very endeavor. Yet in its limitation, it also discloses possibility.
For Percy, the social character of naming, the pairing of namer and hearer 
(or writer and reader), opens the possibility for a "co-celebration" of a thing beheld 
in common. The name sanctions and frees. The two impossibilities to which 
Percy refers in the epigraphs—the impossibility of creating a new language and the 
impossibility of creating a sovereign text—join possibility and limitation. They 
both invoke hope: the first, that something entirely new will be sung; the second,
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that at least something old will be sung in a new way. This linking of possibility 
and limitation forms, I think, the mystery of language and narrative, and it will 
guide my remarks in this chapter. For, Gabriel Marcel writes, "I cannot place 
myself outside or before [the encounter with mystery]; I am engaged in this 
encounter, I depend on it, I am inside it in a certain sense, it envelopes me and it 
comprehends me—even if it is not comprehended by me."7 If I substitute the 
word "language" for "mystery" in Marcel’s definition, the meaning remains 
unchanged. For language is precisely that which "envelopes and comprehends" 
the language-user but which itself remains elusive. Perhaps nowhere can this 
mystery of language be better revealed (and concealed!) than in an exploration of 
metaphor and Percy’s works, both fiction and nonfiction. For Percy understands 
metaphor, like the novel, as both inventive and derivative, something newly made, 
yet something made new, something renovated—something repeated.
In "Metaphor as Mistake" (1958), Percy explores the analogical and 
cognitive dimensions of metaphor, and he contends that in metaphor "something 
very big happens in a very small space" {MB 66). That something very big is 
nothing less than the ontological potential of language and metaphor, their 
capacity to validate and discover being. For Percy claims ultimately that 
"metaphor is the true maker of language" {MB 79). Returning once again to his
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favorite example, Helen Keller and the primordial naming act, Percy anticipates 
the writings of Paul Ricoeur on metaphor. Although Ricoeur notes that metaphor 
is a "phenomenon of predication, not denomination,"8 on the level of the sentence 
and not of the single word, both writers agree that metaphor "tells us something 
new about reality" (Ricoeur 53). It is important to remember that, despite his 
repeated use of the Helen Keller phenomenon, Percy understands naming to 
extend beyond the level o f isolated words. A symphony, a novel, a short-story, a 
poem can all "name" and thus disclose being. They can, as Ricoeur puts it in Time 
and Narrative, "refigure" reality.9 I will touch on this aspect of naming in the 
second section of this chapter, the mystery of narrative. Suffice it to say now that 
although Percy uses "naming" to designate his understanding o f metaphor, he uses 
it in a sense different from Ricoeur’s "denomination."
For Percy, the Helen Keller phenomenon offers fertile ground for an 
exploration of metaphor because in this "aboriginal naming a c t . . . the most 
obscure and the most creative of metaphors" manifests itself: "No modern poem 
was ever as obscure as Miss Sullivan’s naming water water tor Helen Keller" (MB 
78). The word water has only the "most tenuous analogical similarities" with the 
thing itself (MB 79). The aboriginal naming act, which is metaphor, involves a 
pairing of word and thing, object beheld and word uttered. Percy writes: "We can 
only conceive being, sidle up to it by laying something else alongside. We
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approach the thing not directly but by pairing, by apposing symbol and thing" 
{MB 72).10 By virtue of the space between the word and the thing, language both 
validates and obscures; it responds to the call of being and does violence against it. 
When a namer utters a name in good faith and authority for a hearer, the thing 
beheld in common is both sanctioned and freed: sanctioned because the name 
somehow formulates, i.e., gives form to, the being of what is commonly beheld; 
freed because that same formulation nevertheless makes a clearing for the thing to 
appear in all its strangeness. In its pairing, naming thus becomes a sort of 
"reconciliation," as Charles Bigger puts it.11
Yet, this same pairing leads to the deadening of language. Words no longer 
signify. Instead, the distance collapses, and words mummify that which they 
originally disclosed. For the person who has long-since crossed the linguistic 
threshold, the word water has devolved. Certainly, I do not disclose being to you 
when I say water'And point to the clear liquid that flows from a fountain. Signifier 
and signified have interpenetrated, and the word has lost its metaphorical potency. 
It has become evacuated. Ricoeur writes that "there are no live metaphors in the 
dictionary" (52), and by this I take him to mean that if naming does not both 
validate and obscure, language is dead.
It is the task of metaphor, then, to reinstate the distance between word and 
thing. Like naming, metaphor also employs a pairing, although it is often
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considered a "wrong" coupling. But in the "wrongness" of its pairing, its strange
coupling, metaphor reopens the queerness and obscurity of being—its
uncanniness.12 Ricoeur notes that metaphor’s function is
close to what Gilbert Ryle has called a "category mistake." It 
is . . .  a calculated error, which brings together things that do 
not go together and by means of this apparent 
misundersanding [sic] it causes a new, hitherto unnoticed, 
relation of meaning to spring up between the terms that 
previous systems of classification had ignored or not allowed.
(52)
Thus, in "Metaphor as Mistake," Percy agrees with Gabriel Marcel who says that 
when "I ask what something is, I am more satisfied to be given a name even if the 
name means nothing to me (especially if?), than to be given a scientific 
classification" (MB 72). Metaphor circumvents the abstract and general 
classifications that theory and science depend on, categories that make individual 
entities a "case o f' or an "instance o f' a general, discarnate rule. In this function 
of metaphor, the relation between gnosticism, death-in-life, and language becomes 
most clear. For if language merely provides a means of conveying discarnate, 
theoretical categories, then it bypasses lived time in favor of an immediate 
perception of the atemporal abstract. Theory, then, becomes more real than the 
concrete, and a "loss of the creature" ensues.13
Ricoeur argues that in its wrongness, metaphor not only circumvents 
previous systems of classification, but it depends on a "literal interpretation [an
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interpretation based on prevalent systems of classification] which self-destructs in
a significant contradiction" (50). This notion of circumventing and destroying
normal classification not only fits in with the "apocalyptic" theme of Percy’s
fiction and his avowed writing habits (an exercise in despair and recovery), but it
also relates to a comment he once made to a French interviewer:
Recently I have read a book, you must read it: Zen and the 
Art o f Motorcycle Maintenance by Robert Pirsig. I had been 
put off by the title a long time, but then I started reading it, 
and it certainly set me thinking. There are books, you know, 
even if you do not admire them, they give impetus to your 
mind. In that book the hero makes Aristotle and his logic 
responsible for all our evils—I personally make Descartes 
responsible—and has a nervous breakdown, which he 
overcomes by running and maintaining a motor-bike 
(Con 247).
One wonders if it is both Aristotle’s logic and his "classifications" that provided 
the "impetus" to Percy’s mind in the reading of Pirsig’s book. If it is both, then 
Ricoeur’s comments about metaphor and classification would seem all the more 
apposite.
For Percy, Gerard Manley Hopkins creates metaphors that self-destruct 
best, and so are thereby most able to capture the peculiar inscape of things. 
Lightning is not simply a flash of light in the sky, but
a straight stroke, broad like a stroke with chalk and liquid, as 
if the blade of an oar just stripped open a ribbon seat in 
smooth water and it caught the light, (quoted in MB 78)
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Hopkins was surely the kind of poet Percy had in mind when he wrote that a poet
can "wrench signifier out of context and exhibit it in all its queerness" (Z.C106).
But metaphor does not merely rename what has already been named and
subsequently ossified, as in the case of "lightning." It also institutes something
altogether new. It names what has been "secretly apprehended" (inscape) but
hitherto unknown, because unnamed. Metaphor, then, both renovates and
invents. In either case, it establishes in the reader or hearer "a unique joy which
marks m an’s ordainment to being and the knowing of it" {MB 71). It repeats the
primordial naming act, and thus opens a new world and a new way of knowing the
"old" world. It creates a new language.
Percy’s thoughts on metaphor and language find a parallel in the writing of
Paul John Eakin on autobiography. In a seminal chapter o f his Fictions in
Autobiography: Studies in the Art o f Self-Invention, Eakin outlines
the relative positions of self and language in the order of 
being. . . . When an "I" speaks, and especially in 
autobiographical discourse, is its language in effect an 
original speech, a self-validating testimony to the uniqueness 
of the self? Or is such speech always fatally derivative?14
Eakin shows how questions of the relation between self and writing have polarized
into "a self-before-language or a language-before-self set of positions" (191).
Instead of adopting one pole or the other, Eakin looks for a third way, a position I
characterize as "self-in-language."
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Borrowing insights from a wide spectrum of linguistic philosophers,
developmental psychologists, literary theorists, and autobiographers—some of
whom were Percy’s own favorites, notably Susanne Langer and Helen Keller—
Eakin argues that "the origin of the self as the reflexive center of human
subjectivity is inextricably bound up with the activity o f language" (198). He
posits a model, based on three moments, for "the history of self-definition" of an
individual (219). The first moment involves the acquisition of language, whereby
the self becomes aware of itself; the second concerns what some have termed the
"I-am-me" experience, in which the self undergoes a doubling of self-
consciousness, i.e., a "self-conscious experience of self-consciousness" (218); and
the third, if it ever comes, is the autobiographical act, which
like the first moment . . .  is a coming together of self and 
language; [and] like the second . . .  is characterized by a 
double reflexiveness. . . . The text of an autobiography is 
likely to recapitulate the second moment as a content, while 
the making of the text re-enacts the first moment as a 
structure. (219)
Put in terms I have developed throughout this chapter, Eakin seems to say 
that the act o f autobiography repeats both the acquisition of language (as the 
"how" of the text) and the experience of self as self (as the "what" of the text). 
Autobiography creates a new language which both comprehends and constitutes 
the self even as its content is derived from a self already experienced as a self
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determined and immeshed in language. Thus, autobiography evinces what Hillis
Miller says about novels being "a complex tissue of repetition and of repetitions
within repetition." In Percy’s terms, autobiography evinces the "consciousness
raised to the second power" which he understands true Kierkegaardian repetition
to be {MB 96). Autobiography attempts to name the self—i.e., to sanction and
free it—in the self-consciousness of language. It repeats the aboriginal naming act,
and thus it provides, as Olney’s classic work suggests, a "metaphor of self."15
It may be useful to examine Eakin’s analysis of Helen Keller’s experience at
the well-house to show further the convergence (and divergence) of his and
Percy’s thought and to show what I see as Percy’s contribution to the
understanding of autobiography as metaphorical repetition.16 Eakin reveals how
Helen Keller’s experience is similar to the autobiographical act in three respects:
it is an act of memory ("suddenly I fe l t . . .  a thrill of 
returning thought"); it is an act of language in which 
experience is transformed into symbol ("she spelled into the 
other [hand] the word water. . . . my whole attention fixed 
upon the motion of her fingers"); and it is a constitution of 
self ("that living word awakened my soul"). (212-13)
Eakin goes on to say that her experience taught her that "the self has a name," and
that it is the task of autobiography "to state ‘what we have learned we are’" (213).
In this sense, then, autobiography would be both invention and derivation:
invention because it constitutes the self; derivation because it depends on the what
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the self "has learned," but hitherto left unnamed. Is it possible to say that 
autobiography, like Percy’s metaphor, tries to capture the "inscape" of the self s 
experience of self, to capture the secretly apprehended but hitherto unnamed 
selfhood of the self, its "unformulated presence" (MB 69)? If so, this task, 
according to Percy, both discloses and does violence to whatever being the self 
may have.
Eakin often worries about, but cannot resolve, the challenge Jacques 
Derrida poses to the relation of self and language. For Derrida and his followers, 
writing can never manifest the self-presence, "the meeting point of the physical and 
the intelligible," that we accept as the norm in speech.17 Thus, autobiography can 
never make present a self which is never self-present. Like Eakin, I cannot claim 
to resolve the metaphysical question of self and language, but I can repeat some 
aspects of Percy’s thought on the question. In Chapter Two, I made much of "the 
unformulability of the self," that the self, as Percy claims, names everything under 
the sun except itself. The self has no sign of itself. In the case o f Binx Bolling, I 
argued that although the self cannot find a single sign for itself, its only avenue 
toward self-discovery nevertheless rests in sign use, that is, language. Thus, as a 
pairing of word and thing, the aboriginal naming act is bound to be frustrated 
when it turns toward the self, because the self is "no-thing." No single word can 
encompass it. On the other hand, metaphor, as a pairing of one named thing with
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another ("flesh is grass"), an activity as I have tried to show that repeats both the 
aboriginal naming act and the acquisition of language, can provide an avenue to 
the self. In its queer, "wrong" pairing, metaphor can repeat the queerness o f the 
self which has "fallen" into language. The self is a stranger and, with the help of 
metaphor’s indirection, it can constitute and disclose its own strangeness. One is 
reminded of the subtitle of Percy’s The Message in the Bottle. "How Queer Man 
is, How Queer Language is, and What One has to do with the Other." In this 
sense, Binx Bolling’s experience of people as "dead dead dead" can be likened to 
dead metaphor. According to Binx, too many people "go gently into" a good 
dictionary. They accept some theoretical formulation of the self based on the 
tenets and classifications of scientific humanism, which would deny their 
queerness. They accept themselves as cases or instances of this or that abstraction.
This notion of strangeness, furthermore, provides an avenue for extending 
Eakin’s lucid analysis of Helen Keller’s experience. To the threefold similarity he 
cites between her experience and autobiography, I would add Keller’s last 
sentence: "It would have been difficult to find a happier child than I was as I lay 
in my crib at the close of that eventful day and lived over the joys it had brought 
me, and for the first time longed for a new day to come." Here, Keller repeats 
("lived over") the events of the day, not only in her crib, but also in the act of 
writing her text and in the text itself. The repetition adds a new dimension to her
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existence: for the first time in her life, she has a future. She "longed for a new day 
to come." She longs, in essence, for the opportunity to repeat events, new and old; 
that is, she has entered into "anticipatory resoluteness." But the longing, like the 
"repentance and sorrow" she experienced at the breaking of her doll, indicates the 
very queerness, the strangeness of her newfound existence as a human. One 
neither longs nor feels strange if one is "at home." Only homo viator longs. 
Keller’s entry into language, then, also marks her entry into the restlessness of her 
own unformulability, an inter esse which is a happiness, to be sure, but a happy 
longing. Her entry into language and the language that she employs to tell o f that 
event (the text) are self-reflexive. I mean to say that her entry into language 
becomes the metaphor for herself, a story in which the "how" and the "what" 
interpenetrate to disclose a self now happy and strange but never quite itself.18
One of the places the "how" and the "what" overlap for Percy comes in the 
account of the "blue-dollar hawk." He first uses the story in "Metaphor as 
Mistake" as one of the opening examples of the sort o f "misnaming" that can result 
in an "authentic poetic experience" (MB 65). Portions of the story reappear years 
later as part of the older Will Barrett’s "memory trip" in The Second Coming. As 
in any true repetition, the two versions display both similarities and differences. 
Undoubtedly, some of the differences result from the demands of the particular 
rhetorical situations. An essay on the ontology of metaphor requires a clearer
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demonstration of a thesis than does a section of a novel. Yet the very differences 
are themselves posited on a prior acknowledgment of similarity. Thus, the way 
Percy employs the story in the novel suggests that he repeats his previous work to 
reveal something about Barrett, something about the novel as a whole, and 
something about his narrative technique in general.
In "Metaphor as Mistake," the account goes as follows:
I remember hunting as a boy in south Alabama with my 
father and brother and a Negro guide. At the edge of some 
woods we saw a wonderful bird. He flew as swift and 
straight as an arrow, then all of a sudden folded his wings 
and dropped like a stone into the woods. I asked what the 
bird was. The guide said it was a blue-dollar hawk. Later 
my father told me the Negroes had got it wrong: It was really 
a blue darter hawk. I can still remember my disappointment 
at the correction. What was so impressive about the bird was 
its dazzling speed and the effect of alternation of its wings, as 
if it were flying by a kind of oaring motion. {MB 64)
I want to examine two aspects of this personal account. First, it rings true. 
As Percy writes, "everyone has a blue-dollar hawk in his childhood" {MB 69). One 
of my own, for example, must have been rather common for a child growing up at 
the time because I have heard others recount something similar to it. Louisiana 
had renewed its interest in its French roots through various grammar-school 
programs. Yet, being part of a middle-class, suburban (i.e. ahistorical) family, I 
really had little idea of what "French roots" meant. Thus, when I heard my 
parents and siblings speak of job possibilities and perquisites that certain
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companies provided for their employees and/or customers, I mistook "Fringe 
Benefits" for "French Benefits." For the longest time, I tried to understand just 
what sort of benefits were being provided. When I learned the correct form, I 
shrugged at my own denseness, and I felt a bit chastened and disappointed that the 
"real" term was so straightforward. But I haven’t forgotten the attempt to connect 
what little I knew of the business world with what little I knew of the French. I 
conjured a fascinating array of the exotic, the sexual, and the culturally elite. The 
name, "French Benefits," said much more than its descriptive counterpart. But 
then, I was only a boy.
At the time he first saw the hawk, Percy was a boy, too. This is the second 
aspect of the account I want to examine: while Percy is free with the first person 
pronoun in the account o f the hunting trip with his father, the person to whom he 
refers when he cites the example in the rest of the essay is not the "I" of the present 
writer, now reflecting on the ontology of metaphor by means of an experience he 
had as a child, but "the boy" who had the experience (see especially M B 71). Like 
Henry Adams, Percy eschews the use of the first person pronoun for the third 
person. I do not want to make too much of this shift in shifters. Certainly, it is 
due in part to the fact that the example supports the thesis Percy pursues in the 
piece. In such a "scientific" essay, he removes himself from the writing so that the 
general idea may be more easily apprehended by the reader. Yet, could one not
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say that, in his retrieval of the memory, Percy also retrieves and then distances 
himself from the disappointment he originally experienced at his father’s 
correction? Furthermore, could we not say that, even here, Percy rejects his 
father’s foreclosing of the possibility of being?19
In the account as he writes it, it is "I" who "can still remember the 
disappointment." Yet, everywhere else in the piece, it is "the boy’s delight," "the 
boy can’t help but be disappointed," "the boy’s preference," and so on (MB 71). 
Thus, the philosopher of language now sitting at his desk in Covington, Louisiana, 
seems to forget the "I" of his account and to posit someone quite other ("the boy") 
who experienced the wonder and disappointment of the name and its subsequent 
correction. This strange shift between "I" and "the boy" opens a distance that can 
be viewed as a repetition of the strange distance in metaphor which, of course, 
forms part of the content, the "what," of the essay. However obscure and 
distanced, then, the essay is not only about the mistake upon which metaphor 
inevitably depends, it also enacts that same mistake by distancing the writer from 
"the boy," and then both from the father, who proved so disappointing. In the 
language of the text, Percy repeats the argument of the text itself: language and 
metaphor mediate experience by means of distance and indirection . The writer 
can never relive the experience as it was lived by the boy; he can only write it. In 
the writing, Percy seems to evince something of Keller’s discovery of longing, for
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he, too, seems to long for a time before his disappointment. Like Keller, he senses 
an unformulability that nevertheless calls for formulation in language. The 
writing, however wrong, remains the only avenue through which the experience 
might be both renovated and created. It provides Percy with a link between his 
autos and bios. "Metaphor as Mistake" thus becomes part of the mistaken 
metaphor by which the "I" o f the writer reconciles himself with "the boy" of the 
experience. In this essay, Percy not only adds to his reader’s understanding o f the 
relation between metaphor and the queerness of language and being, but he 
reveals his own concealment in metaphor (his own strangeness) as well. He 
discloses himself as "enveloped" and "comprehended" in the mystery of language.
2. Metaphor and the  Mystery o f  Narrative
If it is true that Percy turned from writing essays to writing novels because 
he wanted to emulate the French, who "see nothing wrong with writing novels that 
address what they consider the deepest philosophical issues" (Con 183), then his 
use of the blue-dollar hawk account in The Second Coining would seem to confirm 
his self-stated purpose. Whereas the account in "Metaphor as Mistake" serves as 
an example that supports a philosophical thesis, in the novel it becomes an episode 
which finds its place in a larger configuration. But in the type of novels that Percy 
writes, the account should nevertheless serve something of its original
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philosophical purpose. I want to explore Percy’s fictional repetition of this 
account to see what light it can shed on his "repetitive" narrative technique as a 
whole, especially with regard to plot and metaphor.
In some of his early essays and interviews Percy often made comments
which suggest a lack of concern with plots: "I’m not primarily concerned with
plotting a story" (Con 24); "by following a predestined plan with outline, like some
writers, I could foresee the action and likely it wouldn’t go veering off on another
path. But I can’t work like that" (Con 8). To Shelby Foote, who often tried to
goad Percy into working from an outline—Foote himself seemed obsessed with
plotting—Percy once wrote: "The French really kill me—it’s all form. Come to
think of it, you would like them better than I do" (SHC). And later, he wrote:
The French are idealogues, i.e. madmen, and yet without 
them we’d sink into a torpor. The mind-body split, locked-in 
ghost in a machine on one side, structure and world on the 
other, me with the former, you with the latter, like I used to 
make ghostly spiritual (but flyable) Lockheed Vegas and you 
used to make solid structural admirable perfect unflyable P- 
51s. (SHC)
And toward the end of "From Facts to Fiction" (1966), a piece about "how it came 
to pass that a physician turned writer and became a novelist" {Signposts 186),
Percy refers to John Barth’s comment that the age of the nineteenth-century novel 
has passed:
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I agree. When I sat down to write The Moviegoer, I was very 
much aware of discarding the conventional notions o f a plot 
and a set of characters, discarded because the traditional 
concept of plot-and-character reflects a view of reality which 
has been called into question. (Signposts 190)20
Despite these disavowals of structure and plot (and what seems to be a 
backhanded swipe at Foote’s work), Percy, like any writer, nevertheless has to plot 
his novels. His stories have to be "followable."21 Since the "traditional concept 
of plot-and-character reflects a view of reality that has been called into question," 
it seems likely that Percy turned once again to his philosophical mentor, who 
called much into question, to derive and create his narrative technique. In 
Repetition, Constantin suggests that "repetition is a crucial expression for what 
‘recollection’ was to the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowing is a 
recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition" (131). If 
Kierkegaard is right, then it would seem likely that narrative, the primary means 
by which we know life, would also evince repetition. I have already cited Hillis 
Miller’s and Caroline Gordon’s references to narrative repetition. In "Narrative 
Time," Paul Ricoeur has also written on the subject, and his thought helps to 
clarify the type of plotting that Percy turns to in the wake of the collapse of the 
"traditional" novel.
In this essay that seems to serve as a short recapitulation of his three- 
volume opus, Time and Narrative, Ricoeur suggests that
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every narrative combines two dimensions in various 
proportions, one chronological and the other 
nonchronological. The first may be called the episodic 
dimension, which characterizes the story as made out of 
events. The second is the configurational dimension, 
according to which the plot construes significant wholes out 
of scattered events. . . .  I understand [the configurational act] 
to be the act of the plot, as eliciting a pattern from a 
succession.
Despite their relationship of polarity with respect to chronology, both episode and
configuration evince temporality. The episodic dimension "tends toward the linear
representation of time." The succession and progression of episodes reflects the
"irreversible order of time common to human and physical events" (178-9). The
configurational dimension, however, "is more deeply temporal than the time of
merely episodic narratives" (179). Ricoeur suggests that configuration imposes
Kermode’s "sense of an ending." When a story becomes well known
retelling takes the place of telling. . . . Then following the 
story is less important than apprehending the well-known 
end as implied in the beginning and the well-known episodes 
as leading to this end. (179)
Time is not nullified "by the teleological structure of the judgment which grasps
together the events under the heading o f ‘the end.’" Rather, this grasping
together in configuration involves a deepening of time; it involves repetition: "By
reading the end in the beginning and the beginning in the end, we learn also to
read time itself backward. . . .  In this way, a plot establishes human action not
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only within time . . . but within memory" (180). Furthermore, memory is not on
the level of episodic time. Rather,
it is the spiral movement that, through anecdotes and 
episodes, brings us back to the almost motionless 
constellation of potentialities that the narrative retrieves.
The end of the story is what equates the present with the 
past, the actual with the potential. The hero zswho he was.
(186)
This narrative repetition possesses a forward movement as well; it discloses "the 
complete retrieval in resoluteness o f . .  . inherited potentialities" (186). Spanos’ 
view of repetition as both a mnemonic and projective activity converges with 
Ricoeur’s. I’m not sure, however, that Spanos would appreciate the company.22
It seems to me that all of Percy’s novels display the type of narrative 
repetition that Ricoeur writes of. The Moviegoer, for example, begins with a 
"spiraling" and layering of memory. The first three paragraphs take the reader 
from the present of Binx’s receiving a note from his aunt to the memory of his 
brother’s death to the memory of going to a movie with Linda. Then Binx gives a 
description of his life in Gentilly. We are not brought back to the present until 
page eight. In those same pages, Binx introduces us to ideas of certification, the 
search, science, consumerism, and stoicism, all of which will find further 
elaboration and repetition as the novel progresses.
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Furthermore, the beginning and end both concern death, as does a good 
deal o f the "middle," although death of a different sort. Scott’s death is recounted 
in the beginning as a memory, and the epilogue recounts the story of Binx’s and 
Kate’s visit with Lonnie the day before his death. This account is also out o f 
sequence with the present of the epilogue. After Scott dies, Aunt Emily enjoins 
Binx to "act like a soldier" {MG 2), thus inviting him to become a "southern 
stoic." But Binx embraces a Christian view of death when Lonnie dies. One of 
Lonnie’s brothers asks Binx: "When Our Lord raises up [sic] on the last day, will 
Lonnie still be in a wheelchair or will he be like us?" "He’ll be like you," Binx 
responds {MG2\Q). Thus, while the two accounts repeat one another and provide 
a frame for the action of the novel, they do not establish a relationship of 
circularity and closure. Rather, their relation manifests the "retrieval of inherited 
potentialities" from the narrative itself. Binx tells us at one point that he is at 
home neither in his aunt’s stoicism nor his mother’s Catholicism. At the end, 
however, he recapitulates (and capitulates to) both of these "potentialities"—he 
goes to medical school as his aunt had wished, and he affirms a Christian view of 
death, and life. Thus, he is who he was, both the same and other. The end repeats 
the beginning, and to read this novel from the end foregrounds the wanderings 
Binx undergoes throughout the book. Just as Binx retrieves the "inherited
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potentialities" from the two sides of his family, the narrative retrieves its own 
possibilities into a configuration of pilgrimage.
Thus, the narrative repetition in The Moviegoer takes place on an even
larger scale. In "Physician as Novelist" (1989), which is itself a repetition of "From
Facts to Fiction," Percy reflects on his first novel:
The novel, almost by accident, became a narrative of the 
search, the quest. And so the novel, again almost by 
accident—or was it accident?—landed squarely in the oldest 
tradition of Western letters: the pilgrim’s search outside 
himself, rather than the guru’s search within. All this 
happened to the novelist and his character without the 
slightest consciousness of a debt to St. Augustine or Dante.
Indeed, the character creates within himself and within the 
confines of a single weekend in New Orleans a microcosm of 
the spiritual history of the West, from the Roman patrician 
reading his Greek philosophers to the thirteenth-century 
pilgrim who leaves home and takes to the road. (Signposts 
193)
The narrative inherits potentialities, then, not only from its own progression but 
from the tradition of Western letters as a whole. The Moviegoer retrieves those 
possibilities and, like metaphor which both retrieves and creates, which posits 
something derivative and original, the novel renders them anew so that reader and 
writer (hearer and namer) may come together in a new/old metaphor for 
themselves. In its own derivation and originality, The Moviegoer sings a new song 
about something very old—the status of humans as neither angels nor beasts, 
neither theorists nor consumers, but as wayfaring pilgrims.
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The same sort of narrative repetition takes place in The Second Coming, 
especially in Chapter III, where the story of the blue-dollar hawk recurs. The very 
recurrence in itself suggests the sort of retrieval Ricoeur writes of. Yet, as I hope 
to show, the retrieval of this particular episode in the larger configuration o f this 
particular novel proves especially fruitful.
The Second Coming, like The Thanatos Syndrome, is something of a 
paradox in the Percy corpus. For one thing, it seems that Percy never anticipated 
writing another story about Will Barrett. On February 8, 1977, he wrote to Foote: 
"The only thing I’m sure of is that I can’t do what you suggested, write a novel- 
type novel, the doings of Will Barrett after he leaves Santa Fe" (SHC). And to 
several interviewers after the book’s publication, Percy admitted that he was not 
aware that he was retelling the story of Will Barrett until he was a hundred or so 
pages into the novel (see Con 183, 188, 194, 229). Yet, this work, it seems, more 
than any other of Percy’s, not only returns to the earlier protagonist, but also 
presents itself as a "novel-type" novel. What I mean to say is that, while the work 
does not manifest an abandonment of his earlier view about the world of the 
traditional novel having passed away, it is nevertheless his most obviously 
structured and plotted work. The alternation of points of view from Will to Allie 
in the chapters of the first part and their coming together in Part Two manifest an 
unusual degree of structure for Percy. Furthermore, the "criss-cross" pattern of
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the book—Will’s "used up language" and Allie’s fresh language, Will’s memory 
and Allie’s amnesia, Will’s "sickness in health" and Allie’s "health in 
sickness"—likewise points to Percy’s concern with plot in this work. Moreover, 
the criss-cross structure itself demands a retrieval of the "plot" at the beginning of 
each new chapter, at least in Part One, since it alternates between the points of 
view of the two main characters.
After the book’s publication, Percy was fond of telling interviewers that 
The Second Coming was "the first unalienated novel since Tolstoy" (see Con 190, 
235), and this would seem to place it in the tradition of the "classical" novel. In a 
way, then, the book’s structure suggests the retrieval of the inherited potentialities 
of the traditional "novel-type" novel even as it works against such a generic 
conception of the novel. One would be hard-pressed to find characters such as 
Will and Allie in any traditional novel unless one bypasses Tolstoy to enter the 
world of Walter and Tristram Shandy. Nevertheless, the book does present a 
"sense of an ending" and resolution very much different from Percy’s previous 
works.
Now if one reads The Second Coming backwards, as Ricoeur suggests, 
from the perspective of its "ending," then one could return to almost any chapter 
to find the end repeated and embedded in the beginning. Yet, Chapter III, it 
seems to me, repeats more of Percy’s philosophical concerns and points both
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backward and forward in the novel to the themes and imagery that are themselves 
repeated. In Chapter III, Miller’s "complex tissue" of "repetition and repetitions 
within repetition" begins to manifest itself. The opening words of the chapter, for 
example—"undoubtedly something was happening to him" (40)—repeat the vague 
"something" that haunts the opening lines of the novel: "The first sign that 
something had gone wrong manifested itself while he was playing golf. Or rather 
it was the first time he admitted to himself that something might be wrong" (3). As 
the first chapter and the novel as a whole progress, the unusual "something," 
instead of gaining a simple clarification, becomes both clearer and more obscure. 
The definitions that presumably delimit this "something" offer only further 
possibilities. Is the something related to Will’s chemistry or is it part of the 
"farcical" lives he and his fellows seem to be living? Is it depression, or is it a 
normal response to a deranged world? The narrative raises but never responds 
directly to these questions.
The imagery of spraying or dispersion works in a similar fashion. The sand 
trap into which Will falls on the opening page is repeated in the "spraying sand" of 
Ed Cupp’s "skulled" sand shot in Chapter III (62). Both, however, are 
recapitulated in the locker-room bar, which is "dominated by a photomural of 
Jack Nicklaus blasting out of a sand trap" (11). The photomural, in turn, is itself 
repeated enough—significantly, in the penultimate sentence of Chapter III—to
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suggest its relation to Will’s memory of his father’s suicide. At the end of Chapter 
III, the narrator tells us that Will’s "entire life lay before him, beginning, middle, 
and end, as plain as the mural of Jack Nicklaus blasting out o f the sand trap" (72). 
But this information comes only after Will has begun to reconstruct (as one does 
when one views a mural) the hunting trip in Thomasville with his father, the "most 
important event of his life" (3). Just as the locker-room bar is dominated by the 
mural of Nicklaus, Will’s life is dominated by the memory of this hunting trip and 
his father’s death.
In the account of the hunting trip, the imagery of spraying recurs in the 
description of the father’s gunshot that was meant to kill the boy: "The boy saw 
the muzzle burst and flame spurting from the gun like a picture of a Civil War 
soldier shooting" (51). Later, as his father denies the true intent of his shot, he tells 
his son through D ’Lo (the maid): "I had no idea that savage [the shotgun] had a 
pattern that wide" (54). The "pattern" not only suggests the pattern of the book, 
but also patterns Will’s description of the suicide. It has, in a sense, become so 
wide as to pattern Will’s cosmos: "brain cells which together faltered and fell 
short, now flowered and flew apart, flung like stars around the whole dark 
world" (136).
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It is while Will lay in the sand trap, too, that "a strange bird flew past" (3).
The bird is not mentioned again until page forty-three, but there it is described in
terms very similar to those in "Metaphor as Mistake":
Earlier he had seen a bird, undoubtedly some kind of a hawk, 
fly across the fairway straight as an arrow and with 
astonishing swiftness, across a ridge covered by scarlet and 
gold trees, then fold its wings and drop like a stone into the 
woods. It reminded him of something but before he could 
think what it was, sparks flew forward at the comer of his 
eye. He decided with interest that something was happening 
to him, perhaps a breakdown, perhaps a stroke. (43)
Here, "straight as an arrow," "swift," and "drop like a stone into the woods" all
repeat the depiction of the hawk in Percy’s essay. But the description in the novel
joins the elusive "something" with which the book and the chapter begin, a
"something," moreover, that not only disperses Will’s thought, but also is itself
announced by "sparks," yet another image of "spraying." Repetition discloses
repetitions within repetition.
It is interesting to note, too, that the similes Percy employs to describe the 
hawk’s flight in both the essay and the novel are cliches. They are the sorts of 
comparisons that no longer reveal, but rather entomb. They are, in a sense, dead 
metaphors. A case could be made for Percy’s use of such dried up language in the 
essay. The main point of the blue-dollar hawk account, is, after all, to show that 
the sort of misnaming that happened to the young Percy is itself metaphor. Thus,
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the similes used in describing the bird’s flight are subservient, if you will, to the 
main type of misnaming that "blue-dollar hawk" manifests. An attempt to depict 
the bird’s flight through vivid metaphor might have detracted from the point of 
the essay. Can the same be said for the account in the novel?
The second mention of the hawk occurs just after Will sinks a putt, an
"eagle" putt. Something fowl is going on here! Despite the "something" that is
happening to him, Will still muses on and enacts the "small rites" of golf: "He was
of two minds, playing golf and at the same time wondering with no more than a
moderate curiosity what was happening to him" (43-4). The hawk, however,
was not of two minds. Single-mindedly it darted through the 
mountain air and dove into the woods. Its change of 
direction from level flight to drop was fabled. That is, it 
made him think of times when people told him fabulous 
things and he believed them. Perhaps a Negro had told him 
once that this kind of hawk is the only bird in the world that 
can—can what? He remembered. He remembered 
everything today. The hawk, the Negro said, could fly full 
speed and straight into the hole of a hollow tree and brake to 
a stop inside. He, the Negro, had seen one do it. It was 
possible to believe that the hawk could do just such a single- 
minded thing. (44)
The single-mindedness of the hawk retrieves elements of the account of the 
cat in Chapter I. The cat is "a hundred percent cat, no more no less"—i.e., o f one 
mind—but people are often only "two percent themselves"—i.e., dispersed (15). 
And Will’s double-mindedness repeals the effect of the play on personal pronouns
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in Allie’s "Instructions from Myself to Myself' (24), in which she writes these sorts 
of sentences: "It took me (you? us?) all my life to make the discovery. Why so 
long? And then I (you, we) had to go crazy to do it" (36). Will’s being of two 
minds also sets the stage for his meeting with Allie, his double, which takes place 
toward the end of the third chapter.
But the single-minded hawk and the double-minded Will also retrieve a 
major aspect o f Percy’s thought on language. Because of language, Percy argues, 
we experience a "semiotic fall," a consciousness of ourselves as knowers who can 
name and know everything in the world through the mediation of signs, 
everything, that is, except ourselves. With no name for the self, we are semiotically 
adrift, never quite ourselves. Since cats and hawks do not have language, they 
have not experienced the "fall" and thus are always one hundred percent 
themselves. That the single-minded hawk is also "fabled" furthers the complexity 
of the novel’s tissue.
From the Latin fabula, "a narrative, story," and fari, "to speak," "fabled" 
implies the hawk’s "storied" or "spoken" existence. Although labelled "wonderful" 
in Percy’s essay, the hawk is nowhere called "fabled." It becomes so only in the 
story about Will Barrett and in the story he reconstructs in his memory. Barrett’s 
memory, in fact, can be seen as both the subject and the agent of much of The 
Second Coming. Like Augustine, who, as Stephen Crites points out, tries to
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"collect" his "dispersed" memories into a coherent form, Barrett struggles against 
the dispersion of himself as a son of his "dispersed" father.24 He tries to "grasp 
together" a story that will "make sense" of both himself and his father. At one 
time, "fabled" suggests, this task was not so difficult. Barrett lived in a storied 
world: "when people told him fabulous things . . .  he believed them." Now, 
however, the only stories he hears are jokes, and what he hears is "not the joke, but
25the plan and progress of the joke," its structure (59). Barrett’s fabulous world 
has been shattered and, fittingly enough, it was shattered during his father’s 
attempt to repeat a "fabled" hunt (48).
But the fabled hawk and the fabled hunt do not imply the same thing. For 
the boy, "fabled" suggests a vivid metaphor, a time when language was not dead, 
when stories quickened the sense of the world. It repeats, in short, the repetition 
that is enacted in the aboriginal naming act. That is to say, it discloses the 
possibility of being. But in the "fabled" of the father’s hunt, one senses the 
entombment of language. Like Constantin Constantius’s failed attempt to repeat 
his trip to Berlin in Repetition, the father cannot repeat the legendary hunting trip:
This hunt had gone badly. The Negro guide was no good.
The dog had been trained badly. The lawsuit was not going 
well. They, the man and the boy, had spent a bad sleepless 
night in an old hotel (the same hotel where the man had
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spent the night before the great Thomasville hunt). The hotel 
was not at all as the man had remembered it. (48)
Here, "fabled" suggests the devolution of language, its capacity to do violence to
being. Instead of opening possibilities, "fabled" in the father’s case shuts
possibility off, expressed quite literally in the father’s attempt to kill both his son
and himself. Unable to reckon with—unable to "story"—change in time, the
father dispenses with language and memory in his cataclysmic self-dispersion. The
"how" and the "what" intermesh. The novel both retrieves its own "inherited
potentialities" and becomes the story of Barrett’s struggle against his own heritage.
One could even say that the rest of the book concerns Barrett’s search for a type of
dispersion that paradoxically unifies. The sexual nature of the father’s suicide—
"the penetration and union of perfect cold gunmetal into warm quailing mortal
flesh, the coming to end all coming" (136)—finds counter-expression in the
"comings" (sexual and otherwise) that bring Allie and Will together in their
difference.
It is interesting to note that at the time of the hawk’s third mention in the 
chapter, Barrett’s attitude toward the vague "something" that opens the novel has 
shifted. At first, the "something" seemed so dominant that "it occurred to him that 
he might shoot himself' (4). Yet, as I have already cited, when the hawk is 
mentioned a second time, the "something" holds only "a moderate curiosity" (44).
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By the time the narrative returns to the hawk, there is only a "mild stirring of 
curiosity. . . .  A little something or other was happening, but no more than that" 
(64). This shift seems to indicate Barrett’s preliminary movement outside himself 
and the first hint of his future possibility, for immediately following the 
description of the diminution of the "something," we are told that "one day he 
heard a footstep. Someone was coming" (64). At this point, of course, the 
"someone" is ambivalent. It could be the spectre of his father, who lures Barrett 
toward self-annihilation and thanatos. Or, it could be the call of erosr. in the very 
next section of the chapter, as he hunts for his errant golf balls in the woods, Will 
meets Allie for the first time.
The third mention of the hawk occurs just before their coming together. At
the same time he heard the footstep, he
saw the bird. A small cloud passed over the sun, the 
darkness settling so quickly it left the greens glowing. A 
hawk flew over, a dagger-winged falcon, its flight swift and 
single-minded and straight over the easy ambling golfers.
When it reached the woods it folded its wings as abruptly as 
if it had been shot and fell like a stone. (64)26
The "cloud" retrieves the one he noticed as he lay in the sand bunker on the novel’s
first page. There, it is one that "went towering thousands of feet into the air" and
that looked like the cloud "over Hiroshima" (4). Just as the nondescript
"something" has diminished, so have the proportions of the cloud. The rest of the
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hawk’s description is by now familiar: swift, straight, single-minded, fell like a 
stone. The distinguishing feature of this reference rests in the fact that the hawk is 
given a name. It is a dagger-winged falcon.
Artistic license surely allows Percy to change the names that appear in 
"Metaphor as Mistake"—"blue-dollar hawk" and "blue-darter hawk." But the 
character o f the name here seems more akin to the disappointing "description" the 
father gives the boy than it does to the more vivid and truer "name" the guide 
gives. "Dagger-winged," like "blue-darter," suggests a class o f bird, not its 
"inscape." If Will is awakening to the possibility of a future, if "someone is 
coming," and if the hawk is "fabled," then why would it be given a descriptive 
designation and not a name?
The important thing to remember here, it seems to me, is that Will is on a 
precipice. As the ambivalent use of "fabled" suggests, he is both on the verge of a 
nascent reawakening and caught up in the death-dealings of his father. Since I am 
reading the book backwards, however, since I am retrieving the inherited 
potentialities from the end, then what seems to be a description can be seen instead 
as a reawakening into language. Like Paul John Eakin’s tripartite analysis of 
Helen Keller’s entry into language, "dagger-winged" signifies Will’s nascent 
autobiographical act. First, it is an act of memory. Will remembers everything, 
the narrator says, and the name itself is part of this remembering. From this
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perspective, "dagger-winged" becomes a name on a par with "water." Second, it is 
an act o f language; experience is transformed into symbol. The hawk, before 
unnamed, is somehow formulated and set free under the auspices of "dagger­
winged." In the retrieval of this name from his memory, Will manifests the resolve 
to go on naming. This he does, not only in naming the before unnameable, as in 
the many "names of death" (246-48), but in his continued renaming, his 
reconstructing the "fable" of the hunting trip with his father. Third, it is a 
constitution of self. Will’s naming and renaming brings about "the second 
coming" of self with Allie. And finally, if I add the dimension of the future to 
Eakin’s triad, then the resolve to name further comes about by the grace of the 
"someone coming" to him. Having passed through the death of his father, Will 
now experiences the gain o f repetition. "Dagger-winged falcon," then, like The 
Second Coming, is both something new and something derived. The hawk repeats 
the story as told in Percy’s essay, but it introduces a new name. And the novel 
repeats itself so that it might grasp together the dispersed selves of Will and 
Allie—and the reader—into a new fable.
Percy was once asked in an interview if he was worried about repeating
himself in The Second Coming. He responded:
It’s been said that all novelists write the same novel over and 
over again. And since the kind of fiction I write is an
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exploration to begin with, all I can hope to do is push the 
boundaries back. I’m convinced that in The Second Coming 
there’s a definite advance. (Con 183-84)
Percy is right. There has been an advance; but it is an advance within a return. He
returns not only to his own work, but also to the tradition of letters in America.
Reflecting on the work of Herman Melville, Percy once gave passing praise to the
structuralists’s concept of intertextuality (Signposts 200). Moby Dick, Percy
writes, "was not only dedicated to Hawthorne, it was written at him" (200). He
goes on to point out the paradoxical way Melville characterized his experience
after writing his masterpiece. At once, Melville felt "broiled in hellfire" and
"spotless as a lamb." Percy notes that the paradox might be understood by what
Melville described as the "ineffable sociability" he felt: "Surely this is the key to
the paradox—the ineffable sociability in writing. Intertextuality, if you please. As
lonely as is the craft of writing, it is the most social of vocations" (200).
At whom did Percy write his works? With whom did he feel these ineffable 
sociabilities? The answer perhaps rests in the concept of repetition. Since his 
fiction is explorative in nature, Percy not only names something new for his 
reader, but also writes constantly at himself; he repeats himself. He pushes the 
boundaries back, while remaining within limitation nonetheless. W hat he says of 
Melville’s work is equally true of his own: "As the narrative unfolds, one becomes 
aware that in its very telling, something else is being told, a ghostly narrative of
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great import told by a ghostly self, perhaps one’s own shadow self' (201). The 
Second Coming repeats the story of Will Barrett, but it also repeats the account of 
the blue-dollar hawk, however transformed. That account, in turn, repeats the 
constitution of the self in metaphor, which as repetition repeats the mystery of 
language and narrative.
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Notes to Chapter Four
1. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1982) 3. Further references will be made 
parenthetically in the text.
2. It interesting to note that in his adulation of the coach horn, Constantin 
ostensibly wants to prove the impossibility of repetition. Yet, here again, 
Kierkegaard masters his irony. For the very difference in similarity (the 
instrument is the same instrument no matter how often one "wheedles" 
different notes from it) is precisely what repetition is all about.
3. "Walker Percy: The Novelist as Poet," Southern Review 17 (1981): 165.
4. See Ricoeur’s "Time and Narrative" Critical Inquiry 7(1980): 169-90.
5. "Walker Percy and the Resonance of the Word," Southern Quarterly 18
(1980): 47.
6. Following Percy’s lead in the Intermezzo section of Lost in the Cosmos, 
Lewis Lawson writes that the entry into language is a "fall." See "The 
Cross and the Delta: Walker Percy’s Anthropology," in Jan Nordby 
Gretlund and Karl-Heinz Westarp, eds., Walker Percy: Novelist and 
Philosopher (Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1991) 3-12.
7. The Philosophy o f Existentialism (New York: The Citadel Press, 1956) 22.
8. Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus o f Meaning (Fort 
Worth, Texas: Texas Christian UP, 1976) 50. Future citations will be made 
parenthetically in the text.
9. 3 vols. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1984, 1986, 1988). Here, I refer to 
Ricoeur’s tripartite development of "figuration, configuration, and 
refiguration."
10. "Symbol" here refers to "sign." In this essay, Percy used the vocabulary of 
Cassirer and Langer instead of Saussure.
11. "Resonance of the Word" 47.
12. In his perceptive article which I have already cited, Charles Bigger 
emphasizes the fact that Percy’s stress on the name serves precisely this 
purpose—to reinstate the strangeness of being.
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13. Here, Percy’s thought would seem to converge with that of Jacques 
Derrida, especially Derrida’s critique of the traditional view of language as 
making present some prior transcendent and Platonic "idea." Of course, 
there are serious differences as well. Whereas Percy wants to maintain a 
connection between identity and difference, transcendence and immanence, 
and incarnation (understood here as a simultaneous, "always already" 
indwelling of transcendence and immanence), Derrida heralds difference 
and would seem to cut off the possibility of transcendence.
14. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985) 181-2. The chapter I have in mind is 
Chapter Four: "Self-Invention in Autobiography: The Moment of 
Language." Further citations will be made parenthetically in the text.
15. Metaphors o f Self: The Meaning ofAutobiography (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1972).
16. It may also be useful for readers to look again at Keller’s description of this 
moment. I have quoted the entire passage in note 14 of Chapter Two.
17. This passage comes from Jonathan Culler (quoted in Eakin 224), "Jacques 
Derrida" in John Sturrock’s Structuralism and Since: From Levi-Strauss to 
Derrida (New York: Oxford UP, 1981) 169-70.
18. In the forward to Henry Kisor’s remarkable autobiography, What’s That 
Pig Outdoors? A Memoir o f Deafness (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 
Percy calls Kisor’s work "a moving account from a novel perspective of the 
universal experience, which most of us take for granted, of the human 
breakthrough into language" (viii). Certainly, this same phenomenon is 
what so captivates him about Helen Keller’s The Story o f M y Life. Thus, 
just as he reads Keller’s Life as a metaphor of the acquisition of language, 
that is what strikes him about Kisor’s work.
19. I am, of course, following William Rodney Allen’s reading of Percy’s work, 
though not his nonfiction, in light of the "father." See Walker Percy: A 
Southern Wayfarer (Jackson, UP of Mississippi, 1986).
20. Percy refers to Barth’s comment in an interview with Carlton Cremeens in 
1968 (see Con 24-25). There, he seems to contradict his earlier statement in 
"From Facts to Fiction": "John Barth said it was no longer possible to 
write nineteenth-century novels, a novel which has the usual characters 
where the characters interact, where there is a story line, a development of
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plot, a resolution—a classical novel. I’m not sure I agree with him." Percy 
qualifies this statement by saying that he would agree with Barth to the 
extent that the view of the world which the "classical" novel reflects has 
now passed away.
21. I borrow the term from Paul Ricoeur’s "Narrative Time." See note number 
4 above. I will make further citations to this article parenthetically in the 
text.
22. Ricoeur’s comments in this article are anticipated (and strangely 
corroborated), especially with regard to memory, in Stephen Crites’ "The 
Narrative Quality of Experience," which originally appeared in the Journal 
o f the American Academy o f Religion 34 (September 1971): 291-311, and 
which is reprinted in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, eds., Why 
Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989) 65-88.
23. See Lewis Lawson’s "Walker Percy’s Southern Stoic," in Following Percy: 
Essays on Walker Percy’s Work (Troy, New York: The Whitston 
Publishing Company, 1988)41-63.
24. "The Narrative Quality of Experience" 74.
25. It is noteworthy that Jimmy Rogers, the joke-teller in this scene, is 
described as being "all plans and schemes and deals" (59). The idea of 
plans is repeated in Chapter IV, when the narrator recounts Allie’s 
struggles against the "plans" of her mother, her father, and Dr. Duk (89- 
94). She decides to make her own plans: "What if /m ake  plans for me" 
(96). This resolve to act on her own carries over into her renovation of the 
greenhouse and stove. The idea of plans, furthermore, finds a place in the 
later chapters of the book when Leslie makes plans for Will and Will and 
Allie make plans for themselves.
26. Some parallels between the account of the hawk and that of the peregrine 
falcon in The Last Gentleman suggest an even more complex tissue of 
repetition—i.e., woods/park, gun/telescope, "something'V'sign."
Chapter Five
Coda: Autobiography, Repetition 
and Percy
I am having the uncomfortable feeling of having at last been 
stuck in my slot—as a "Christian Existentialist." I hear sighs 
of relief all over: now that they know what I am, they don’t 
have to worry about me.
—Walker Percy to Shelby Foote 
January 29, 1979 (SHC)
Speaking at a memorial service in honor of Walker Percy at St. Ignatius
Church in New York City, Robert Giroux commented:
We come here today to honor the memory and the work of 
Walker Percy, a superb novelist, a distinguished man of 
letters, a witty and searching critic, a great American. If I 
resist the adjective Southern, I am only following Dr. Percy’s 
example.1
Toward the end of his eulogy, however, Giroux dramatically sums up Percy’s life 
and work with two words which seem to emphasize the very Southernness he 
earlier resisted: "[Percy] was truly a man for all seasons, whose life and work 
exemplified that pair of concepts all too rare today—probity and honor." Despite 
the fact that the South has never been the sole proprietor of these virtues, Giroux 
nevertheless seems to link the two, the region and the qualities. He had earlier
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referred to Colonel John Pelham’s appearance in Percy’s witty, "The Last Phil 
Donahue Show" in Lost in the Cosmos.2 There, Giroux characterizes Pelham as 
"a Confederate officer, representing probity and honor." Thus, while he refrains 
from the label in his opening remarks, he nevertheless seems to place Percy 
squarely in the South in his closing ones.
Giroux’s wavering signals something students o f Percy often encounter: 
the difficulty they have in placing him. This difficulty, furthermore, seems to be 
related to the category of repetition. If it is true that repetition as inter esse finds a 
prominent place in Percy’s works, then it may not be surprising that Percy himself 
resisted labels. Labels foreclose possibility; they demand an adherence, one might 
say, to a prescribed proscription. That is, they place the abstract before the 
concrete. They make of the self a neat, rounded-off package. Percy not only 
resisted the label "Southern," he also resisted "professional," "philosopher," and 
"linguistician." He did so, moreover, despite his having spent almost forty years of 
his life thinking and writing about the unique phenomenon of language.
In Chapter Two, I suggested that such a resistance might indicate what I 
called Percy’s methodology of repetition. Not only did Percy return time and 
again to his "extra-literary" pursuit, but the posture of the nonprofessional, "being 
between," allowed him a fresh view of what "professional specializations" can too 
often foreclose in jargon and theoretical apparatus. Percy, thus, took the posture
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of the genuine researcher, not the technician. As he writes in "The Loss of the 
Creature":
The technician . . . [is] always offended by the genuine 
research man because the latter is usually a little vague and 
always humble before the thing; he doesn’t have much use 
for the equipment or the jargon. Whereas the technician is 
never vague and never humble before the thing; he holds the 
thing disposed of by the principle, the formula, the textbook 
outline, and he thinks a great deal o f equipment and jargon.
(MB 61)
Such a researcher is not entirely different from Binx Bolling, who although not 
disposed to the "pure research" of science as his Aunt Emily seems to think, 
nevertheless goes out into the world and "doesn’t miss a trick." Such a researcher 
is, in short, a homo viator.
"Research" itself derives from the Middle French recercher which means 
"to travel through, survey." Both words, thus, indicate a posture of wandering or 
wayfaring. As I tried to show in Chapters One and Two, homo viator is a label 
that both limits and opens possibility. The same could be said for research. As an 
exploration, its posture is similar to that of homo viator—i.e., it places one "no­
place." When all is said and done, there is always more to be said and done.
There will always be those who go back to retrieve the inherited possibilities of the 
researcher’s work. One’s place never really solidifies; one is always displaced.
Like homo viator, then, research is a label that resists labelling.
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Despite his status as a researcher, Percy nevertheless used his own sort of 
tools, notably essays and novels. And the "thing" he explores in both his fiction 
and nonfiction is really "no-thing"—i.e., the self which places itself in the world in 
and through language. Without the breakthrough into language, Percy argues, the 
self has no world. Already, the sort of reflexivity I mentioned in the last chapter 
reveals itself. For Percy uses language to get at the self that is always and already 
immeshed in a world of language. The medium which is his tool is also the 
medium whose relation to the self and world he explores. Because the self and 
language are inextricably joined, one can step back from neither.
Yet, because of language, the self develops a self-consciousness o f itself.
And what it experiences is a sense of its own displacement in language. The self 
cannot place itse/Zas it places other things and so it wanders, in search of a place 
that would quell the anxiety of its fundamental displacement. Percy’s writing 
bears the indelible imprint of a self-consciously wandering self. It speaks of his 
own self and life, however transformed either may be in the final product. In his 
writing, as I suggest at the end of the last chapter, Percy repeats himself. Even an 
ostensibly "scientific" essay such as "Metaphor as Mistake" traces the attenuated 
links of a self who is both different and same—the "I" of the present writer, and 
the "boy" around whose experience the writer frames part of his argument.
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Repetition, thus, becomes necessary. Percy tries time and again in both the
novels and the essays to come at his displacement in a new way. In a
Faulkneresque comment to Linda Whitney Hobson, Percy said that his work up
to that point (1981) had been a failure:
I think I’ve failed in these five novels and in The Message in 
the Bottle, but I’ve got a good idea for the next one. You 
know, I’ll tell you a secret: I think the only thing that keeps 
the novelist going (and I’m sure that any other novelist 
would admit this) is that you are going to do the really big 
one.
Unlike Faulkner, Percy does not say that his works are "splendid failures."
Rather, the impression he creates is that he forgets his previous failures to go after 
the "big one." Whether Percy ever wrote the big one (the great novel) is not for me 
to say. Readers must decide for themselves. Instead, the phrase itself intrigues 
me. If it is taken not solely as a compound noun—i.e., the masterwork—but as a 
noun modified by an adjective—i.e., the big ONE—then Percy’s comment suggests 
a search for the unity of repetition.
In this regard, his works begin with himself as a denizen of the postmodern 
world who experiences himself as displaced in language, and they return to himself 
as somehow unified, however tentatively—else why continue to go after the big 
one?—in the difference of writing. In his writing, Percy repeats his life and his self 
in the hope of creating the unity of self, life, and writing, which is autobiography.
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But just as autos, bios, and graphein are different elements of one word, so the 
self, life, and writing of Percy do not find a simple unity. The self and the life are 
both different from and the same as the writing which portrays them. Yet, as I 
suggested in the last chapter, they find a reconciliation in the difference of 
metaphor. Percy’s works begin and end as "autobiography," which, like "novel," 
is also a label that resists labelling.
Using the works of three critics in James Olney’s collection,
Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical? Joseph Fichtelberg categorizes 
three approaches to the problem of the relation between self, life, and writing: 
"Olney’s unity, Renza’s difference, and Sprinker’s multiplicity are the three 
possible responses to the problem of the subject in autobiography."4 Does the self 
find unity in the telling of its story? Does it forever differ from the story told? Or 
does it endlessly multiply itself (and eventually evaporate) in the telling? I have 
tried to show that in reading Percy’s work as autobiographical repetition, "Yes" 
seems to be the answer to all three. I do not mean to be overly paradoxical here. 
W hat I suggest is that my reading of Percy’s works in light of autobiography has 
been an attempt to de-struct the necessity of seeing autobiography as falling within 
the exclusive limits of one or the other school. All three "trouble with," as Olney 
puts it, "the self and consciousness and knowledge of it."5 And Percy’s works 
trouble with these same issues. His research brought him face to face with the
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predicament of the postmodern attitude, and although I have read his works in a
postmodern light, Percy himself seemed to have retreated from fully embracing its
tenets. Thus, his transformation of experience into art calls forth at once all three
views of the relation between self, life, and writing. Percy’s place remains elusive.
In the errant label that autobiography provides, he seeks a place for the self whose
only place is provided by the travelling of research. His research returns him—and
the reader—to the label "homo viator."
In her talk at the memorial service in New York City, Eudora Welty spoke
about Percy’s novels as an exercise in defamiliarization:
On first reading a novel by Walker Percy, we might rather 
soon ask ourselves, Where are we? Where in the world is he 
taking us? . . .  What was until a moment ago a familiar time 
and place (even, perhaps, "Southern") is signalling "Danger!"
Where is Walker Percy taking us?
We are still at home. But home lies before us in a different 
light, and its face is turned toward a new perspective, but it’s 
still where we live. Only we may have altered.
Percy takes us somewhere that seems familiar yet is really strange. In so doing, he
ends his exploration in the place it began. He returns us to ourselves so that we
know ourselves to be both at home and not at home, at the place of exploration,
the no-place of the self whose life is a wandering in the strangeness of language
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and writing. The unity of Percy’s self, life, and writing derives from the strange 
unity o f repetition and the limited possibility of autobiography.
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1. Walker Percy: J916-1990 (New York: Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1991). 
There are no page numbers in this booklet. Besides Giroux, other speakers 
included Shelby Foote, Stanley Kauflfmann, Patrick Samway, S.J., Mary 
Lee Settle, Wilfrid Sheed, and Eudora Welty. I will make further references 
to this booklet by citing the particular speaker.
2. In his talk, Giroux mistakenly calls him "Palmer."
3. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980).
4. Fichtelberg makes this comment in his The Complex Image: Faith and
Method in American Autobiography (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 
1989) 4. Fichtelburg also points to repetition—"obsessive rewriting"— as 
providing a key to understanding autobiography. Yet whereas he uses 
Nietzsche as his guide, I have followed Kierkegaard and Percy. The articles 
Fichtelburg refers to are Olney’s "Some Versions of Memory/Some 
Versions of Bios"; Louis Renza’s "The Veto of the Imagination: A Theory 
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5. "Autobiography and the Cultural Moment," in Autobiography: Essays 
Theoretical and Critical, 23.
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